44th

BI-ANNUAL REPORT OF COSAC

Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny



COSAC Chairpersons' meeting in Copenhagen 3-4 July 2025. Photo: Folketinget



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BACKGROUND

This is the Forty-Fourth Bi-annual Report from the COSAC Secretariat.

COSAC Bi-annual Reports

The XXX COSAC decided that the COSAC Secretariat should produce factual Bi-annual Reports, to be published ahead of each ordinary meeting of the Conference. The purpose of the Reports is to give an overview of the developments in procedures and practices in the European Union that are relevant to parliamentary scrutiny.

All the Bi-annual Reports are available on the IPEX website, either by accessing this <u>overview</u> or by navigating to the respective <u>meeting</u>.

The three chapters of this Bi-annual Report are based on information provided by the national Parliaments of the European Union Member States and the European Parliament. The deadline for submitting replies to the questionnaire for the 44th Bi-annual Report was 15 September 2025.

The outline of this Report was adopted by the meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC, held on 3-4 July 2025, in Copenhagen.

As a general rule, the Report does not refer to all Parliaments or Chambers that have responded to a given question. Instead, illustrative examples are used.

Please note that, in some cases, respondents are able to provide more than one answer to multiple choice questions. This may explain any perceived disparity in the total number of answers to a question and the total number of respondents can thus be accounted for.

Complete replies, received from 39 national Parliaments/Chambers of 27 Member States and of the European Parliament, can be found in the annex on the <u>COSAC section</u> on the IPEX website.

Note on Numbers

Of the 27 Member States of the European Union, 15 have a unicameral Parliament and 12 have a bicameral Parliament. Due to this combination of unicameral and bicameral systems, there are 39 national parliamentary Chambers in the 27 Member States of the European Union.

Although they have bicameral systems, the national Parliaments of Austria, Ireland and Spain each submit a single set of replies to the questionnaire, therefore the maximum number of respondents per question is 37, including the European Parliament. There were 37 responses to the questionnaire.

ABSTRACT

Chapter 1: Simplification of EU legislation and fast track procedures

The first chapter of the 44th Bi-annual Report deals with several questions concerning how national Parliaments scrutinise EU legislation adopted with a fast-track procedure.

In the first question Parliaments/Chambers were thus asked if they had procedures in place which enabled them to scrutinise such proposals. Twenty-one Parliaments/Chambers answered that they did not have such parliamentary procedures in place, while 16 replied that they did. Parliaments/Chambers that had replied positively were then asked to briefly describe these parliamentary procedures; 11 of 16 noted that in fact there was no separate "fast track" procedure; rather, the general procedure for the scrutiny of EU legislative procedures was applied with necessary adaptations. The respondents were then further asked to outline the main challenges connected with scrutinising fast-track procedures. Responses highlighted, among other things, organisational challenges, lack of influence over the procedure, and a general perceived weakening of democratic oversight and accountability in a fast-track procedures.

Parliaments/Chambers were also asked if they may adopt opinions as a result of the monitoring procedure in these cases; 28 out of 34 replied yes.


The following four questions concerned parliamentary involvement and scrutiny in a number of Omnibus packages adopted by the European Commission in 2025: sustainability (Question 3); investment simplification (Question 4); agricultural simplification (Question 5); and small mid-caps and removal of paper requirements (Question 6). Parliaments/Chambers were asked to indicate whether they had been consulted by their governments on these proposals (and if so, at what level), if their governments had published explanatory memoranda or similar, and lastly, in case they had not scrutinised the proposals, Parliaments/Chambers were asked to explain why.

Following these case questions, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they thought that the EU institutions should set up clear criteria for the use of fast-track decision-making on EU legislative proposals. Out of the 29 Parliaments/Chambers that replied to the question, 22 answered yes. Asked to further elaborate if they thought that certain minimum conditions should be met to allow fast-track decision making, several proposals were put forward. Some recurring themes were a) the need for clear criteria for the use of the mechanism and transparency throughout the process; b) that fast-track procedures should be justified, demonstrable or defined; c) and that the deadlines for subsidiarity checks should in any case be respected. Some Parliaments/Chambers also elaborated on how they thought that the conditions for the use of fast-track procedures should be regulated, and some proposed that the fast-track procedures should be evaluated. Following this Parliaments/Chambers were also given the opportunity to provide more general comments on the use of fast-track procedures, which 18 Parliaments/Chambers did, providing a broad range of comments.

Lastly, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had ever experienced that their government had not fulfilled its obligation towards the Parliament/Chamber due to a fast-track procedure. Four Parliaments/Chambers indicated that this had happened.

The first chapter ends with three questions regarding administrative resources in national Parliaments available to support members and committees in carrying out parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislative proposals.

Parliaments/Chambers were asked to indicate the overall number of staff employed in their administrations in charge of providing EU-related assistance to Members of Parliament and parliamentary committees. The results are visible in the chart below.



Parliaments/Chambers were also asked to indicate where in the administration the employees worked, and lastly what main services the administration provided to Members of Parliament and committees in their work with EU affairs questions. To the first of these questions, a majority indicated that employees were affiliated to the EU Affairs Committee, and to the second that research and background notes to committees on EU legislative proposals was the most commonly chosen option.

Chapter 2: Transparency and access to documents

The second chapter concerns transparency and national Parliaments' access to information about EU legislative activities, via the EU institutions and via their respective governments.


In the first question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they use the Council Information Exchange Platform (CIxP) to get access to non-public Council documents. A vast majority (28 of 35) replied no. Those who did reply that they use the platform were also asked what kind of documents they could access – WK-documents (Working), ST-documents (Standard), and CM-documents (Communication). All but one had access to all the three types.

Parliaments/Chambers were then asked what categories of classified Council documents they had access to, ranging from the level Restricted via Confidential and Secret to Top secret – or none of these. Twenty-three Parliaments/Chambers replied that they have access to none of these levels. In a follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked from whom and how they got access to these documents; many of the replied clarified that Parliaments/Chambers have access to Council documents via their government.

The next question concerned access to interinstitutional documents related to trilogue negotiations, for example the so-called four column document. Twenty-six responded that they do not have access to this kind of document. Eight indicated that they had access to them, and some provided additional information under this point.

Following this, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they use the new institutional database called the EU Law Tracker. To this, 16 replied yes and 19 no.

The next part of the chapter concerns background information on EU matters supplied by governments. Parliaments/Chambers were asked about the amount of EU related documents they receive annually from their government. The results are indicated below.



They were also asked what type of EU-related documents their governments prepared and submitted to the Parliament/Chamber. Twenty-six of 33 indicated that they receive explanatory memoranda, and 15 mentioned non-papers produced or co-signed by their government in key policy areas.


The last section of the second chapter deals with the use of the IPEX webpage. All Parliaments/Chambers indicated that their staff use IPEX to gain information from other Parliaments/Chambers. Respondents were also invited to provide suggestions on functionalities in IPEX that could be improved, which generated a lot for replies. These rather concrete suggestions focused on improving a) the general functionality and user experience, b) search tools and navigation; c) alerts and notifications; d) interoperability and integration and e) access to documents and content quality.

In the last question, Parliaments/Chambers were also invited to provide any further observations and proposals on these topics, which a bit more than a handful did.

<u>Chapter 3: Should the political dialogue with the European Commission include a green card?</u>

The last chapter of the 44th Bi-annual Report contains several questions related to the idea of a so-called green card procedure, as well as the political dialogue with the European Commission in general.

In the first question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether or not they made use of the direct political dialogue with the Commission over the past year. Twenty-nine of 37 confirmed that they did so. Asked to clarify how they engaged in the political dialogue, 23 indicated that they did so by submitting an opinion on a legislative proposal, 22 did so by inviting a Commissioner to address their parliament or a committee, and eight had submitted enquiries in writing to the Commission. Five went on to describe how they had engaged in political dialogue through various means. The following question concerned how many times the Parliaments/Chambers had made use of three different modes of political dialogue in the course of the past year, namely: a) number of opinions sent to the Commission on an EU legislative proposal or other relevant EU initiatives; b) number of enquiries in writing submitted to the Commission regarding EU legislative proposals and Commission consultation documents and c) number of meetings with a Commissioner that were held in Parliaments or a parliamentary committee. The results are illustrated below.



Next, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether, over the past five years, they had taken the initiative to invite the Commission to act at the European level in a particular policy field. Twelve respondents confirmed that they had done so, and also provided brief descriptions of the policy areas in which they had done so and whether or not it had been done jointly with other national Parliaments.

The question was then put to Parliaments/Chambers whether they believed that the existing political dialogue between national Parliaments and the Commission should be expanded through a green card mechanism, which would give national Parliaments a right to request the Commission to act in a particular policy field. Twenty-nine replied to this question, out of which 23 supported the idea. Those who had replied positively were also asked to specify how such a mechanism should work, in their opinion. Most underlined in general terms that such a mechanism could strengthen the role of national Parliaments, enhance democratic legitimacy and enable national Parliaments to play a more proactive and constructive role. Most of the respondents also thought that establishing a minimum threshold would be necessary to trigger the mechanism. Some Parliaments/Chambers also pointed out that such a change would, in their view, necessitate a Treaty revision; some referred to the conclusions of the COSAC working group on the role of national Parliaments established in 2022, and some asked for the question to be further discussed during a COSAC plenary meeting.

In the last question of the report, Parliaments/Chambers were invited to share any additional proposals on how to strengthen the political dialogue. Nineteen Parliaments/Chambers submitted replies to this request, with varying levels of detail. Some themes that emerged were a) the need for earlier and more structural involvement of national Parliaments in the EU legislative process; b) a call for stronger engagement from the European Commission with national Parliaments by participation in interparliamentary activities including by physical representation at COSAC meetings; c) a strengthened role for national Parliaments in monitoring the compliance with the subsidiarity principle through an extension of the eight week deadline; d) development and strengthening of existing interparliamentary cooperation and IPEX, to name a few.

CHAPTER ONE

SIMPLIFICATION OF EU LEGISLATION AND FAST TRACK PROCEDURES

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE 44th BI-ANNUAL REPORT takes as its departing point the observation that the European Commission's work programme for 2025 has a strong focus on simplification. It includes a series of Omnibus packages and other simplification proposals to tackle EU priority areas. The Commission invites the European Parliament and the Council to consider fast-tracking these files. The chapter examines whether and how EU national Parliaments manage to scrutinise such proposals when they are being adopted by the European Parliament and Council under fast-track procedures.

The chapter also contains an addendum (questions 10-12), which looks at how Members and Committees of Parliaments are supported by the parliamentary administration when it comes to assisting them in carrying out parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislative proposals. The addendum is informed by the <u>Draghi report on EU competitiveness</u>, in which it is suggested that initiatives should be taken to reinforce the role of national Parliaments and Member States in controlling the EU institutions' legislative activity, including by further supporting the administrative capacity of national Parliaments.

1. In the first question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether they had parliamentary procedures in place which enabled them to scrutinise EU legislative proposals that were adopted under fast-track procedures in the EU decision-making process. All Parliaments/Chambers replied to this question. Twenty-one Parliaments/Chambers answered that they did not have such parliamentary procedures in place, while 16 replied that they did.

The Parliaments/Chambers that had replied positively were then asked to briefly describe the parliamentary procedures that enabled them to scrutinise EU legislative proposals adopted under fast-track procedures.

Eleven Parliaments/Chambers (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and Swedish *Riksdag*) noted that there was no separate "fast track" procedure; rather, the general procedure for the scrutiny of EU legislative procedures was applied with necessary adaptations. Examples of this included: the government submitting its communication to the parliament on these proposals faster (Finnish *Eduskunta*), a fast-track referral to a committee (German *Bundestag*) or an earlier meeting of the relevant parliamentary body (Spanish *Cortes Generales*).

In the five Parliaments/Chambers that had specific mechanisms allowing them to scrutinise EU legislative proposals adopted under fast-track procedures, the Czech Senát noted that, in fasttrack procedure cases the plenary is not involved, and the resolution of the European Affairs Committee constitutes the opinion of the Senate (while under normal procedure, resolutions on draft EU legislative acts must be adopted by the plenary). The French Assemblée nationale explained that in fast-track procedures it is the committee secretariat that drafts a resolution for the validation or rejection of the concerned proposal and submits this to the two appointed rapporteurs and the President of the European Affairs Committee. For its part, the French Sénat noted that in fast-track procedures it is asked by the government for an early lifting of objections to the proposal. The Polish Sejm indicated that, in fast-track procedures, the European Affairs Committee is expected to examine the document at the earliest possible session. If this is not possible due to the short deadlines fixed at the EU level, the Council of Ministers (i.e., the government) may adopt a position without seeking the opinion of the Sejm (except in cases where the Council shall act unanimously or where the proposal imposes a significant burden on the state budget). In these urgent cases, the Council of Ministers shall immediately present the official government position to the committee, along with its reasons for not requesting an opinion. At the EU level, the European Parliament noted that Rule 170 allows for the adoption of an urgent decision, based on a report from the responsible committee, to be given priority on the agenda and in a simplified procedure. This is an efficient route where there is a clear political majority to approve a particular text without amendment, or limited amendments, including when part of an Omnibus package.

In a second follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers were further asked to outline the main challenges connected with scrutinising fast-track procedures. The question was answered by 16 Parliaments/Chambers.

A first set of challenges related to the organisational challenges linked to the short time available. The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and Spanish *Cortes Generales* noted that there are often no meetings of the relevant committee foreseen to take place in the indicated period. The Polish *Sejm* noted as an obstacle that no internal procedure exists for formally accepting the chamber's opinions in writing. The French *Sénat* and German *Bundesrat* for their part pointed out the fact that, in fast-track procedures, EU documents are not translated and are only available in English.

Six Parliaments/Chambers (Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, German *Bundesrat*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and Swedish *Riksdag*) also pointed to the lack of influence of national Parliaments in the procedure, given that in fast-track procedures the Council may agree on its position before the deadline for subsidiarity scrutiny has expired, or before committees have submitted their opinions.

Lastly, some Parliaments/Chambers (Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta* and Lithuanian *Seimas*) referred more generally to the weakening of the democratic oversight and accountability in a fast-track procedure, as Parliaments/Chambers do not have time to scrutinise and debate the proposal very thoroughly and there is less time for expert hearings.

2. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked **whether they may adopt opinions as a result of the monitoring procedure**. The question was answered by 34 Parliaments/Chambers.

Twenty-eight Parliaments/Chambers replied affirmatively, while six indicated that they may not adopt an opinion as a result of the monitoring procedure (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Latvian *Saeima*, and Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*).

The 28 Parliaments/Chambers that had indicated that they may adopt an opinion were then asked **if the opinions of the committee were binding** for the government.

Eleven Parliaments/Chambers answered affirmatively: the Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Danish *Folketing*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Romanian *Camera Deputaților*, Romanian *Senat* and the Slovak *Národná rada*. The remaining 17 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the opinions were not binding for the government.

3-6. In the following four questions, the Parliaments/Chambers were asked about their involvement and scrutiny in a number of Omnibus packages adopted by the European Commission in 2025: sustainability (Question 3); investment simplification (Question 4); agricultural simplification (Question 5); and small mid-caps and removal of paper requirements (Question 6).


3. Parliaments/Chambers were first asked whether they had been consulted by the respective government on the first Omnibus package on sustainability (COM(2025)80, COM(2025)81 and COM(2025)87). The German *Bundestag* and the European Parliament did not answer this question.

Twenty Parliaments/Chambers answered that the government had consulted them *prior* to the Council's approval of its position.

Four Parliaments/Chambers (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, German *Bundesrat*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés* and Polish *Senat*) replied that the government had consulted them *after* the Council's approval of its position.

Eleven Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had not been consulted at all: the Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, French Assemblée nationale, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati,

Portuguese Assembleia da República, Romanian Camera Deputaţilor and the Spanish Cortes Generales.




The Parliaments/Chambers that had been consulted were then asked to specify at what level. Fourteen of them noted this was done at the level of the European Affairs Committee (Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Czech Senát, Danish Folketing, French Sénat, German Bundesrat, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Italian Camera dei Deputati, Lithuanian Seimas, Polish Sejm, Polish Senat, Slovak Národná rada, Slovenian Državni zbor and Spanish Cortes Generales). Four Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the consultation was done at the level of the relevant sectoral committee: the Dutch Eerste Kamer, Dutch Tweede Kamer, Irish Houses of the Oireachtas and the Romanian Senat. Eight Parliaments/Chambers provided additional information. Seven of them (Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat, Estonian Riigikogu, Finnish Eduskunta, Italian Senato della Repubblica, Lithuanian Seimas, Slovenian Državni svet and Swedish Riksdag) indicated that both the European Affairs Committee and the relevant sectoral committee had been consulted. The German Bundestag informed that the consultation was done through the parliamentary information platform on EU matters, which serves all Members of Parliament.

In a second follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether their respective governments provided the Parliament/Chamber with an explanatory memorandum or any other written or oral information on the dossier. Twenty-two Parliaments/Chambers replied that, yes, this information had been provided in accordance with their normal obligations. The French Assemblée nationale indicated that no information had been provided. Three Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other" (Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati and Spanish Cortes Generales). The Spanish Cortes Generales explained that the government did not consult Parliament in the referred initiatives, but that, in accordance with the regulations and usual practice, the Joint Committee for EU Affairs adopted resolutions regarding the compliance of each of the three proposals included in the first Omnibus package

on sustainability with the principle of subsidiarity. The three resolutions considered the proposals to be in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

The Parliaments/Chambers that had not scrutinised the first Omnibus package on sustainability were asked to explain the reasons. Five Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon and Romanian Camera Deputatilor) responded that the proposal was not planned to be examined (e.g. it was not part of the selected list of priorities or was otherwise not chosen for scrutiny for normal reasons). The Croatian Hrvatski sabor indicated that the proposal should have been examined, but it was not consulted by the government. Five Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other". The Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati noted that the government had not yet sent its position on the mentioned dossiers. The Luxembourg Chambre des Députés noted that only one of the proposals had been received by Parliament, and there had been no consultation with the government. The French Assemblée nationale informed that no information dossier had been received and that the proposal had not been the subject of any proposal for a resolution from any Member of Parliament either. The Portuguese Assembleia da República explained that the government was not obliged to consult parliament regarding these matters, and that, furthermore, due to the legislative elections that took place on 18 May 2025, it had not been possible to scrutinise these European initiatives under the usual parliamentary procedure.

4. Parliaments/Chambers were then **asked if they had been consulted by their respective governments on the second Omnibus package on investment simplification** (COM(2025)84). The European Parliament did not answer this question.



Twenty-one Parliaments/Chambers answered that the government had consulted them *prior* to the Council's approval of its position.

The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* indicated that the government had consulted it *after* the Council's approval of its position.

Fourteen Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had not been consulted: the Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/ Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Estonian Riigikogu, French Assemblée nationale, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, Portuguese Assembleia da República, Romanian Camera Deputaţilor, Slovak Národná rada and the Spanish Cortes Generales.

The Parliaments/Chambers that had been consulted were then asked to specify at what level. Ten of them (Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Danish Folketing, French Sénat, German Bundesrat, Italian Camera dei Deputati, Latvian Saeima, Polish Sejm, Polish Senat, Romanian Senat and Slovenian Državni zbor) replied that this was done at the level of the European Affairs Committee. The Dutch Eerste Kamer and Dutch Tweede Kamer replied that the consultation had been done at the level of the relevant sectoral committee. Eleven Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other". Six of them (Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat, Finnish Eduskunta, Italian Senato della Repubblica, Lithuanian Seimas, Slovenian Državni svet and Swedish Riksdag) indicated that both the European Affairs Committee and relevant sectoral committees had been consulted. The Czech Senát indicated that the consultation involved the European Affairs Committee and the plenary. As in the previous question, the German Bundestag referred to the parliamentary information platform on EU matters. Also, the Spanish Cortes Generales noted that the government did not consult it, but that the Joint Committee for EU Affairs adopted a resolution wherein it considered the proposal to be compliant with the principle of subsidiarity.


A second follow-up question was whether their respective governments had provided the Parliament/Chambers with an explanatory memorandum or any other written or oral information on the dossier. Twenty-one Parliaments/Chambers replied that, yes, this information had been provided in accordance with their normal obligations. The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* indicated that no information had been provided. The Swedish *Riksdag* noted that the government submitted information to the Committee on Finance before the Council had adopted its position. The Committee requested and carried out a deliberation with the government after the Council adopted its position.

The Parliaments/Chambers that had not scrutinised the second Omnibus package on investment simplification were then asked to explain the reason. Eight Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Romanian Camera Deputaților and Slovak Národná rada) replied that the proposal was not planned to be examined (e.g. it was not part of priorities or was not chosen for scrutiny for normal reasons). The Croatian Hrvatski sabor indicated that this should have been examined but was not consulted by government. Five Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other". Of these, the French Assemblée nationale, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati and the Portuguese Assembleia da

República all indicated the same reasons for not scrutinising the proposal as in the previous question.

5. Parliaments/Chambers were then **asked if they had been consulted by their respective governments on the third Omnibus package on the Common Agricultural simplification package** (COM(2025)236). All Parliaments/Chambers answered this question.

Nineteen Parliaments/Chambers answered that the government had consulted them *prior* to the Council's approval of its position.



Two Parliaments/Chambers, the Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* and the European Parliament, indicated that the government had consulted them *after* the Council's approval of its position.

Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had not been consulted: the Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/ Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Cypus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, French Assemblée nationale, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Irish Houses of the Oireachtas, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, Portuguese Assembleia da República, Romanian Camera Deputaţilor, Slovak Národná rada and Spanish Cortes Generales.

The Parliaments/Chambers that had been consulted were then asked to specify at what level. Nine of them (Danish Folketing, Estonian Riigikogu, French Sénat, German Bundesrat, Italian Camera dei Deputati, Latvian Saeima, Polish Sejm, Polish Senat, and Slovenian Državni zbor) noted this was done at the level of the European Affairs Committee. Four Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the consultation was done at the level of the relevant sectoral committee: the Dutch Eerste Kamer, Dutch Tweede Kamer, Italian Senato della Repubblica and the European Parliament. Ten Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other".

Six of them indicated that both the European Affairs Committee and relevant sectoral committees had been consulted: the Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, Czech *Senát*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovenian *Državni svet* and the Swedish *Riksdag*. As in the previous questions, the German *Bundestag* referred to the parliamentary information platform on EU matters, and the Spanish *Cortes Generales* noted that the government had not consulted it, but that the Joint Committee for EU Affairs found the package to be in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

As in the earlier questions, Parliaments/Chambers were also asked whether their respective governments provided the Parliament/Chamber with an explanatory memorandum or any other written or oral information on the dossier. Nineteen Parliaments/Chambers replied that this information had been provided in accordance with their normal obligations. The European Parliament indicated that this information had been provided on a voluntary basis. The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* indicated that no information had been provided, and the Romanian *Senat* chose the option "Other" but provided no additional information.


The Parliaments/Chambers that had not scrutinised the third Omnibus package on the Common Agricultural simplification package were asked to explain the reasons. Seven Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés and Romanian Camera Deputaţilor) replied that the proposal was not planned to be examined (e.g. it was not part of priorities or was not chosen for scrutiny for normal reasons). The Croatian Hrvatski sabor indicated that this should have been examined but was not consulted by government. Six Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other". The Czech Poslanecká sněmovna explained that the European Affairs committee had not met since the publication of the package due to the pre-election period. The Slovak Národná rada replied that the package had not been examined to date but deliberations on it were planned for the forthcoming period. The French Assemblée nationale, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati and Portuguese Assembleia da República all indicated the same reasons for not scrutinising the proposal as in the previous question.

6. Lastly, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had been consulted by the respective government on the **fourth Omnibus package on small mid-caps and removal of paper requirements** (COM(2025)0501). The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* and the European Parliament did not answer this question.

Nineteen Parliaments/Chambers answered that the government had consulted them *prior* to the Council's approval of its position.

Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had not been consulted: the Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/ Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, French Assemblée nationale, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Lithuanian Seimas, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, Portuguese Assembleia da

República, Romanian Camera Deputaţilor, Slovak Národná rada, Spanish Cortes Generales and Swedish Riksdag).



The Parliaments/Chambers that had been consulted were also asked to specify at what level. Eleven of them (Czech Senát, Danish Folketing, French Sénat, German Bundesrat, Italian Camera dei Deputati, Italian Senato della Repubblica, Latvian Saeima, Polish Sejm, Polish Senat, Romanian Senat and Slovenian Državni zbor) replied this was done at the level of the European Affairs Committee. Three Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the consultation was done at the level of the relevant sectoral committee: the Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Dutch Tweede Kamer, and the Irish Houses of the Oireachtas. Eight Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other". Three of them (Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat, Estonian Riigikogu and Slovenian Državni svet) indicated that both the European Affairs Committee and relevant sectoral committees had been consulted. The Finnish *Eduskunta* pointed out that it aimed to adopt its position soon after the summer recess, involving both the European Affairs Committee and the sectoral Committee(s), time allows. As in the previous question, the German Bundestag referred to the parliamentary information platform on EU matters, which serves all Members of Parliament. The Spanish Cortes Generales noted that the government did not consult Parliament but that the Joint Committee for EU Affairs aims to adopt a resolution regarding the compliance of the fourth Omnibus package with the principle of subsidiarity, but this has not yet been adopted.

Parliaments/Chambers were then asked whether their respective governments provided them with an explanatory memorandum or any other written or oral information on the dossier. Twenty Parliaments/Chambers confirmed that this information had been provided in accordance with normal obligations. The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* chose the option "Other" but provided no additional information.

The Parliaments/Chambers that had not scrutinised the fourth Omnibus package were asked to explain the reasons. Seven Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian Kamer van

volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Luxembourg Chambre des Députés and Romanian Camera Deputaților) explained that the proposal was not planned to be examined (e.g. it was not part of priorities or was not chosen for scrutiny for normal reasons). Nine Parliaments/Chambers chose the option "Other". The French Assemblée nationale, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati and Portuguese Assembleia da República all indicated the same reasons for not scrutinising the proposal as in the previous question. The Czech Poslanecká sněmovna again explained that the European Affairs committee had not met since the publication of the package due to the pre-election period. The Lithuanian Seimas, Slovak Národná rada and the Swedish Riksdag all indicated that the package has not been examined to date, but the examination was planned for the forthcoming period according to regular procedures.

7. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked if they thought that the **EU institutions should set up clear criteria for the use of fast-track decision-making** on EU legislative proposals. Out of the 29 Parliaments/Chambers that replied to the question, 22 answered yes and seven Parliaments/Chambers answered no (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, Czech *Senát*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Latvian *Saeima*, Polish *Senat*, Slovak *Národná rada*, and Slovenian *Državni svet*). In addition, eight Parliaments/Chambers skipped the question (Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, German *Bundestag*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Spanish *Cortes Generales*, Swedish *Riksdag* and European Parliament).

The Parliaments/Chambers who had answered yes were asked to **specify if they thought that certain minimum conditions should be met to allow fast-track decision making**. Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers answered this question. The following paragraphs reflect some of the most common ideas put forward. For the full and complete answers, the annex to the report can be consulted.

Many Parliaments/Chambers mentioned how they believed clarity and/or transparency were of high importance when describing and proposing certain minimum conditions related to the use of fast-track decision (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Czech *Senát*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Romanian *Senat*, and Spanish *Cortes Generales*). In particular clear criteria for the use of the mechanisms and transparency throughout the process was emphasised.

Another point that was recurrent in the replies by Parliaments/Chambers was that the urgency related to the use of fast-track decision making should be justified, demonstrable or defined (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Danish *Folketing*, Latvian *Saeima*, and Polish *Sejm*). In that regard the Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* and the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* elaborated that they believed that the intended use of the fast-track procedure should be indicated already in the Commission Work Programme.

Another topic raised in the replies from several Parliaments/Chambers concerned subsidiarity checks, where the Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, and the Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* highlighted that the use of fast-track procedures should respect adequate time for subsidiarity and proportionality checks. The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, amongst others, believed that the role of Parliaments/Chambers should be protected by allowing them to anticipate and prepare for shortened scrutiny deadlines, and by ensuring that the use of fast-track procedures does not unduly restrict parliamentary oversight and the subsidiarity control mechanism. The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* and the Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* argued that the fast-track procedure should not be used at least until the expiration of the subsidiarity deadline.

Some Parliaments/Chambers also elaborated on how they thought that the conditions for the use of fast-track decision-making should be regulated and justified in accordance with the principles set out in the Treaty on European Union (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* and Hungarian *Országgyűlés*). Some Parliaments/Chambers also emphasised the importance of not overstepping or undermining the EU institutions' powers. In that regard, the Romanian *Camera Deputaților* answered that the criteria for the fast-track decision making should be based on a specific legal framework and should not overstep the legislative power of the European Parliament. Similarly, the Romanian *Senat* answered that the criteria for applying fast-track decision-making must be grounded in a clear legal framework and must not undermine or exceed the legislative prerogatives of the European Commission.

Finally, some Parliaments/Chambers also suggested that the use of the fast-track procedure should be evaluated. The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* noted that there should be a post-hoc evaluation or review mechanism to assess the use and impact of the fast-track process. This was echoed by the Italian *Camera dei deputati*, which proposed that the use of fast-track procedure should always require an impact assessment to be made.

8. Parliaments/Chambers were in addition asked if there was **anything else they would like to note** about the Commission's, Council's and the European Parliament's use of fast-track procedures in EU decision-making. Eighteen Parliaments/Chambers responded and 19 skipped the question. Below are some of the suggestions put forward by Parliaments/Chambers.

The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* answered that they believed Parliaments/Chambers should be officially informed of the use of the fast-track procedure. Similarly, the Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* answered that in cases where fast-track procedures are used, they should be clearly communicated and justified. The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* argued that Parliaments/Chambers should be informed as early as possible when a legislative proposal is expected to be processed under a fast-track procedure, arguing that early notification would allow Parliaments/Chambers to adapt their internal procedures accordingly and avoid delays in carrying out their scrutiny responsibilities.

The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* answered that it believed it was essential that the use of fast-track procedures should always be made public, announced in a timely manner, and based on clear and transparent criteria as well as accompanied by thorough substantiation.

The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* answered that fast-track procedures represented a great tool for the simplification of legislative procedures, especially for proposals that dealt with issues of particular importance to the public opinion. It argued that the most important thing to discuss was the enabling of Parliaments/Chambers to have first-hand information on the time schedule of the legislative proposals, in order to have the possibility of scrutinising their compliance with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles in due time.

The Polish *Sejm* answered that a fast-track procedure should be reserved only for exceptional cases where its application is justified by the substantial EU interest or genuine emergencies. It believed that in all other instances, the application of such a procedure may be questioned as it limits time for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals, thereby undermining democratic legitimacy and transparency in the EU legislative process.

The Swedish *Riksdag* considered it important that the fast-track procedure is used with restraint, and only in duly justified and urgent cases, and that Parliaments/Chambers be informed in cases where the eight-week period for subsidiarity checks will not be complied with. It remarked that it is important that the subsidiarity checks carried out by the Parliaments/Chambers can be done before the negotiations on the proposals begin. Otherwise, the subsidiarity checks of Parliaments/Chambers may lose their importance. In addition, the Swedish *Riksdag* remarked that there is also reason to consider how reasoned opinions submitted within the eight-week deadline under the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are handled at EU level, in cases where the legal instrument has been adopted before the expiration of that deadline.

The European Parliament noted that the Omnibuses launched during this term shared a new common overall objective, namely, to boost competitiveness while safeguarding economic, social and environmental goals and streamlining and harmonising the regulatory framework, thereby reducing administrative burdens and compliance costs for businesses. Given that more Omnibuses of a similar horizontal nature could be expected, the European Parliament could consider an alternative, simpler and more consistent way to deal with them. It should ensure coordination, minimise internal disputes and related delay as well as facilitate a timely, coordinated and consistent way of working, and be put on a more equal footing with the Council.

9. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked if they had ever experienced that **their government** had not fulfilled its obligations towards the Parliament/Chamber due to a fast-track procedure. Out of 28 respondents, a majority of 24 Parliaments/Chambers answered no. Four (Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, French *Sénat*, Polish *Sejm*, and Slovak *Národná rada*) answered yes. Nine Parliaments/Chambers did not answer this question

The four Parliaments/Chambers that had replied that their **governments had not fulfilled their obligations towards the Parliaments/Chambers** were asked the follow-up question of how their governments had justified this.

The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* answered that the Croatian government is required to send the national positions on EU draft legislative proposals to the *Hrvatski sabor* in the earliest stage of the debate on the said draft proposal in the Council (working group level). However, due to time constraints, national positions are often not prepared in the working group stage, but only for Coreper meetings. These positions are thereby not delivered to the parliament, as they are adopted in a different procedure, so in such cases the *Hrvatski sabor* remains uninformed.

The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopan* answered that due to the strict separation of powers provided for in the constitution of Cyprus, the executive does not have a formal obligation towards the parliament in the context of the EU legislative procedure, including when proposals are subject to a fast-track procedure.

The French *Senat* explained that the French language version of the text was not submitted in due time by the Council Secretariat.

The Polish *Sejm* replied that their government had justified it by referring to the workflow of the Council and the application of the fast-track procedure.

Finally, the Slovak *Národná rada* answered that it could not categorically exclude that such a situation had occurred, however, in instances where it may have arisen, the government did not provide a specific justification, as it was deemed not necessary under the circumstances.

Addendum: Resources in national parliaments

10. Turning to administrative resources, Parliaments/Chambers were asked about the overall number of staff employed in their administrations in charge of providing EU-related assistance to Members of Parliament and parliamentary committees.

Seven Parliaments/Chambers reported having 1-5 staff providing EU-related assistance (Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers*, Belgian *Sénat/Senaat*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Slovenian *Državni svet*, and Slovenian *Državni zbor*).


Eleven Parliaments/Chambers had 6-10 staff providing EU-related assistance (Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Czech *Senát*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Latvian *Saeima*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Senat*, Slovak *Národná rada*, and Spanish *Cortes Generales*).

Nine Parliaments/Chambers had 11-15 staff providing EU-related assistance (Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, French *Assemblée nationale*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*,

Hungarian Országgyűlés, Italian Camera dei deputati, Italian Senato della Repubblica, Romanian Parlamentul României and Romanian Senat).

Four Parliaments/Chambers had 16-20 staff providing EU-related assistance (Danish Folketing, Dutch Tweede Kamer, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon and Irish Houses of the Oireachtas).

Three Parliaments/Chambers had more than 20 staff providing EU-related assistance (German *Bundestag*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and Swedish *Riksdag*).



11. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked specifically where in the administration the employees worked. More than one answer was possible.

Twenty-nine Parliaments/Chambers answered that the employees were affiliated to the European Affairs Committee secretariat. Seventeen Parliaments/Chambers answered that the employees were affiliated to a horizontal unit in parliament (e.g. research unit), while ten answered that the employees were affiliated to a secretariat of a sectoral committee.

In addition, it was also possible to specify if the employees were affiliated elsewhere. Thirteen Parliaments/Chambers specified this. For example, the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* answered that staff was affiliated to a specific bureau under the International Affairs Department, the Lithuanian *Seimas* answered that staff was affiliated to the Foreign Affairs Committee secretariat and the Polish *Sejm* answered that staff was affiliated to their Research Unit.

12. A final question on this topic dealt with the **main services that the administration provided** to the Members of Parliament and committees in their work with European Union affairs. For this question, it was also possible to choose more than one answer.

Thirty-one responded that one main service was research and background notes to committees on EU legislative proposals, decisions by the European Court of justice or other relevant EU initiatives. Twenty-two Parliaments/Chambers answered that one main service was individual research and analytical support to Members of Parliament.

Finally, twenty Parliaments/Chambers specified other main services. The two most recurring themes regarding services provided are briefly described below. For the full set of answers, the annex to the report can be consulted.

In terms of the specified main services provided by parliamentary administrations to support Members of Parliament and committees in their work with European Union affairs several Parliaments/Chambers mentioned service and assistance related to interparliamentary committee meetings and conferences (Belgian Sénat/Senaat, Belgian Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Dutch Eerste Kamer, Lithuanian Seimas and Portuguese Assembleia da República). Another main service highlighted by numerous Parliaments/Chambers was support and assistance related to scrutiny and/or subsidiarity checks of EU Proposals (Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Dutch Tweede Kamer, Portuguese Assembleia da República, Slovak Národná rada, Spanish Cortes Generales and European Parliament).

CHAPTER TWO

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS

THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE 44th BI-ANNUAL REPORT examines the current status of EU national Parliaments' access to information about EU legislative activities, via the EU institutions and via their respective governments. The chapter aims to identify best practices in national Parliaments regarding both access to relevant Council documents and to the different types of documents produced by the respective governments on EU legislative proposals and other key initiatives.

13. In the first question of this chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they use the Council Information Exchange Platform (CIxP) to get access to non-public Council documents. To this question, a vast majority (28 out for 35 respondents) replied no, with only the Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Danish Folketing, German Bundestag, German Bundesrat and the Italian Senato della Repubblica responding that they do use the platform. The Latvian Saeima and the European Parliament did not reply to the question. The Hungarian Országgyűlés noted that there is an ongoing negotiation with the government services on the access conditions to CIxP for the Hungarian Országgyűlés.

14. As a follow-up question, those who did have access to the platform were asked **what kind of non-public Council documents they could access** via CIxP. Respondents were asked to choose between three document types: WK-documents (Working); ST-documents (Standard); and CM-documents (Communication). The Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, German *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*, and the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* all indicated they have access to all these document types. The Danish *Folketing* replied that it only has access to ST-documents (Standard) and CM-documents (Communication) via the platform.

15. The next question concerned **what categories of classified Council documents Parliaments/Chambers have access to.** Parliaments/Chambers were asked to indicate if they had access to documents of the level Restricted, Confidential, Secret, Top secret or none of these. Only the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat* and the Lithuanian *Seimas* indicated that they have access to documents up to and including the level Top secret. The Swedish *Riksdag* replied that it has access to documents up to and including the level Confidential, and the

Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and *Tweede Kamer* replied that they have access to documents of the Restricted level. Twenty-three Parliaments/Chambers stated that they have access to none of these levels. Seven did not reply; some of those however provided further information in the follow-up.

In the follow-up, Parliaments/Chambers were asked from whom and how they got access to these documents.

Many of the replies clarified that the Parliaments/Chambers have access to Council **documents via their government.** Thus, the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat* replied that EU documents are provided directly by EU institutions as well as by relevant ministries in the government. The Bulgarian Narodno sabranie explained that its Committee on European Affairs has access to working documents and so-called cables from the Permanent Representation to the EU. The Croatian Hrvatski sabor informed that all documents are forwarded to the parliament by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs by e-mail; however, the system is of limited utility since the parliament received hundreds of documents every day and does not have the capacity to go through all of them, nor access to a functional search option. The Finnish Eduskunta explained that it forms its opinion on EU proposals based on the information it receives from the Finnish Government. It has not requested access to documents via CIxP, and as a general rule the government does not send EU documents to the Eduskunta but describes the essential content of the proposals in its communication with the parliament. The Grand Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee can ask for access to the EU documents from the government if they deem it necessary, but they rarely do so. The Latvian Saeima made the brief remark that it utilises a national EU document database. The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* also briefly replied that it gets the documents from the government. Similarly, the Romanian Camera Deputatilor explained that though it does not have access to these documents via CIxP, it can access them through the Government of Romania. The Swedish Riksdag also replied that the government is legally obliged to provide the Riksdag with ongoing information on EU cooperation, and this can include these categories of documents (Restricted and Confidential). Both sectoral committees and the Committee on EU Affairs can be recipients of information and documents.

A few replies focused more specifically on access to classified Council documents. The Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* simply explained that it receives classified documents in the same way as other EU documents. The German *Bundestag* used this opportunity to explain that the *Bundestag* may have access to all classified documents from the Council, provided they are subject to the Federal Government's legal obligation to inform the Bundestag on EU matters, and that access to these documents depend on their classification. The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* remarked that access is granted to some Limited documents. The Lithuanian *Seimas* explained that documents are forwarded to the *Seimas* by the Lithuanian Government in accordance with established procedures, and that access to classified information depends on the specific position of an MP or staff and is granted by the State Security Department. The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* replied that its administration generally has access to documents of the

level Limited, and access to documents of the level Restricted is granted upon special request from the parliament.

Lastly, the Italian *Camera dei Deputati* remarked that it still uses the Delegates portal and it finds that CIxP does not ensure an adequate level and content of information and documents.


16. The next question concerned access to interinstitutional documents. Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they have **access to EU legislative documents related to the trilogue negotiations** between the Council, European Parliament and the Commission (for instance the so-called four column documents). Twenty-six respondents replied no. The Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Czech *Senát*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and *Senato della Repubblica*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and *Eerste Kamer*, and the Swedish *Riksdag* replied yes. The Finnish Eduskunta did not reply, but referred to their reply to question 15.

Some Parliaments/Chambers provided additional information. The Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat replied that this information is provided by the Council. The Czech Senát answered that it has access to some, but most likely not all, Council documents related to trilogues via the Government database of Council documents and the Government database of EU agenda (Council meetings). The German Bundestag explained that it has access to the four-column document via the government, thanks to the Act of Cooperation between the Federal Government and the Bundestag. The Dutch Eerste Kamer and Tweede Kamer clarified that they only have access to the documents if they are available on the Delegates Portal. The Italian Camera dei Deputati and Senato della Repubblica clarified that they have access to the fourcolumn documents and Presidency compromise texts. The Latvian Saeima explained that if there is a specific interest in a particular trilogue, the responsible ministry is requested to provide it. The Romanian Camera Deputaților and Romanian Senat both replied that although they do not have direct access to these documents, they can ask the Government of Romania to provide all documents related to the EU legislative process, on the basis of the government's democratic accountability towards the parliament. The Swedish Riksdag replied that though it very rarely has access to trilogue documents, the Committee on EU Affairs relatively often receives oral information from the Swedish Government on how trilogue negotiations are progressing. Furthermore, due to its extensive obligation to keep the Riksdag informed, it cannot be ruled out that the Swedish Government may provide trilogue documents to the committee.

17. The next question concerned whether staff of the different Parliaments/Chambers use the new institutional database called the **EU Law Tracker**, which was launched on 30 April 2024. To this, 16 replied yes and 19 replied no. The German *Bundesrat* and the European Parliament did not reply.

18. In the next part of the chapter, questions were raised on the background information on EU matters supplied by the governments. Parliaments/Chambers were first asked about the

amount of the EU related documents (explanatory memoranda and other background notes prepared by their government) they receive annually.



Nine Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they receive fewer than 50 EU related documents from their respective governments (Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants, Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Portuguese Assembleia da República, Romanian Camera Deputaţilor, Slovenian Državni zbor, Spanish Cortes Generales).

Five Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they obtain between 50-100 EU related documents from their respective governments (French *Sénat*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Polish *Senat*, Romanian *Senat*, Slovenian *Državni svet*).

Five Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they get between 100-200 EU related documents from their respective governments (Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Polish *Sejm*).

Nine Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they receive between 200-500 EU related documents from their respective governments (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovak *Národná rada*, Swedish *Riksdag*).

Seven Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they obtain more than 500 EU related documents from their respective governments (Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, Dutch *Staten-Generaal: Tweede Kamer* and *Eerste Kamer*, French *Assemblée nationale*, German *Bundestag*, German *Bundesrat*, Latvian *Saeima*). Only the Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés* stated that it does not receive any EU related documents from the government.

19. The following question focused on the types of EU-related documents prepared by national governments and submitted to their respective Parliaments/Chambers in relation to EU legislative proposals and other significant EU initiatives. A clear majority of respondents (26 out of 33) indicated that they received explanatory memoranda. Additionally, 15 respondents mentioned non-papers produced or co-signed by their government in key policy areas.

Nineteen Parliaments/Chambers provided additional information on other types of documents. The following summary outlines the types of documents and practices in selected Parliaments/Chambers.

The Latvian Saeima receives National Positions from the government, which include explanatory memoranda, as well as Informative Statements concerning EU legislative proposals and other important EU matters. The Romanian Camera Deputaților obtains periodic reports on Romania's involvement in the Council decision-making process, along with biannual reports on the transposition of EU law into national legislation. The Polish Sejm and Polish Senat both receive official government positions on EU legislative proposals. The Croatian Hrvatski sabor is additionally provided with government positions for Council meetings. The Dutch Tweede Kamer and Eerste Kamer receive annotated Council agendas, Council meeting reports, Cabinet appreciations (e.g., State of the European Union), quarterly reports, updates on implementation progress, and reports on infringement procedures. The Czech Poslanecká sněmovna and Czech Senát receive government positions on EU documents, including directions and mandates for Coreper and Council meetings. In addition, the Czech Senát also receives summaries of meetings, information on how its resolutions were considered by the government, and mandates as well as instructions for EU negotiations. The French Assemblée nationale is provided with thematic briefs prepared by the General Secretariat for European Affairs (SGAE), outlining the priorities of the EU Council Presidency and presenting the French position on each, while the French Sénat France receives diplomatic notes. In the Lithuanian Seimas parliamentary committees receive national positions drafted by the Government as part of the mandate-granting procedure for new EU legislative initiatives. The Italian Camera dei deputati is informed about the state of play in Council negotiations and other related debates. It also receives preliminary evaluations of proposals from the relevant government departments. The Danish Folketing obtains notes on decisions from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and written responses to questions on various EU-related issues. In the Swedish Riksdag the Committee on EU Affairs receives annotated agendas from the Government Offices prior to each Council meeting. Parliamentary committees are also given memoranda from the Government to support discussions before deliberations and briefings. The Hungarian *Országgyűlés* has access to information shared by other national parliaments.

On the contrary, the Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* does not systematically receive government documents on EU initiatives due to constitutional provisions that establish a strict separation of powers. Relevant documents are provided only upon request by the appropriate parliamentary committee. Similarly, the Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* is provided with background information when needed.

20. The subsequent section of the chapter, which focused on access to information from other Parliaments/Chambers, included a question about whether parliamentary staff make **use of the IPEX database** for this purpose. All 37 respondents confirmed that the IPEX database was indeed used within their Parliaments/Chambers.

21. In the following question, Parliaments/Chambers were invited to provide **suggestions on functionalities in IPEX that could be improved**. The responses received are summarised below and grouped thematically.

1. General Functionality and User Experience

The Italian Camera dei deputati, Latvian Saeima and the Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati emphasised the importance of systematically publishing scrutiny documentation, ideally accompanied by English summaries. Similarly, the Romanian Senat advocated for full or summarised translations of national contributions into English to improve accessibility. The Czech Poslanecká sněmovna called for overall improvement in the structure and clarity of the platform. The Swedish Riksdag stated that while IPEX improvements were an ongoing process, more effort was needed to ensure that content was up-to-date and relevant. The Riksdag explained that it has integrated its internal EU document system with IPEX to streamline uploads and reduce workload. The Riksdag also encouraged other Parliaments/Chambers to consider automatic information transfer. The Finnish Eduskunta reiterated the strategic role of IPEX as a "one-stop shop" for interparliamentary cooperation and welcomed the results of the recent user survey.

2. Search Tools and Navigation

The Polish *Sejm* proposed several technical enhancements, including: improving visibility of the rotating Presidency link on the homepage; publishing a list of IPEX keywords with explanations; clarifying "Important Issues" vs. "News" on the homepage; explaining legislative search codes and correcting dysfunctional ones; enhancing navigation within the search results; properly classifying EU affairs documents; creating a search form for the "EU Affairs Documents" section; creating a subpage with IPEX important documents in the section "About"; creating an archive section for interparliamentary cooperation documents; publishing Commission *lettres de saisine*, not just indicative subsidiarity deadlines; removing or limiting blinking red dots next to subsidiarity deadlines; removing outdated references (e.g. Conference on the Future of Europe from permanent conferences). The Portuguese *Assembleia da República* suggested: relocating the search button in the Legislative Database for better visibility; removing "Important Issues" and ensuring that "Documents with High Activity"

reflect most-searched documents, or those with most uploads recently; adding links to the webpage of the current presidency's parliamentary dimension and calendars for EU Council Presidencies. The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and the German *Bundestag* recommended revising the "Documents with High Activity" section to reflect current relevance rather than past engagement. The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* put forward the idea of elaborating guidelines or shared criteria for the harmonised use of symbols on the IPEX platform, particularly the "E" symbol for "information to exchange".

3. Alerts and Notifications

The European Parliament suggested introducing email notifications for new document uploads, including metadata on document type and related events. The French *Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat* supported automatic alerts when a reasoned opinion or political dialogue contribution was issued by another parliament. The Romanian *Camera Deputaților* proposed that subsidiarity deadlines should be automatically calculated and displayed alongside the subsidiarity letter.

4. Interoperability and Integration

The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* recommended enhancing interoperability with other EU platforms, such as integrating hyperlinks to the EU Law Tracker on each EU legislative proposal page, as well as introducing interactive features to facilitate structured dialogue and best practice exchanges. The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* proposed creating a staff forum for early exchanges on EU proposals; restructuring the homepage, introducing a dedicated page for national parliaments' priorities (based on the Commission's work programme); adding search filters by Parliaments/Chambers; integrating with the EU Law Tracker database. Similarly, the Danish *Folketing* suggested that the EU Law Tracker was integrated on IPEX. The Belgian *Senaat/Sénat* highlighted the possibility of automatic downloads by the Commission services of reasoned opinions and opinions within the framework of political dialogue issued by Parliaments/Chambers.

5. Document Access and Content Quality

The Belgian Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants advocated for better access to documents related to interparliamentary conferences (COSAC and interparliamentary committee meetings). The Croatian Hrvatski sabor suggested adding information on fast-track procedures and legislative adoption stages. The Hungarian Országgyűlés supported archiving media files from past Presidencies and suggested sharing best practices on topics like parliamentary education.

22. In response to the last and open-ended question of this chapter, regarding access to EU documents, several Parliaments/Chambers provided **further observations and proposals**.

A few Parliaments/Chambers expressed concern over the removal of national Parliaments' access to the Council's Delegates Portal:

- The German *Bundestag* emphasized that access to the Delegates Portal should have been restored, as requested in the multilateral letter addressed to the General Secretariat of the Council on 9 February 2024.
- The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* reported that the termination of access to the Delegates Portal had triggered discussions with the national government to find a viable alternative for accessing Council documents. However, no concrete solution has yet been identified.
- The French *Sénat* also expressed regret regarding the loss of access to Council documents, which were previously available via the Senate's Permanent Representative in Brussels.

Among other concerns raised, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* advocated for broader access to Working Party (WK) documents and improved transparency regarding informal EU bodies such as the Eurogroup, emphasising that this would significantly strengthen parliamentary scrutiny. The Romanian *Senat* recommended improving the availability of European Commission documents on the IPEX platform—particularly type C documents—by enabling search via standard identifiers.

The Lithuanian *Seimas* took the opportunity to highlight their national information system, which registers and administers EU documents, supports the preparation and coordination of national positions, registers reports from EU institutions, facilitates the transposition of EU law, and serves as a tool for institutional memory, containing archived documents and positions. The Lithuanian *Seimas* noted that their information system allows real-time coordination and swift drafting of national positions, and could serve as a model for similar national tools.

The Hungarian *Országgyűlés* emphasised that providing courtesy translations of submitted documents would improve understanding and comparability of other national parliaments' positions, thereby enhancing interparliamentary dialogue and cooperation.


CHAPTER THREE

SHOULD THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION INCLUDE A GREEN CARD?

THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE 44th BI-ANNUAL REPORT starts from the observation that over the years some national Parliaments have promoted the idea pf enhancing the political dialogue with the Commission through a so-called green card mechanism as a means by which national Parliaments can invite the Commission to act within a particular policy field. A green card would provide national Parliaments with a right, which is similar to the one held by the European Parliament, the Council and one million European citizens (European Citizens' Initiative) today. The chapter seeks to assess whether and how national Parliaments would be interested in further strengthening the political dialogue with the European Commission, for instance through such a green card mechanism.

23. The first question of this Chapter seeks to answer if Parliaments/Chambers made use of the direct political dialogue with the European Commission over the past year.

All 37 Parliaments/Chambers replied to this question, with 29 confirming that they had used the direct political dialogue, whereas eight Parliaments/Chambers stated that they did not use it.




Parliaments/Chambers that had engaged in the political dialogue over the past year were then asked to **clarify how they had done so**. Twenty-three replied that they did it by submitting an

opinion to the Commission on an EU legislative proposal or other relevant EU initiatives, 22 did it by inviting a Commissioner to address Parliament or a parliamentary committee, whereas eight Parliaments/Chambers submitted enquiries in writing to the Commission regarding EU legislative proposals and Commission consultation documents.

Five Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon Dutch Eerste Kamer, Dutch Tweede Kamer, and French Sénat) mentioned that they had engaged in political dialogue with the European Commission through various means. These included submitting resolutions on key EU and foreign policy issues, prioritising the Commission's work programme, organising committee visits to Brussels to meet Commissioners and officials, holding interviews - either in Brussels or via videoconference - between parliamentarians and Commission experts, and hosting conferences with Commissioners that lead to joint declarations transmitted to EU institutions as part of the broader dialogue.

24. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked how **many times they made use of three different modes of political dialogue** in the course of the past year, namely:

- number of opinions sent to the Commission on an EU legislative proposal or other relevant EU initiatives
- number of enquiries in writing submitted to the Commission regarding EU legislative proposals and Commission consultation documents and
- number of meetings with a Commissioner that were held in Parliaments or a parliamentary committee.



Out of the total 37 respondents, 12 mentioned that they did not issue any opinions to the European Commission on an EU legislative proposal or other relevant EU initiatives, whereas 12 issued more than three of such opinions. Thirteen Parliaments/Chambers replied that they had issued between one and three such opinions in the past year.

Regarding the number of enquiries in writing to the Commission on EU legislative proposals and Commission consultation documents, 33 Parliaments/Chambers provided answers, out of which 24 did not send such inquiries, six sent more than three, and three respondents replied that they had sent between one and three of the inquiries in the last year.

Regarding the number of meetings with a Commissioner in Parliament or a parliamentary committee over the past year, 33 respondents provided answers. Seventeen Parliaments/Chambers organised between one and three of such meetings, whereas eight did have more than three, and the other eight did not organise such meetings at all.

25. In the next question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether, over the past five years, they had taken the initiative to invite the European Commission to act at the European level in a particular policy field where they considered common European rules were needed. Thirty-five Parliaments/Chambers replied to this question, while two - the Belgian Senaat/Sénat and the German Bundestag - did not provide an answer. Twelve Parliaments/Chambers replied positively: the Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Danish Folketing, Dutch Tweede Kamer, French Assemblée nationale, French Sénat, Hungarian Országgyűlés, Italian Camera dei Deputati, Italian Senato della Repubblica, Slovak Národná rada, and the European Parliament. Twenty-three Parliaments/Chambers replied negatively, with the Czech Senát noting that, while it has never invited the Commission to take action in an area previously left to the Member States, it has on many occasions asked the Commission to adopt, amend, or repeal specific legislative provisions.

Those Parliaments/Chambers that had replied affirmatively were then asked to **specify the policy area in which they had invited the Commission to take action**, and to indicate whether this had been done jointly with other national Parliaments.

The replies reflected a wide range of policy areas and instruments employed. The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* reported that it had adopted a declaration on cohesion policy, which was transmitted to the Council Presidency, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* noted that individual members and committees had undertaken initiatives focusing on enlargement policy, agriculture, and food safety. The French *Sénat* referred to an initiative concerning the European Civil Protection Mechanism, while the Italian *Camera dei Deputati* cited initiatives in the fields of asylum, migration, and taxation. The Hungarian *Országgyűlés* mentioned its resolution in support of the Minority SafePack European Citizens' Initiative. The Slovak *Národná rada* referred to informal calls made by members of its European Affairs Committee during inter-parliamentary conferences, urging the Commission to take action in various policy areas. The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* reported having addressed a letter to the Commission concerning housing and EU state aid rules. Similarly, the European Parliament referred to a request for urgent action made to the Commission through a letter from its Special committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union.

In a few cases, initiatives were undertaken jointly with other national Parliaments. For example, the Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* hosted a conference that resulted in a joint declaration on Mediterranean agriculture, calling on the Commission to strengthen EU-level action in areas such as the post-2027 Common Agricultural Policy, water resilience, food security, sustainability, and support for farmers facing climate and geopolitical challenges. The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* referred to coordinated initiatives with the COSAC Chairpersons of Mediterranean countries on the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and with other COSAC Chairpersons on border management and energy policy. The Danish *Folketing* adopted a green card initiative calling on the Commission to present an action plan on plant-based foods, which was open for co-signing by other national Parliaments.

Lastly, the European Parliament, acting under Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), adopted 25 resolutions inviting the Commission to submit legislative proposals in several areas, of which the Commission responded positively to 23.

26. The following question referred to whether the existing political dialogue between national Parliaments and the European Commission should be expanded through a green card mechanism, which would give national Parliaments a right to request the Commission to act in a particular policy field at the European level. Of the 29 Parliaments/Chambers that replied to this question, 23 supported the idea, whereas six were against it (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, German *Bundesrat*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Slovak *Národná rada*, Slovenian *Državni svet*). Eight respondents skipped this question.

Those Parliaments/Chambers that replied affirmatively were then **asked to specify how such a green card mechanism should work in practice** (for instance, by establishing a minimum threshold of national Parliaments to trigger the green card mechanism and how should the right be recognised by the Commission). Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers provided detailed replies to this request.

In this regard, most Parliaments/Chambers acknowledged the green card mechanism as a useful tool that could strengthen the role of national Parliaments, enhance democratic legitimacy of the EU decision-making process and enable national Parliaments to play a more proactive and constructive role (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Danish *Folketing*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, Romanian *Senat* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*).

Some Parliaments/Chambers emphasised that introduction of this procedure would require Treaty changes (Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Romanian *Camera Deputaților* and European Parliament). In relation to the issue of establishing a minimum threshold that would trigger the green card mechanism, the Dutch *Eerste Kamer* opted for no threshold at all, whereas the European Parliament voiced an opinion that even one national Parliament/Chamber could trigger this procedure. Most of the Parliaments/Chambers claimed that establishing a minimum threshold would be necessary in order to trigger the green card mechanism (Austrian

Nationalrat and Bundesrat, CyprusVouli ton Antiprosopon, Italian Senato della Repubblica, French Assemblée nationale, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, Polish Sejm and the Polish Senat).

Furthermore, some Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian Senaat/Sénat, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon and Latvian Saeima) pointed out that the COSAC working group on the role of national Parliaments in the EU established in 2022 during the French Presidency, had already developed certain proposals in the regard of a green card mechanism that could be implemented. It was also recalled by some respondents that the green card procedure should be discussed and agreed by at the COSAC plenary meetings (the Hungarian Országgyűlés, Irish Houses of the Oireachtas, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati). Regarding the practical approach, respondents mentioned that the European Commission should always be invited to provide a timely and reasoned response on whether the action would be taken or not (Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Danish Folketing, Polish Sejm and Polish Senat).

Some Parliaments/Chambers also noticed that as much as a green card procedure could reinforce the role of national Parliaments, it should avoid the procedural complexity and limited effectiveness of the already existing "yellow card" and "orange card" mechanisms (Romanian *Camera Deputaților* and Romanian *Senat*).

27. In the last question of the questionnaire, Parliaments/Chambers were invited to share any additional proposals on how to strengthen the political dialogue between the national Parliaments of the EU Member States and the European Commission, and to provide any further information they considered relevant to the topic.

In total, 19 Parliaments/Chambers submitted replies to this request, with varying levels of detail. The responses, while diverse in scope and emphasis, converged around several recurring themes.

- A number of Parliaments/Chambers highlighted the need for earlier and more structured involvement of national Parliaments in the EU law-making process, starting from the pre-legislative stage. They called for early access to information such as the Commission's roadmaps and Work Programme, and for a structured and continuous dialogue with the Commission supported by systematic and regular feedback on how parliamentary inputs are taken into account. Proposals included organising ad hoc interparliamentary exchanges prior to the presentation of key legislative proposals, ensuring early consultation on the Commission's Work Programme and better consideration of national Parliaments' opinions in the EU legislative process, as well as holding more frequent and substantive discussions with the Commission during the formative stages of EU policies, with due regard to national specificities (Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, French *Assemblée nationale*, French *Sénat*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, and Romanian *Senat*).

- Several Parliaments/Chambers referred to the green card mechanism as a useful tool for enhancing political dialogue and strengthening the participation of national Parliaments in the EU legislative process (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, French *Assemblée nationale*, and Polish *Sejm*). The German *Bundesrat* pointed out the importance of reinforcing the effectiveness of existing tools for parliamentary involvement.
- Several Parliaments/Chambers called for stronger engagement by the European Commission with national Parliaments, by participation in interparliamentary activities, including the meetings organised by the Presidency and physical participation in COSAC meetings, as well as by visiting national Parliaments more frequently. Such views were expressed by the French Assemblée nationale, German Bundestag, Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, Lithuanian Seimas, Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati and the Swedish Riksdag.
- Parliaments/Chambers also proposed strengthening the role of national Parliaments in monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity principle by extending the eight-week examination period and lowering the threshold for triggering a yellow card (French *Assemblée nationale*, French *Sénat*, and Italian *Camera dei Deputati*).
- Some Parliaments/Chambers underlined the importance of interparliamentary cooperation as a means to enhance dialogue, coordination and transparency. The Finnish *Eduskunta* encouraged building upon existing interparliamentary conferences and meetings rather than creating new structures, and suggested that IPEX could be utilised more as a platform for sharing information and hosting interparliamentary networks. A similar emphasis on IPEX was made by the Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*.
- The German *Bundesrat* mentioned delays in the transmission of translation of legislative proposals, which hinder timely parliamentary scrutiny, and recommended their transmission within a certain time frame after the publication of the English text to ensure that they are provided before the Council concludes its discussions.
- The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* proposed granting national Parliaments the right to submit written questions to the European Commission within the framework of the political dialogue. Similarly, the French *Assemblée nationale* suggested strengthening the scrutiny role of national Parliaments through a right of written questioning to the EU institutions.

For the full responses, please consult the annex to the report.