Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations
Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)

PART II REVIEW: RECONSTRUCTION IN SINT MAARTEN

Report 31 October 2022

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluator. They do not engage the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) nor other parts of the Government of the Netherlands in any way. While an attempt has been made to take into consideration views and perspectives of stakeholders consulted in the Netherlands and in Sint Maarten, the interpretation of this type of information, and all findings, conclusions and recommendations in this report are the exclusive responsibility of the author.

"When the wind blows, the chicken's ass is exposed"
(Caribbean saying)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of acronyms and abbreviations

Preface

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Context and background

3. The overall policy review of article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations
- **3.1. Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations**
- **3.2. Objectives of the overall policy review**
- **3.3. Organisation of the overall review and delimitation of activities to be evaluated**

4. Policy review of part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten
- **4.1. Guidance from article 8**
- **4.2. Evaluation questions**
- **4.3. Methods and limitations**
  - 4.3.1. Documentation
  - 4.3.2. Interviews
  - 4.3.3. Visit to Sint Maarten (8-20 November 2021)
  - 4.3.4. Triangulation of information
  - 4.3.5. Limitations

5. Design of support to reconstruction in Sint Maarten
- **5.1. Overall design of reconstruction efforts**
- **5.2. Funding and conditionalities**
- **5.3. Options considered for implementation**

6. The World Bank executed Trust Fund
- **6.1. The establishment of the Trust Fund in 2018**
- **6.2. Urgent priorities vs. strategic orientations**
- **6.3. Institutional arrangements related to the Trust Fund**
- **6.4. Overview of projects**
- **6.5. Effectiveness – results achieved**
  - 6.5.1. Emergency Recovery Project (ERP)
  - 6.5.2. Emergency Income Support and Training Project (EISTP)
  - 6.5.3. Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness
  - 6.5.4. Emergency Debris Management Project (EDMP)
  - 6.5.5. Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project
  - 6.5.6. Red Cross Roof Repair Project
  - 6.5.7. Enterprise Support Project (ESP)
  - 6.5.8. Civil Society partnership Facility for Resilience Project (R4CR)
  - 6.5.9. Child Resilience and Protection Project (CRPP)
  - 6.5.10. Sint Maarten Digital Government Transformation Project (DGTP)
  - 6.5.11. Fostering Resilient Learning Project Preparation (FRLP)
- **6.6. Summarizing remarks on results achieved by projects under the Trust Fund**
- **6.7. Efficiency of Trust Fund implementation**
  - 6.7.1. Costs and benefits of World Bank involvement
  - 6.7.2. Building Back Better
  - 6.7.3. Involvement of the Government of the Netherlands

7.1. Overview of activities
7.2. Effectiveness and efficiency
7.2.1. Border control
7.2.2. Public law and order
7.2.3. Support to Trust Fund activities
7.2.4. Other activities
7.3. Summarizing remarks on projects under direct support

8. Beyond this review: Liquidity support, recent Covid-19 related activities (COHO) and the Integrity Chamber
8.1. Liquidity support
8.2. Recent Covid-19 related activities (COHO)
8.3. Integrity Chamber

9. Conclusions concerning reconstruction in Sint Maarten
9.1. The overall design of support to reconstruction
9.2. Effectiveness: achievements and challenges at mid-point of the reconstruction process
9.3. Efficiency: learning from experience in implementation modalities

10. Recommendations concerning reconstruction in Sint Maarten
10.1. Recommendations for the remainder of the reconstruction phase (until end 2025)
10.2. Recommendations beyond 2025

Annex I: Terms of Reference - Part II
Annex II: Letter to Parliament of 21 September 2020
Annex III: Letter to Parliament of 17 December 2020
Annex IV: Evaluation matrix with references
Annex V: Interview guides
Annex VI: Lists of persons met

List of acronyms and abbreviations

Acronym / abbreviation	Meaning
Art.	Article
ATRP	Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project
BETF	Bank-executed Trust Fund
BZK	(Netherlands) Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
CARTAC	Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center of the International Monetary Fund
CBS	(Netherlands) Central Office for Statistics *(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek)*
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Control and Prevention
COHO	Caribbean Mechanism for Reform and Development
CRPP	Child Resilience and Protection Project
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSPFRP	Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project
DAC	(OECD) Development Assistance Committee
DGTP	Digital Government Transformation Project
DRF	Disaster Relief Fund
EDMP	Emergency Debris Management Project
EDP	Emergency Disaster Preparedness Plan
EIB	European Investment Bank
e.g.	For example
EISTP	Emergency Income Support and Training Project
ERP-I	Emergency Recovery Project I
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
ESP	Enterprise Support Project
EUR	Euros
FRLP	Fostering Resilient Learning Project preparation grant
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEBE	Sint Maarten's Utility Company
HRPP	Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness Project
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
Ibid.	At the same place
i.e.	That is
IFV	Institute for Public Safety (previously *Instituut voor Fysieke Veiligheid)*
ISRS	Integrated Social Registry System
Kstk	Document of Parliament (Kamerstuk)
MHF	Mental Health Foundation

MYCYS	(Sint Maarten) Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports
KPSM	Sint Maarten Police Force
MHF	Mental Health Foundation
MSME	Micro, small and medium enterprises
MTR	Mid-Term Review
Naf	Netherlands Antilles Guilder
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
NOC*NSF	Netherlands Olympic Committee / Netherlands Sport Federation
NRPB	National Recovery Program Bureau
NRRP	National Recovery and Resilience Plan
OCW	Netherlands Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORVG	Cooperating services under Mutual Agreement Border Control Sint Maarten (*Onderlinge regeling versterking grenstoezicht Sint Maarten)*
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization
PJIA	Princess Juliana International Airport
PJIAE	Princess Juliana International Airport Operating Company N.V.
PJIAH	Princess Juliana International Airport Holding Company N.V
PM&A	Program Management and Administration
PPG	Project Preparation Grant
R4CR	Resources for Community Resilience
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RCNL	Red Cross Netherlands
RETF	Recipient-executed Trust Fund
SC	Steering Committee
SF	Sint Maarten Trust Fund Strategic Framework
SMHDF	Sint Maarten Housing Development Foundation
SMDF	Sint Maarten Development Fund
SMMC	Sint Maarten Medical Center
SRU	Social Registry Unit
SWM	Solid Waste Management
SXM TF	Sint Maarten Reconstruction, Recovery and Resilience Trust Fund
TDSR	Temporary Debris Storage and Reduction
TF	Trust Fund
UN	United Nations
UNDP	the United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNICEF-NL	United Nation Children's Fund Netherlands
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USD	United States Dollar
USONA	Implementing Organization of the Development Foundation Netherlands Antilles (*Uitvoeringsorganisatie Stichting Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Antillen)*
VNACS	Representation of the Netherlands in Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten (*Vertegenwoordiging van Nederland in Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maarten)*
VNG-I	VNG-International *(Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten Internationaal)*
VROMI	(Sint Maarten) Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment, and Infrastructure
VSA	(Sint Maarten) Ministry of Public Health, Social Development and Labor
VWS	(Netherlands) Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport
WB	World Bank

Preface

The present study is part of a policy review concerning article 8 of the Netherlands Budget of Kingdom Relations labelled "Reconstruction in the Windward Islands"[1]. It covers the restoration of basic services and infrastructure in Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba to levels, which existed before hurricanes Irma and Maria that struck the islands in September 2017.

The policy review was announced to the Netherlands Parliament (House of Representatives – *Tweede Kamer*) on 21 September 2020 with a description of the intended overall design, goal, evaluation questions, delineation, methodological approach, timelines and institutional arrangements[2]. The initial commitment was that the policy review would be presented to Parliament during the last quarter of 2021. This date was, however, revised at a later stage to last quarter of 2022[3].

For analytical purposes, the overall evaluation has been sub-divided into three parts: a) Part I: emergency assistance on all three islands (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) - article 8.2.; b) Part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten – article 8.1.; c) Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius – article 8.1. The present study only concerns Part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten. Only activities completed by 31 December 2021, i.e. at mid-point of the implementation period as originally foreseen (end 2025) have been taken into consideration in this evaluation.

Activities undertaken and results achieved in Sint Maarten in 2022 have not been taken into consideration in this study. It should be mentioned that the duration of the World Bank supported Trust Fund was recently extended by 36 months beyond the scheduled end-date of 31 December 2025, i.e. until 31 December 2028, by decision of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom (*Rijksministerraad)* of 21 June 2022.

As this extension coincides with key recommendations of this report, the forward-looking part of this study may already appear somewhat out of date by the time when the report reaches Parliament during the last quarter of 2022. It is nevertheless hoped that recommendations will still be useful for the actual shaping of the Trust Fund between now and the end of 2028.

At this point, the author of this report, independent evaluator Lucien Bäck, would like to thank all those who have guided the evaluation between March 2021 and August 2022. Thanks are due especially to Mr. Wim Bekker and Mr. Patrick Vonk, who managed the evaluation on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (henceforth referred to as Ministry of BZK[4]) and who took upon themselves the onerous task of compiling key documents from the archives of the Ministry and other public services in the Netherlands. They also facilitated interviews and supported the Evaluation Support Group (see below).

Special thanks are due to Mr. Ted Kliest, External Independent Adviser, who undertook several rounds of diligent and meticulous reading of draft versions of the report and provided most helpful general and specific comments as part of his quality assurance assignment. The evaluation also benefitted from advice provided by the inter-ministerial Evaluation Support Group chaired by Mr. Sjef IJzermans (see Annex VI for the names of members in the Group). The critical role of the Group is gratefully acknowledged.

[1] Article 8 of chapter IV (Kingdom Relations) of the national budget (Parliamentary Paper 33 189, no. 12 and *Wijziging van de begrotingsstaten van Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) voor het jaar 2018 (Derde incidentele suppletoire begroting inzake wederopbouw Bovenwindse Eilanden), kstk. 34988-2 d.d. 6 juli 2018*

[2] *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Ministerie van BZK, 21 september 2020* https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/09/21/kamerbrief-onderzoeksopzet-beleidsdoorlichting-artikel-8-bzk-begroting, website consulted on 22 August 2022. See Annex II.

[3] *Kstk 33189, Nr. 13, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 17 december 2020, Antwoorden op vragen commissie over de onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Koninkrijksrelaties* https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z25295&did=2020D53094 website consulted 22 August 2022. See Annex III.

[4] Dutch acronym for *Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.*

It should be mentioned that all experts guiding the evaluation duly respected the independence of the evaluator, who therefore assumes full responsibility for findings, conclusions and recommendations in this report (see also disclaimer on the title page of this report).

Although the reviews of parts I/III and II followed different paths and resulted in separate reports, close coordination could be ensured between Ecorys, the consultancy firm in charge of parts I/III, and the author of this report on part II. Support by Mr. Michel Briene, Ms. Elvira Meurs and Ms. Simone Snoeijenbos is gratefully acknowledged especially for the organisation of interviews during the field trip to Sint Maarten (8-20 November 2021) and by videoconferencing with stakeholders in the Netherlands and other parts of the Kingdom.

Annex VI contains the full list of these stakeholders in the Ministry of BZK, other Ministries in the Netherlands, as well as among other public and non-governmental partner organisations. Their contributions through interviews and in some cases written comments have been much appreciated.

The field visit was kindly coordinated by Ms. Nerissa Cornelia, Legal Policy Adviser in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten. Mr. Marcel Gumbs, the Sint Maarten Representative in the Trust Fund Steering Committee, made himself available for an extensive interview. Most precious was also support provided by management and staff of the National Recovery Program Bureau, especially Mr. Claret Connor, Mr. Abel Knottnerus, Ms. Olivia Lake and Mr. Thijn Laurensse, both during the field visit and through email exchanges during the report-writing phase.

Throughout the evaluation process, Ms. Michelle Keane, World Bank Program Manager, provided a wealth of information and helped the evaluator negotiate the single-audit principle and regulated public information policies of the Bank. It was agreed that this review focused on the contribution of the Netherlands to reconstruction in Sint Maarten under article 8 and would not be an evaluation of the World Bank supported Trust Fund. Only information available in the public domain on Trust Fund activities has been used in this report.

Executive Summary

The policy review of art. 8[5] of the Kingdom Budget[6]

The present policy review is governed by provisions of the Regulation of Periodical Evaluation Research of the Government of the Netherlands of 15 March 2018[7]. The overall review focuses on 8 of the budget for Kingdom Relations describing funds reserved for emergency assistance article and reconstruction of the Windward Islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius[8].

Policy reviews of this type follow standard evaluation questions. This particular review takes into account further development of the standard questions in the Letter by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (henceforth referred to as Ministry of BZK[9]) to the House of Representatives of 21 September 2020[10] concerning the policy review of article 8[11].

For analytical purposes, the evaluation has been sub-divided into three parts: a) Part I: emergency assistance on all three islands (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) - article 8.2.; b) Part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten (both World Bank Trust Fund projects and direct support activities) – article 8.1.; c) Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius – article 8.1.

The present report only covers part II (reconstruction in Sint Maarten), which has been conducted by an independent evaluator. The larger part of reconstruction in Sint Maarten comprises activities implemented through the World Bank executed Trust Fund which is currently scheduled to end on 30 June 2025[12]. This policy review was therefore designed to be a mid-term evaluation. This review also covers direct support activities with disbursements until 31 December 2021[13] and spending without a specific end-date[14].

The evaluator of part II will eventually also be responsible for a synthesis report covering the evaluation results of both parts I / III and part II.

Context and motivation of Dutch support to reconstruction in Sint Maarten[15]

The islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius were hit by devastating Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017. Sint Maarten was particularly hard hit by Hurricane Irma which struck on 6 September 2017.

The Government of the Netherlands was disposed to contribute a maximum of EUR 550.0 million to reconstruction in Sint Maarten in addition to emergency assistance in 2017. This was a

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[5] Article 8 of chapter IV (Kingdom Relations) of the national budget (Parliamentary Paper 33 189, no. 12 and *Wijziging van de begrotingsstaten van Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) voor het jaar 2018 (Derde incidentele suppletoire begroting inzake wederopbouw Bovenwindse Eilanden), kstk. 34988-2 d.d. 6 juli 2018.*

[6] Question 1, 2 and 5 in the Letter by the State Secretary of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to Parliament of 21 September 2021, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/09/21/kamerbrief-onderzoeksopzet-beleidsdoorlichting-artikel-8-bzk-begroting, website consulted on 22 August 2022.

[7] *Regeling Periodiek Evaluatieonderzoek* 15 March 2018 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0040754/2018-03-27, website consulted on 22 August 2022.

[8] https://www.rijksfinancien.nl/jaarverslag/2018/IV/onderdeel/d17e6028 website consulted on 22 August 2022.

[9] Dutch acronym for Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.

[10] *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Ministerie van BZK, 21 september 2020* https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/09/21/kamerbrief-onderzoeksopzet-beleidsdoorlichting-artikel-8-bzk-begroting, website consulted on 22 August 2022. See Annex II

[11]. *Kstk 33189, Nr. 13, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 17 december 2020, Antwoorden op vragen commissie over de onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Koninkrijksrelaties* https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z25295&did=2020D53094 website consulted on 22 August 2022. See Annex III.

[12] Sint Maarten Reconstruction, Recovery and Resilience Trust Fund.

[13] The original deadline for BZK disbursements under direct support was 31 December 2021. It has been extended for an amount of EUR 5.0 million until 30 June 2022. Activities under this extension are not taken into consideration.

[14] For further details on direct support activities see section 8.

[15] Questions 3 and 4 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.

generous offer that emanated from a deep and lasting sense of solidarity in the Netherlands with other parts of the Kingdom based on centuries of shared history[16].

This was in compliance with art. 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom adopted on 10 October 2010 (usually referred to as 10-10-10) which stipulates that the four countries of the Kingdom provide each other mutual help and support. This is commonly understood to be a voluntary engagement, not an obligation. Due to the autonomy of the three Caribbean countries since 10-10-10, the understanding has also been that such help and support would require an explicit request to be addressed by a country in need to the other countries, including the Netherlands.

Longer term reconstruction needs were considered at an early stage, i.e., while emergency assistance was still under way. As early as on 15 September 2017, a little more than a week after the hurricane, a letter was addressed by the Ministry of BZK to the Government of Sint Maarten[17] announcing that a significant financial envelope could be made available for the reconstruction of the island, provided Sint Maarten gave its consent to two conditionalities, viz. a) the establishment of an Integrity Chamber[18]; and b) strengthening of border control. Both conditions were described as essential for the support to benefit the population of Sint Maarten in a sustainable manner[19].

The conditionalities were not immediately met by the then Government of Sint Maarten. In November 2017, after a cabinet crisis in Sint Maarten, a new caretaker Government accepted the conditions. The Netherlands Government then pursued with the design of the Dutch contribution to reconstruction in Sint Maarten, the larger part of which was eventually to be channelled through a World Bank executed Trust Fund and a smaller part through direct support. The Government of the Netherlands maintained close involvement in decision-making under both modalities.

Design of the support[20]

The laudable intent of the Netherlands Government to invest EUR 550.0 million in reconstruction of Sint Maarten was a high-level political decision in the Netherlands, which lacked an in-depth needs assessment and a detailed results framework spelling out goals and objectives, expected impact, outcomes and inputs.

Neither the Netherlands Ministry of BZK nor the Government of Sint Maarten initially had realistic expectations as to benefits to be derived from Trust Fund execution and challenges associated with this mode of operation. Although supported by the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of BZK did not have realistic expectations as to the *modus operandi* of the World Bank and when reconstruction activities would be fully operational and how much time would be required to see results on the ground.

The Netherlands, more specifically the Ministry of BZK, initially estimated full operationalization of the Trust Fund and early results by mid-2018. The creation of an adequate management structure, the establishment of the National Reconstruction Program Bureau (NRPB), took more time than expected by the Ministry. Operationalization through projects also met with unexpected challenges for a variety of reasons, e.g., unexpected complexity of debris management, managerial challenges at the airport, the need to adapt the legislation. Smaller social projects to be executed by Dutch and local partners outside the Government of Sint Maarten started up in earnest only in 2020-2021.

Based on international experience the World Bank was aware that the setting up of capacity in countries without previous experience with the Bank would take time. In the Netherlands, the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, more familiar with the World Bank, were apparently also

[16] See Conclusion 1.
[17] Letter of the Netherlands Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations addressed to the Government of Sint Maarten on 13 October 2017.
[18] For further details see section 8.3.
[19] See conclusion 2.
[20] Question 10 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.

more realistic in their expectations, but this message somehow did not register with the Ministry of BZK.

The absence of a proper results framework for article 8 severely limits the evaluability of reconstruction in Sint Maarten. While this limitation is less felt for Trust Fund activities due to the existence of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), the Strategic Framework and project-specific results frameworks, it represents a major drawback for the assessment of direct support activities, none of which are supported by a proper definition of objectives, expected impact, outcomes and outputs. Reporting on these activities, to the extent that it is available at all, also remains rather generic and unspecific in this regard. This has had consequences for the evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency under this policy review, which cannot fully comply with requirements defined in the guidelines of Periodical Policy Reviews[21], namely, to assess achievement of expected outputs and outcomes[22].

Implementation through the World Bank executed Trust Fund[23]

The entire contribution to the Trust Fund was to be released to the World Bank in four tranches. The first and second tranches were released in 2018 amounting to EUR 112.0 million and EUR 150.0 million respectively. A third tranche of EUR 90.0 million was transferred in November 2020. The fourth tranche amounting to EUR 86.115.000 was sent to the World Bank in October 2021. The total now adds up to EUR 438.115 million.

This amount is lower than the EUR 470.0 million originally foreseen, as deductions were made for disbursements by the Netherlands Government through bilateral channels. The amount of EUR 16.9 million was used for bilateral liquidity support to Sint Maarten in 2018. It was also agreed between Sint Maarten and the Netherlands in 2021 that an additional EUR 15.0 million would be deducted from the Trust Fund budget and made available through Covid-19 related bilateral liquidity support.

The World Bank executed Trust Fund has played its role well as a neutral and trusted intermediary for the Government of the Netherlands[24]. From the perspective of the Netherlands Government the Trust Fund has proved to be an effective mechanism ensuring adequate spending of resources and avoidance of too direct confrontations with partners in Sint Maarten. Issues and challenges that may arise are resolved in the tripartite Steering Committee that guides and controls Trust Fund operations. Both the Netherlands and Sint Maarten have had themselves represented by the same senior officials since the beginning. Both enjoy the trust of their respective political leadership. They have entertained amicable and constructive relations among themselves.

The reaction has been more muted in Sint Maarten[25]. While the well-funded contribution to reconstruction is welcomed, requirements embodied in the many procurement guidelines and other safeguards applied by the World Bank have at times been felt to be rather undesirable burdens and distractions. Trust Fund support is sometimes perceived as an extended arm of the Netherlands. With such a heavy external involvement by the Netherlands and the World Bank, Sint Maarten at least initially experienced difficulties in developing a sense of ownership and leadership in line with what might be expected in an autonomous country in the Kingdom. There are nevertheless indications that Government interest and involvement in Trust Fund projects and its support to these projects has grown considerably at the ministerial and technical levels.

However, in general terms, the ambiguity of Kingdom Relations inherent to the 10-10-10 Charter, a built-in contradiction between autonomy on the one hand, but dependence on external support

[21] *Regeling Periodiek Evaluatieonderzoek* 15 March 2018 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0040754/2018-03-27, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[22] See conclusion 3.
[23] Questions 6 and 7 as well as e) f) g) and h) in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[24] See conclusions 4 and 6.
[25] See conclusion 7.

with strings attached, on the other, lies like a thick blanket over Trust Fund relations and operations.

Implementation through direct support[26]

The maximum budget allocated to direct support to Sint Maarten originally amounted to EUR 80.0 million. Deductions were made for programme support cost for the Ministry of BZK (EUR 8.0 million). The maximum amount available to Sint Maarten was hence EUR 72.0 million. Of this amount, EUR 22.8 million were allocated to reimbursable liquidity support 2017 and EUR 7.0 million to early recovery activities of which EUR 6.8 million were disbursed. The net amount available for direct support to reconstruction in Sint Maarten was hence around EUR 42.4 million of which a little more than EUR 27.0 were disbursed as of the end of 2021.

Direct support funds were meant to finance activities that could or would not be addressed by the Trust Fund. Activities include delivery of equipment, training, and other forms of technical assistance, e.g., advisory services, legal support, and technical studies. They can be grouped together as follows: a) border control (immigration, customs, coast guard, police force KPSM[27]); b) public law and order (KPSM, public prosecutor, detention centre / crime fund); c) public social services (ambulance services, fire brigade, and light masts for sports fields); and d) bilaterally implemented support to World Bank executed Trust Fund activities. Direct support also included supplementary funding to the Representation of the Netherlands in Sint Maarten (VNACS[28]) and expenditure related to the present policy review. The latter two remain outside the purview of this report.

Discontinuity between early recovery and social projects under the Trust Fund[29]

Early recovery projects ceased to receive support from art. 8 budgets in mid-2018. The Trust Fund was slow in addressing these needs. The Emergency Recovery Project (ERP-1), though approved in July 2018, started disbursements on social goals as from March 2019 only, albeit on a limited scale once minimum requirements for World Bank involvement had been met. The Red Cross Roof Repair and the Enterprise Support Projects were approved end of 2019 and became effective in 2020. In both cases, Dutch and local partners that had overseen early recovery projects – the Red Cross and Qredits – were not supported from article 8 for almost two years. The gap was even longer for UNICEF Netherlands, as the Child Resilience Project was only approved in January 2021. Another project, the Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project also became effective only in 2021[30].

It should be noted that continuity between early recovery projects and Trust Fund operations was not part of discussions between the Netherlands and the World Bank. Continuation of the early recovery activities would have served as a useful bridge of support to the population (albeit on a smaller scale and with different standards) while larger more structural national scale programmes of the Trust Fund were prepared. Such Trust Fund programmes could have been prioritized within the shortest possible time after Trust Fund establishment. Benefits from World Bank support would still have accrued only after some time given that its approach was based on systematic and transparent national criteria of eligibility including appropriate evidence to allow for fair distribution of benefits.

The decision to limit scope and duration of the early recovery phase was partly due to unrealistic expectations in the Netherlands as to how quickly the Trust Fund could take over on social goals in an effective and efficient manner. If the decision had been better informed, the early recovery phase could at least have had a more consequential budget and a longer time-period. The

[26] Question 6 and 7 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[27] *Koninklijke Politie Sint Maarten.*
[28] *Vertegenwoordiging van Nederland in Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maarten.*
[29] Question c) in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[30] See conclusions 8 and 9.

Governments of Sint Maarten and the Netherlands could also have insisted that the Trust Fund would address social needs as a matter of priority right as from Trust Fund establishment.

At the same time, it is well known how the World Bank approaches such projects in other parts of the world and that comprehensive programmes would require a good deal of preparatory work. With hindsight, an obvious alternative could have been not to entrust the World Bank with these projects but to situate them in the direct support component alongside activities aiming to support border control and public law and order. This would however have had the drawback that Sint Maarten would not have benefitted from the advantages of the World Bank approach.

Local and Dutch partner organisations in question[31], may be assumed to possess the necessary credentials to implement social projects, e.g., on housing, repairs of shelters and schools and offering psychosocial support etc. in a competent and effective manner, albeit not on a scale that was possible with World Bank support to Sint Maarten. Implementation under direct support would most probably also have come at a lower cost. It should be mentioned that all these organisations usually entertain excellent relations with the Sint Maarten Government.

The Ministry of BZK could have managed the process from a distance, in the same manner as what had already been practiced successfully in the early recovery phase. A more consequential direct support budget may have required more human resources in the Ministry with the necessary managerial and technical skills. Additional staff could have been drawn from other Ministries and public services in the Netherlands on funding to be provided from the technical support component.

Effectiveness[32]

The World Bank reports more than adequately on project results and challenges[33]. Within the limits agreed between the Ministry of BZK and the World Bank about the use of information, Trust Fund executed projects are well documented, both as far as their design and their implementation and results achieved are concerned. In most cases, it is possible to distil objectives, expected outcomes and outputs and their relative realization considering their starting date. In its aggregate reporting, mostly in its annual and semi-annual reports, the World Bank reports on results and also mentions challenges that have been encountered, e.g., with the legal framework in Sint Maarten, the limited size of the economy, and administrative impediments.

While it is too early to judge results on social projects started in 2020-2021, implementation through the Trust Fund has resulted in good achievements on major infrastructure projects, notably the Airport Terminal Reconstruction, the Hospital Resilience, and the Emergency Debris Management Projects[34]. At mid-point of the current implementation period for article 8 funding, the reconstruction of major infrastructure in Sint Maarten shows good achievements or at least results that could realistically be expected. The World Bank has demonstrated great competence on such major projects. Procedural guidelines and safeguards are really designed for such projects and have a very beneficial effect. Especially for the Airport and Debris Management projects, they did present challenges for the Government of Sint Maarten and agencies involved in the implementation, as they required new laws and regulations and different management practices. The Sint Maarten Medical Center already worked according to standards that were compatible with World Bank safeguards.

When judging progress and effectiveness of these infrastructure projects, it is necessary to let a certain sense of realism prevail. It may be helpful to make comparisons with similar projects in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the world, many of which have faced huge unexpected legal and

[31] These comprise non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like UNICEF Netherlands and the Netherlands Red Cross, civil society organisations (CSOs) as well as other institutions, which are not NGOs, e.g., VNG-International or the Schiphol Group. Throughout the document all these institutions are referred to as partner or implementing organisations.
[32] Questions 8, 9, 11 and 12 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[33] See conclusion 10.
[34] See conclusions 11 and 12.

technical challenges. Damages from the fireworks disaster in Enschede in 2000 took many years to repair. The construction of metro lines in Amsterdam and a high-speed railway line in the Netherlands took much more time than initially foreseen and exceeded original cost estimates. Building a new airport in Berlin was delayed for many years and showed huge cost overruns. One should also look at reconstruction works after Irma and other hurricanes elsewhere in the Caribbean, e.g., in Dominica, Montserrat, Puerto Rico or Texas. By comparison, Sint Maarten does not do too badly.

By contrast, activities funded under direct support are much less well designed and documented[35]. Direct support activities were not mapped out in any detail or with results-based management principles in mind at the outset and remained a convenient source of funding for various needs outside the Trust Fund that have arisen in recent years[36]. The Netherlands Government could thus grant comprehensive technical assistance to the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment and Infrastructure (VROMI) and to the Airport, including the funding of legal services and support to financial and technical management. More recently, direct support funding has also been used for activities related to debris management outside the Trust Fund.

There is convincing evidence that border control has been considerably strengthened because of direct support funding. This had been a top priority for the Government of the Netherlands since before Hurricane Irma, but it became even more urgent during the post-Irma crisis. Most importantly, the Royal Marechaussee and Netherlands Customs became part of a consultative mechanism, with resulting intensive capacity development directed at the KPSM, Sint Maarten Customs, the Coast Guard and Immigration. Illegal border crossings of people in and out of the country were reduced as well as were smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal (labour) migration and uncontrolled imports and exports of money and goods. There has been improved practical cooperation with the French side on the island, e.g., in Coast Guard operations, but more formal arrangements have been limited, as this would have to involve decision-making in Paris.

Results related to areas of public law and order are less supported by evidence. Digitalisation of the Public Prosecutors Office contributed to improvements in the overall fight against crime. So did support to the KPSM. By contrast, progress in the rehabilitation of the Point Blanche detention centre was initially rather slow, which seems to have been largely due to lack of support by the Government of Sint Maarten. There are, however, signs that there has been better communication between the Netherlands and Sint Maarten in this regard since 2020.

Building Back Better[37]

The ambitious and complex political agenda of Building Back Better has received adequate attention under article 8 funding, but it is still too soon to assess its effectiveness in all its dimensions[38]. The agenda encompasses three dimensions: a) Material reconstruction of buildings and other physical infrastructure to hurricane 5 resistant standards; b) Improved disaster management capacity and disaster preparedness; and c) a broad agenda of good governance, strengthening of civil society, economic diversification and policies aiming at sustainable development in pursuit of social and environmental goals.

Building Back Better has been a political agenda especially in the Netherlands. It was included in an Appendix to the Administration Arrangement concluded with the World Bank. It implicitly also guided direct support activities. Although the Appendix is non-binding, it largely converges with reconstruction goals of the World Bank not only for this Trust Fund. Elements of Building Back Better were incorporated in the Strategic Focus Areas of the Trust Fund and, albeit more implicitly, in direct support activities. Major infrastructure projects, such as rehabilitation of the airport and Medical Center as well as debris management, are executed with hurricane 5 resistance as a goal to the greatest possible extent. Such a standard is more difficult to meet with home repairs,

[35] See conclusion 10.
[36] See conclusion 13.
[37] Questions g) and h) in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[38] See conclusion 14.

rehabilitation or rebuilding of shelters and schools and other social infrastructure. In these works, one is faced with a huge dilemma between the urgency of necessary interventions and the aim to offer the highest quality of constructions.

Improved disaster preparedness and management is exemplified by the promotion of the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCIRF) and membership in the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) under ERP-I. The medium-/long-term perspective of the establishment of a National Disaster Fund with reimbursements by Princess Juliana International Airport (PJIA) to the Government of Sint Maarten opens the possibility of self-sustaining disaster management. Direct support activities also clearly aim at strengthening disaster preparedness with equipment for the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment and Infrastructure (VROMI) and the fire brigade, digitalization of the Public Prosecutor's Office and a much-improved detention centre.

In terms of the realization of broad goals like good governance, economic diversification and sustainable social and economic development, there are encouraging partial results, but by and large it is too soon to conclude on the achievement of these high goals in a comprehensive manner.

Positive and negative side-effects[39]

The huge volume of funding under article 8 in combination with strong roles exercised by the Trust Fund and the Netherlands, have had unexpected side-effects in Sint Maarten which cannot yet be fully assessed[40].

The insistence on good governance, on adequate procurement rules and social and environmental safeguards by the Trust Fund and the Netherlands has had the positive side-effect that capacities of managerial and technical staff in Sint Maarten have been improved, e.g., in the NRPB, in line ministries and in other partner organisations. The newly acquired skills can be used not only in current jobs, but also in future employment situations. It is too early to measure these positive side-effects in a comprehensive way.

Some features of the Trust Fund and involvement of the Netherlands may have had less desirable side-effects, the full extent of which can also not be assessed at this stage. One side-effect has been that the application of high standards of scrutiny in the financial management, procurement, and safeguards areas have placed heavy administrative and procedural burdens on Sint Maarten. Such a burden may have been disproportionate to the island's size and capacity.

Another is that, at least in the short run, the intensive demand for building materials and construction workers drives up prices and has an inflationary effect. Finally, demanding administrative procedures and the need to comply with guidelines, according to some stakeholders in Sint Maarten, may paralyze or at least slow down progress both in government and even more so in NGO and civil society organisation (CSO) action. Stakeholders in Sint Maarten may have been prevented, at least initially, from developing a sense of ownership and leadership because of too heavy-handed external management.

Trust Fund priorities could also crowd out other development challenges, e.g., non-addressed dimensions of climate change mitigation, freshwater and wastewater management, the road infrastructure and public transport etc. While post-Irma reconstruction (and currently Covid-19 related funding needs) have been the most important issues that needed to be addressed, the Government of Sint Maarten would normally have to weigh their relative importance in a broader context and define its own political priorities with a long-term vision. This will become more important, as post-Irma effects (and possibly also Covid-19 requirements) recede over time.

[39] Question 12 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[40] See Conclusion 15.

Efficiency[41]

Due to the single audit principle under World Bank policies, external partners are precluded from assessing the efficiency of World Bank executed Trust Fund operations. This policy review also had no access to World Bank audits. It is therefore beyond the remit of this policy review to evaluate the efficiency of the Trust Fund projects.

The World Bank contends that all Trust Fund projects are assessed on an economic rate of return basis. While the cost / benefit ratio is likely to be adequate as far as the large infrastructure projects (airport, hospital, debris management), this may be less true for smaller social projects (EISTP, Red Cross Roof Repair, ESP, Civil Society R4CR, Child Resilience). It has taken a long time to prepare these projects, get them approved and start operations.

Had the Dutch and local partner organisations selected for their implementation been allowed to pursue their operations started during the early recovery phase under the direct support modality of the Ministry of BZK, this would surely have sped up the process and pressing needs of the population in terms of housing, shelters, schools etc. would have been responded to more expeditiously. The scale of operations would, however, have been at a much lower level and Sint Maarten would not have benefitted from the much more comprehensive World Bank approach.

Most activities under direct support present difficulties to assess their efficiency. Financial documentation of the Ministry of BZK is not always well labelled and adjustments due to exchange rate fluctuations can often not be related to specific disbursements. This is also due to the paucity of traceable reporting. Results can be demonstrated for the areas of border control and public law and order. By contrast, it is harder to demonstrate specific effects of legal services and technical assistance for the airport and of studies on debris management, as they are part of a more complex set of measures under the Trust Fund. Finally, several activities were approved in 2021 only and do not warrant an assessment as to their effectiveness and efficiency yet[42].

The World Bank and main implementing partners of direct support (border control agencies, public law and order institutions, lawyers etc.) can be trusted to apply highest accountancy standards, fight corruption, and ensure best possible spending in terms of volumes / use and standards / prices[43]. The propriety of purchases in terms of volumes, prices and utility could ultimately only be determined, if a full-fledged audit on operations by Chartered Accountants were available. The World Bank has its own internal procedures in this regard. Direct support activities have been audited on various occasions by the General Accounts Chamber (*Algemene Rekenkamer*) in the Netherlands, whereby no improprieties were found[44].

If funding for reconstruction in Sint Maarten had amounted to significantly more (an increase by 20 percent to EUR 660.0 million) or less (a decrease by 20 percent to EUR 440.0 million)[45], this would have affected the scope of reconstruction efforts in Sint Maarten[46]. The National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) estimated in 2018 damages and losses caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria at USD 2.7 billion (USD 1.4 billion and USD 1.3 billion, respectively). Reconstruction needs thus by far exceeded the maximum contribution that the Government of the Netherlands was willing to make. If up to 20 percent more funding had been made available unfunded needs identified in the NRRP could have been addressed. The question is whether this would have been a wise decision, as even the current funding spending in Sint Maarten exceeded this small country's absorption capacity.

[41] Questions 13 and 15 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[42] See conclusion 18.
[43] See conclusions 16 and 17.
[44] *Algemene Rekenkamer 2018 en 2020, Focus op de Nederlandse bijdrage aan de wederopbouw van Sint Maarten; 2020 The Legend of Lokhay, mini-audit; 2018, 2019, 2020 en 2021, Resultaten verantwoordingsonderzoek Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) en BES fonds (H).*
[45] Question 15 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[46] See conclusions 19 and 20.

If by contrast significantly fewer resources had been made available (e.g., EUR 440.0 million corresponding to 20 percent less), fewer needs could have been addressed. It is likely that the rehabilitation of the hospital, the reconstruction of the airport and improved debris management would still have been included among the priorities. There were probably also options to reduce contributions to these projects by seeking complimentary funding from other sources. The ERP-I project could also have been reduced in scope through complimentary resource mobilization from other sources. In the worst case, significant needs would have remained unaddressed.

In the hypothetical case that at this point of time significantly fewer means were available (20 percent savings), projects and activities which have recently been approved and not yet commenced would have to be reconsidered as to their pertinence, scope and duration.

Recommendations for the remainder of the reconstruction phase (until end-2025)[47]

There is room for improvement in both financial and administrative documentation of disbursements made by the Ministry of BZK under article 8. In financial overviews labelling of disbursements needs to be more consistent and systematic and possible ex-post corrections (due to exchange rate calculations or corrections of mistakes) need to be more systematically related to the respective budget lines. One would also expect that specific disbursements can be more easily linked to underlying administrative decisions / contractual agreements with implementing organisations as well as narrative reporting related to the agreements[48].

The Ministry of BZK should also be less lenient on implementing partners, as far as reporting requirements are concerned. While the World Bank spontaneously excels in its reporting discipline (e.g., presenting frequent Regular Monitoring Reports and Annual- and Semi-Annual Reports), the majority of implementing partners of direct support activities present rather generic narrative reports, from which no specific information can be collected on outputs, outcomes and impact as well as challenges met. Requirements should take into account smart objectives, outcomes and outputs that are part of the improved design of activities to the extent that these are available.

Given that the rates of allocations and disbursements of both Trust Fund and direct support projects are basically on track, there is no need to consider an increase / decrease by 20 percent of this funding within the current timeframe of the project. An increase may be considered if the Trust Fund is extended beyond end-2025[49].

At mid-point of the article 8 implementation period, there is a need to establish realistic roadmaps for all projects determining whether they can be completed by end-2025 or whether they require alternative arrangements and / or a longer timeframe after end-2025[50].

Recommendations beyond end-2025[51]

Should Sint Maarten be struck by another major hurricane or other disaster in the future, and if the Netherlands were to consider supporting reconstruction under article 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom, the Netherlands should help Sint Maarten in drawing up a needs assessment and a more or less detailed reconstruction plan applying results-based management principles, i.e., spelling out goals and objectives, expected impact, outcomes and inputs of reconstruction efforts and allowing for monitoring and evaluation[52].

Under the Charter of the Kingdom, reconstruction in the aftermath of a hurricane or other disaster is basically the responsibility of the country of Sint Maarten itself. The first step would be an

[47] Question 14 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[48] See recommendation 1.
[49] See recommendation 2.
[50] See recommendation 3. As of mid-2022, the Rijksministerraad has already approved an extension to 2028. It has been agreed that this extension can take place without additional financing. Based on World Bank calculations this will be possible, though risks presented by rising prices may require within project and potentially portfolio level re-engineering of some Trust Fund projects and objectives (with marginal impact on broad outcomes).
[51] Question 14 in the Letter to Parliament concerning this policy review.
[52] See recommendation 4.

adequate assessment of damages and needs on which a reconstruction plan could be built. In 2018, the NRRP drawn up in Sint Maarten with assistance provided by the World Bank was a good example of what needs to be done. The plan guided the design of the Trust Fund and, to a much lesser extent, direct support activities.

At least the contribution of the Netherlands to such a plan should be formulated along results-based management principles with a clear and logical definition of goals and objectives and underlying inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. Each of these elements should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound ("smart") and be accompanied by appropriate indicators and hypotheses. It should be noted that the Ministry of BZK in its preparatory documentation related to the Caribbean Mechanism for Reform and Development (COHO) has already moved into this direction.

If the roadmap for individual projects indicates that several Trust Fund projects are unlikely to be completed by end-2025, an extension of the Trust Fund Administration Arrangement until at least the end of 2028 should be considered. This may require additional resources[53].

While current direct support projects, e.g., support to border control and public law and order, including the rehabilitation of the detention centre, should be completed as much as possible by end-2025, the modality may remain useful beyond 2025, as some of the NGO-executed projects currently implemented under the Trust Fund (e.g., the ESP, R4CR and Child Resilience Projects) could continue with direct support resources. This may require a strengthening of the respective expertise in the Ministry of BZK. A medium- and long-term vision for these activities should be developed as soon as possible, i.e., already during the current phase.

The prospect of the creation of a National Resilience Fund / Disaster Risk Facility on reimbursements by PJIA to the Government of Sint Maarten (currently estimated at USD 90.0 million) offers an interesting perspective for strengthening Sint Maarten's capacity to prepare for and respond to future disasters in a more autonomous manner[54]. The National Resilience Fund should be protected from uses other than strictly circumscribed disaster preparedness and response needs. It should be situated outside the national budget and its financial and administrative management should be entrusted to an autonomous authority. The NRPB could play a role in the implementation of projects and would then have to be granted a more long-term and permanent status. Additional resource mobilization from the Netherlands or from international capital markets could be envisaged. To the extent that resources originating in the Netherlands or requiring Dutch guarantees of a last-resort lender are involved, the Government of the Netherlands should be represented in the governance structure of the National Resilience Fund.

Finally, as the Kingdom of the Netherlands participates in the continuous updating of World Bank policies through its representation in the Executive Board of the World Bank, experiences made in Sint Maarten with the application of World Bank procurement guidelines and social and environmental safeguards should be brought to the attention of the representation, as they may be a useful source of inspiration for policymaking especially concerning small island states[55].

[53] See recommendation 5.
[54] See recommendations 6 and 7.
[55] See recommendation 8.

1. Introduction

1. The present policy review is governed by provisions of the Regulation of Periodical Evaluation Research of the Government of the Netherlands of 15 March 2018[56]. The Regulation requires periodic assessment of effectiveness and efficiency of policies and budget spending of the Netherlands Government[57]. The focus is on article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations administered by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations[58], henceforth referred to by its Dutch acronym: Ministry of BZK[59]. Article 8 is labelled "Reconstruction in the Windward Islands[60]" and specifically aims at the restoration of basic services and infrastructure for citizens in Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba to levels that existed before Hurricanes Irma and Maria which struck the islands in September 2017.

2. Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations covers a) emergency assistance to Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius (art. 8.2); and b) support to reconstruction on all three islands (art. 8.1). Support to reconstruction on Sint Maarten comprises activities aiming at early recovery in 2018. The design of the overall policy review was described in a letter by the State Secretary of BZK to Parliament of 21 September 2020[61]. The evaluation was divided into two parts, which were entrusted to different evaluators: a) emergency assistance on all three islands and early recovery in Sint Maarten (to be evaluated by consultancy company Ecorys)[62]; and b) reconstruction in Sint Maarten (to be evaluated by independent consultant Lucien Bäck, author of this report)[63]. Both reports will eventually feed into a synthesis report to be presented to Parliament in the Netherlands during the last quarter of 2022[64] (for further details see section 3).

3. The present report only covers art. 8 support to reconstruction in Sint Maarten (Part II). This report is structured as follows. After a brief presentation of context and background (section 2), the architecture of the overall policy review will be described in detail in section 3. Subsequently, in section 4, the focus will be on the present review with a presentation of the evaluation questions as defined in the evaluation matrix, and methods and limitations. Section 5 will present the design of reconstruction efforts in Sint Maarten. A detailed presentation of findings follows, both in terms of effectiveness (results achieved) and efficiency (costs and benefits). World Bank executed Trust Fund activities will be the focus of section 6 and direct support activities outside the Trust Fund of section 7. Section 8 will briefly highlight related activities beyond the purview of this review. Sections 9 and 10 will present conclusions and recommendations.

4. The terms of reference for this review are to be found in Annex I, the Letter to Parliament of 21 September 2021 guiding the terms of reference in Annex II, and a further Letter to Parliament of 17 December 2020 providing answers to questions asked by Members of Parliament

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[56] *Regeling Periodiek Evaluatieonderzoek* 15 March 2018 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0040754/2018-03-27, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[57] In line with the Regulation the terms *policy review* and *evaluation* will be used interchangeably.
[58] Article 8 of chapter IV (Kingdom Relations) of the national budget (Parliamentary Paper 33 189, no. 12 and *Wijziging van de begrotingsstaten van Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) voor het jaar 2018 (Derde incidentele suppletoire begroting inzake wederopbouw Bovenwindse Eilanden), kstk. 34988-2 d.d. 6 juli 2018*
[59] *Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.*
[60] The report follows the tradition in Dutch to describe the islands of the Lesser Antilles north of Dominica as *Windward Islands.* This is the literal translation of the corresponding term in Dutch "*Bovenwindse Eilanden".* In English the islands north of Dominica, including Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius, are usually described as *"Leeward Islands",* whereas for the Lesser Antilles south of Dominica the term *"Windward Islands"* is used. The Dutch linguistic preference is followed as the main audience of the report is in the Netherlands.
[61] *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Ministerie van BZK, 21 september 2020* https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/09/21/kamerbrief-onderzoeksopzet-beleidsdoorlichting-artikel-8-bzk-begroting, website consulted on 22 August 2022. See Annex II
[62] In the Terms of Reference emergency assistance (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) is referred to as part I and reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius as part III.
[63] Referred to in the Terms of Reference as part II.
[64] *Kstk 33189, Nr. 13, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 17 december 2020, Antwoorden op vragen commissie over de onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Koninkrijksrelaties* https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z25295&did=2020D53094 website consulted on 22 August 2022. See Annex III.

in Annex III. Annex IV contains the evaluation matrix with the evaluation questions[65] (including references to specific sections in the report). Annex V contains the interview guide and Annex VI the lists of persons met.

2. Context and background

5. The islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius were hit by devastating Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017. Sint Maarten was particularly hard hit by Hurricane Irma which struck on 6 September 2017. 90 % of the physical infrastructure of the Dutch part of the island was destroyed, including 50 % of the housing stock as well as the larger part of airport and port facilities. Drinking water supply and waste disposal were disrupted imperilling public health. Emergency assistance was initially hampered by a breakdown of communication lines and information gathering and sharing, as well as by a collapse of public order.

6. The Government of the Netherlands provided immediate emergency assistance to Sint Maarten as well as to the islands of Saba and Sint Eustatius, the latter two having been relatively spared by Hurricane Irma. But the other two islands were shortly after hit by Hurricane Maria. Initial emergency assistance in 2017 amounted to a maximum of EUR 55.0 million for the three islands followed by an early recovery phase with a maximum budgetary envelope of EUR 7.0 million that included essential projects to be initiated within a short time span and that could be expected to show quick results in 2018. As from the end of 2017, plans were made for funds designated for reconstruction in the islands. For Sint Maarten, the maximum amount of EUR 550.0 million was reserved, of which a maximum of EUR 470.0 million support through a Trust Fund with the World Bank and a maximum EUR 80.0 million as direct support, for activities to be implemented outside the Trust Fund. For Saba and Sint Eustatius EUR 67.0 million were reserved for reconstruction.

7. The three islands differ in their relationships with the Kingdom of the Netherlands as defined in the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands adopted on 10 October 2010 (usually referred to as 10-10-10). Sint Maarten is one of the autonomous countries of the kingdom, along with Aruba, Curaçao and the Netherlands. Sint Maarten enjoys autonomy in all areas unless limited by provisions of the Charter of the Kingdom[66] or on specific topics by mutual agreement. By contrast, Saba and Sint Eustatius, along with Bonaire, are public bodies of the country the Netherlands and by this token the Government of the Netherlands exercises direct authority on these islands. These differences in the status of the three islands affected procedures concerning emergency assistance and support to early recovery as well as reconstruction provided by the Government of the Netherlands to the three islands. Art 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom stipulates that the countries of the Kingdom provide each other with support and assistance (see section 5.1. how this provision is interpreted).

8. The island of Sint Maarten comprises the country with the same name in the South, commonly referred to as the Dutch part of the island, and the Overseas Collectivity of Saint Martin in the North, which is part of the French Republic (and therefore also of the European Union). The Dutch part of the island had an official population of 41,000 in 2018, whereas the public entities of Saba and Sint Eustatius had populations of nearly 2,000 and 3,1000 respectively. The islands are on similar levels of development, falling under the World Bank Group's classification of upper income countries[67]. GDP per capita in 2020 was highest for Sint Maarten (USD 29,200), followed

[65] Evaluation Questions contained in the Letter to Parliament of 21 September 2020 were slightly reformulated for analytical purposes in an Evaluation Matrix that guided this policy review. In all cases the link with the original questions was maintained.
[66] According to art. 3 of the Charter, the Kingdom is responsible for: a) preserving the independence of the kingdom; b) foreign affairs; c) Netherlands citizenship; d) decorations, flag and coat of arms of the kingdom; e) nationality of and safety requirements for sea vessels; f) admission and deportation of Netherlands citizens; e) admission and deportation of aliens; f) extradition.
[67] The World Bank Group uses an income classification system to group countries based on Gross National Income per capita (Atlas Method).

by Sint Eustatius and Saba (both USD 27,800)[68]. Before the hurricane, tourism accounted for roughly half of GDP in Sint Maarten and three quarters of foreign exchange earnings[69].

3. The overall policy review of article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations

3.1. Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations

9. Table 1 presents the complex overall architecture of funds to be allocated to emergency assistance and reconstruction on the three islands. For immediate emergency assistance to all three islands a maximum budget of EUR 55.0 million was foreseen and EUR 40.5 million was disbursed. A maximum of EUR 18.0 million was initially reserved under art. 8 for reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius, but the amount of EUR 20.5 million was disbursed[70]. These envelopes are included in the top left and top right corners of the table[71]. A maximum budget of EUR 550.0 million was destined to reconstruction in Sint Maarten. Further details are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Art 8 – Disbursement of allocated funds

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Allocation and disbursements of funds under article 8 of the Kingdom Budget</th></tr>
<tr><td>Allocation max.
EUR 55.0 million
Disbursed
EUR 40.5 million
Emergency assistance
Sint Maarten, Saba, and
Sint Eustatius</td><td colspan="2">Allocation max EUR 550.0
Reconstruction Sint Maarten
↓ ↓</td><td>Allocation art. 8
EUR 18.0 million
(out of total allocation
EUR 67.0 million)
Reconstruction Saba
and Sint Eustatius and
Sea Cable
Disbursed art. 8
EUR 20.4 milion</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Allocation max. EUR 470.0 million
World Bank executed Trust Fund Sint Maarten</td><td colspan="2">Allocation max. EUR 80.0 million
Early Recovery and Direct support Sint Maarten</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Less:
Liquidity support 2018:
EUR 16.9 million</td><td></td><td>Less:
Liquidity support 2017:
EUR 22.8 million</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Less:
Programme support
Ministry of BZK:
EUR 8.0 million</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>Early recovery
Sint Maarten
Allocation max.
EUR 7.0 million
Disbursements
EUR 6.8 million</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>1st tranche (2018):

EUR 112.0 million</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>2nd tranche (2018):

EUR 150.0 million</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>3rd tranche (2020):

EUR 90.0 million</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Less:
Deduction in 2021:

EUR 15.0 million</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>4th tranche (2021):</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

[68] Source: CBS, 2020. Trends in the Caribbean Netherlands.
[69] Source: World Bank Trust Fund semi-annual report 30 June 2021.
[70] It should be noted that the art. 8 funding was a small contribution to the overall financing of reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius, as the Government of the Netherlands committed an overall amount of EUR 67.0 million.
[71] Emergency assistance to all three islands, early recovery in Sint Maarten and reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius are evaluated by another team of evaluators (Ecorys). See report on parts I and III of the policy review. These budget posts are highlighted in yellow. Budget posts outside this policy review are highlighted in red. See below section 3.3.

EUR 86.115 million			
Available in the Trust Fund: Allocation max. EUR 438.115 million[72]		**Available for direct support Sint Maarten (after deductions and disbursements for early recovery): max EUR 42.4 million Disbursements as of 31 December 2021: EUR 27.031 million[73]**	

10. The maximum budget of EUR 550.0 million was subdivided into a) an envelope of an initial maximum of EUR 470.0 million to be channelled through a World Bank executed Trust Fund; and b) an initial maximum of EUR 80.0 million earmarked for direct support, i.e., funding to be provided for activities implemented through bilateral cooperation between the Netherlands and Sint Maarten, without involvement of the World Bank. Both budgets were eventually curtailed. Deductions were made from the original Trust Fund budget, i.e., a) EUR 16.9 million for liquidity support provided directly to Sint Maarten in 2018, b) as well as, in 2021 another EUR 15.0 million, which was withheld from the last tranche in 2021[74]. Deductions were also made from the direct support provisions: a) EUR 22.8 million, which was liquidity support provided in 2017 and b) an allocation of EUR 8.0 million as programme support cost for the Ministry of BZK. These deductions are highlighted in red in the table. Disbursements for early recovery amounted to EUR 6.8 million. The net amount available for direct support in Sint Maarten was hence EUR 42.4 million. Disbursements for direct support amounted to a little more than EUR 27.0 million (see section 7.1.).

3.2. Objectives of the overall policy review

11. The overall review focuses on article 8 of the budget for Kingdom Relations describing funds reserved for emergency assistance and reconstruction of the Windward Islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius[75]. The policy review was announced to the Netherlands Parliament (House of Representatives – *Tweede Kamer*) on 21 September 2020 with a description of the intended overall design, goal, evaluation questions, delineation, methodological approach, timelines and institutional arrangements[76]. The contents of this letter guided the terms of reference of this policy review (see Annex II). The design of the policy review was further elaborated on in a reply letter by the State Secretary of BZK to Parliament on 17 December 2020[77].

12. According to the letter to the House of Representatives, the policy review pursues two objectives: a) assessment of effectiveness and efficiency of Dutch spending under article 8; and b) assessment of effectiveness and efficiency of institutional arrangements.

13. Guidelines for such policy reviews of the Government of the Netherlands[78] stipulate that effectiveness relates to the achievement of policy goals with given means (inputs), including human and financial resources as well as activities and other instruments. The achievement of goals usually distinguishes between outputs (direct results and products), outcomes (higher level effects produced) and impact (ultimate societal effects).

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[72] According to the Trust Fund Annual Report 2021 this corresponds to a total of USD 511.96 million. In addition, USD 13.87 million in investment income has been generated for the Trust Fund by the World Bank's Treasury Department since Trust Fund inception. The total amount available is hence USD 525.83 million. See also table 4 in section 6.3.
[73] See section 7.1. table 6
[74] For further details see section 8.1.
[75] https://www.rijksfinancien.nl/jaarverslag/2018/IV/onderdeel/d17e6028 website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[76] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/09/21/kamerbrief-onderzoeksopzet-beleidsdoorlichting-artikel-8-bzk-begroting, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[77] See also Kstk 33189, Nr. 13, *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 17 december 2020, Antwoorden op vragen commissie over de onderzoeksopzet beleidsdoorlichting begrotingsartikel 8 Koninkrijksrelaties* https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z25295&did=2020D53094 website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[78] Handreiking beleidsdoorlichting, https://www.rijksbegroting.nl/beleidsevaluaties/evaluaties-en-beleidsdoorlichtingen/handreiking, website consulted on 22 August 2022.

14. The same guidelines define efficiency as the relation between the effects of the policy (benefit) and financial and other resources mobilized for this policy (cost). The review of efficiency comprises the question whether the same effects could have been achieved with fewer resources and / or more effects could have been attained with more resources.

3.3. Organisation of the overall review and delimitation of activities to be evaluated

15. For analytical purposes, the evaluation has been sub-divided into three parts:

a) Part I: emergency assistance on all three islands (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) - article 8.2. – highlighted in yellow in table 1.

b) Part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten (both World Bank Trust Fund projects and direct support activities) – article 8.1 – highlighted in green in table 1.

c) Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius – article 8.1 – highlighted in yellow in table 1.

Parts I and III have been handled by a separate team of independent evaluators (Ecorys) and have resulted in a separate report. Since reconstruction activities in Saba and Sint Eustatius were to be completed by 31 December 2021, the other report is meant to be a final evaluation of respective activities.

16. The present report only concerns part II (reconstruction in Sint Maarten), which has been conducted by an independent evaluator (Lucien Bäck). The larger part of reconstruction in Sint Maarten comprises activities implemented under the World Bank executed Trust Fund which was originally scheduled to end on 31 December 2025, but which has been extended until 30 June 2028[79]. This policy review is therefore designed to be a mid-term evaluation. This review also covers direct support activities with disbursements until 2021[80] and spending without a specific end-date[81].

17. The latter evaluator will eventually also be responsible for a synthesis report covering the evaluation results of both parts I / III and part II. What is covered under these evaluations and what falls outside their scope and which team handles what can best be illustrated in a table (see Table 2).

Table 2: Delimitation of activities related to emergency assistance / early recovery and reconstruction Windward Islands and scope of reports on parts I/III and II[82]

Activities to be evaluated falling under article 8 – Windward Islands	Activities related to emergency assistance / early recovery and reconstruction Windward Islands (not to be evaluated)
Part I: Emergency assistance to all three islands (including early recovery Sint Maarten) • Coordination by the Ministry of BZK • Funding provided on the budget for Kingdom Relations to various Ministries in the Netherlands (e.g., the Ministries of Defence, Education, Culture and Science - OCW, Economic Affairs and Climate, as	• Emergency assistance provided by budgets of other Ministries in the Netherlands • Emergency assistance provided by other external sources (e.g., the Netherlands Red Cross and other partner organisations) • Emergency assistance mobilized by local government and the private sector

[79] Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer d.d. 15 december 2021
[80] The original deadline for BZK disbursements under direct support was 31 December 2021. It has been extended for an amount of EUR 5.0 million until 30 June 2022. Activities under this extension are not taken into consideration.
[81] For further details on direct support activities see section 8.
[82] Explanation of colours: Part I and part III (Ecorys): yellow; and Part II (Lucien Bäck): green

well as the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management)	
Part II: Reconstruction in Sint Maarten • Coordination by the Ministry of BZK • World Bank executed Trust Fund • Direct support – funding provided to the Government of Sint Maarten, and to partner organisations operating in Sint Maarten	• Integrity Chamber[83] • Reconstruction support provided by budgets of other Ministries in the Netherlands • Reconstruction funded from other external sources • Reconstruction funded and implemented by the Government of Sint Maarten (including with liquidity support) • Reconstruction funded and implemented by private sector • Liquidity and other support to the Government of Sint Maarten (liquidity support under article 8 and liquidity support outside art. 8, e.g., related to the corona pandemic)
Part III: Reconstruction Saba and Sint Eustatius • Coordination by the Ministry of BZK • Funding provided by Ministry of BZK to other Ministries in the Netherlands (the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science - OCW, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, as well as the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management) • Sea cable between Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius • Cliff Sint Eustatius • Reconstruction Saba	• Reconstruction aid provided by budgets of other Ministries in the Netherlands • Reconstruction aid provided by other external sources • Reconstruction aid provided by local government and private sector
Synthesis report on article 8: Emergency assistance to all three islands, reconstruction (including early recovery) in Sint Maarten, reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius	

18. The present report only deals with Part II of the overall policy review addressing reconstruction in Sint Maarten. Section 4 presents guidance from key documents related to article 8, spells out the evaluation questions and describes methods and limitations of the investigation. Sections 5, 6 7 present findings of the policy review both concerning the World Bank executed Trust Fund and direct support as well as considerations that lead to these two implementation modalities. Sections 9 and 10 aim at drawing conclusions on effectiveness and efficiency. Recommendations for the remainder of the implementation period which currently ends in 2025 and beyond, are included in Section 10.

[83] This was a condition for reconstruction support, which is not part of this evaluation according to the terms of reference.

4. Policy review of part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten

4.1. Guidance from article 8

19. The legal text of article 8[84] is relatively succinct and provides limited substantive information and guidance to reconstruction efforts in Sint Maarten. The text mentions the overall goal of reconstruction in Sint Maarten: *restoration of basic services and infrastructure for citizens in Sint Maarten to levels that existed before hurricane Irma*. The text designates the Ministry of BZK to provide funding and to coordinate efforts among ministries in the Netherlands and with other national and international organisations. The larger part of the funding would be channelled through a trust fund aiming at *economic development and access, (resolving) the waste management problem and (promoting) good governance*. Outside the trust fund direct support would cover *border control, public law and order, and financial management*.

20. The fund of EUR 550.0 million for reconstruction in Sint Maarten was approved by the Netherlands Council of Ministers on 10 November 2017. Documents submitted by the State Secretary of BZK to the Netherlands Parliament just after this approval[85] are similarly succinct and uninformative, as far as goals and expected outputs, outcomes and impact of article 8 inputs into reconstruction in Sint Maarten are concerned. The documents mostly refer in broad terms to conditionalities that need to be met by Sint Maarten before accessing the funding of EUR 550.0 million, viz. strengthening of border control and the establishment of an Integrity Chamber (see section 5.2.) and mention the possibility of technical assistance that can be provided to Sint Maarten to meet these conditionalities. This would be part of direct support activities. Furthermore, the documents mention the trust fund modality to pursue broad aims: economic development, access to the island, the waste management problem and promoting good governance.

21. In a Letter addressed to Parliament by the State Secretary of BZK on 23 March 2018[86], reference is made to negotiations with the World Bank concerning the establishment of the Trust Fund. The letter expresses the Dutch concern that Trust Fund projects should be compatible with the scale of Sint Maarten in terms of focus, form and process and take into account the absorption capacity and available know-how in the country. Projects should be effective and efficient with clear benefits for the citizens of Sint Maarten. Basic principles that should be observed are a realistic level of ambition, and the quest for sustainability and innovation.

22. The succinctness of the formulation of the overall goal of Dutch support to reconstruction efforts to be deployed in Sint Maarten and the absence of more specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound ("smart") objectives has consequences for the assessment of effectiveness and efficiency as required by the terms of reference for this policy review (see section 3.2. above). Expected outputs (direct results and products), outcomes (higher level effects produced) and impact (ultimate societal effects) were simply not defined from the Dutch side at the outset. There is hence no way to construct an evidence-based results framework against which to assess achievements. By necessity, this evaluation needs to be less theory-based and more process-oriented (see also sections 4.3., 8 and 9). Weaknesses in the overall design of the Dutch contribution to reconstruction in Sint Maarten are also addressed in Conclusion 3.

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[84] *Begroting Koninkrijksrelaties 4, Artikel 8* covering emergency assistance and reconstruction in all three islands, ,https://www.rijksfinancien.nl/jaarverslag/2020/IV/onderdeel/898498 website consulted on 22 August 2022.

[85] For example, a) Kstk 34773 *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Eerste Kamer d.d. 10 november 2017; b) Kstk 34845 Nr. 1, Brief van de Minister van Financiën d.d. 24 november 2017 aan de Tweede Kamer; b) Kstk 34988 Nr. 2, Wijziging van de begrotingsstaten van Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) voor het jaar 2018 (Derde incidentele suppletoire begroting inzake wederopbouw Bovenwindse Eilanden); d) Kstk. 34775 IV Nr. 26, Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) en het BES-fonds (H) voor het jaar 2018, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties d.d. 7 december 2017; e) Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Eerste Kamer d.d. 21 december 2017;*

[86] Kstk 34773 Nr. 10, *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer d.d. 23 maart 2018.*

4.2. Evaluation questions

23. Evaluation questions closely follow the standard questions pertaining to a policy review under the *Regulation of Periodical Evaluation Research* of the Government of the Netherlands of 15 March 2018[87] and their further development in the Letter to the House of Representatives of 21 September 2020[88]. Annex IV contains all evaluation questions as well as references to specific sections in this report where they are answered. In some cases, it was found useful to break up complex questions covering multiple elements into sub-questions.

24. General questions cover the architecture of the funding; motivations of the Government of the Netherlands to provide support; respective responsibilities of the Governments of the Netherlands and Sint Maarten in the context of the Charter of the Kingdom; the scope of the evaluation; funding that was provided and expenditures that were made; funding from other sources; and documentary and other evidence (including previous evaluations).

25. More specific questions address effectiveness of policy support in terms of results achieved, namely outputs, outcomes and impact, as well as possible side-effects, positive or negative. Under effectiveness, the dimensions of Building back better are explored, namely rebuilding of physical infrastructure; preparedness for future category 5 hurricanes and other disasters through improved crisis management; economic recovery and strengthening of good governance and civil society. Another set of questions addresses efficiency, more in particular how expenses were justified; if they were reasonable in light of results achieved; what policy options would exist, if more or fewer resources (20 % more or less) were available; and finally experiences with institutional arrangements between the Netherlands and the World Bank.

26. Since the policy review takes place roughly at mid-point of the period agreed upon for the Trust Fund at the outset (2018-2025), it also seeks to provide answers to forward-looking questions, e.g., which measures can be taken by the Netherlands and Sint Maarten to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of reconstruction policies in Sint Maarten during the remainder of the Trust Fund period and beyond (see section 10).

4.3. Methods and limitations

4.3.1. Documentation

27. The policy review sought to draw on documentation concerning the original design of the Dutch contribution to reconstruction in Sint Maarten, on the design and implementation of the World Bank executed Trust Fund as well as on direct support activities. At an earlier stage, it was already highlighted that documents describing the overall goal and specific objectives of the contribution from the Netherlands provided little guidance as to which outputs, outcomes and impact were to be achieved within a given timeframe (see section 4.1 and also Conclusion 3 and Recommendation 4).

28. The policy review could draw on more extensive documentation for the review of Trust Fund projects and to a more limited extent on activities under direct support. The genesis of the Trust Fund and the original conceptualization of direct support activities in 2017-2018 concerning border control and public law and order are also reasonably well documented. The review of the documentation did, however, meet with two types of challenges, one pertaining to the World Bank Trust Fund, and one to direct support.

29. In response to the formal letter addressed to the World Bank announcing the policy review dated 9 August 2021, the World Bank made it clear in a letter dated 24 November 2021[89] that the

[87] *Regeling Periodiek Evaluatieonderzoek* 15 March 2018 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0040754/2018-03-27, website consulted on 14 March 2022.
[88] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/09/21/kamerbrief-onderzoeksopzet-beleidsdoorlichting-artikel-8-bzk-begroting, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[89] Letter by the Ministry of BZK to the World Bank of 9 August 2021 and letter of 24 November 2021 from the Program Manager of the Trust Fund to the Program Coordinator in the Ministry of BZK concerning *Dutch Policy Review* –

bulk of information would have to be drawn from publicly available documentation pertaining to the Trust Fund and its activities. In addition, subject to the terms of the World Bank's Policy on Access to Information[90] and its Information Classification and Control Policy[91], the World Bank would consider, on a case-by-case basis, the Netherlands' request to share non-public documents / information, on the condition that written assurance would be given that the sharing of such documentation would not result in further sharing or their public disclosure, unless the Bank had, in each case, given its prior written consent. Access to minutes of the tripartite Steering Committee would require a separate agreement by all three participating parties. This agreement was granted by all three parties represented in the Steering Committee in November 2021.

30. Direct support activities faced a different type of challenge. Beyond the original intent to focus on border control and public law and order, decision-making concerning direct support was mostly rather ad-hoc and not always easy to trace. This difficulty was compounded by weaknesses in the documentation database Digidoc in the Ministry of BZK. Documents concerning this type of funding and activities were scattered and not readily available. An intensive search was required which took more than nine months. The documentation was eventually compiled also with the help of implementing partners. It can nevertheless not be excluded that the documentation is not entirely complete. In a general way, it is found that the Ministry of BZK has demonstrated a major weakness in its ability to document disbursements and funded activities and projects in a transparent manner (see also Conclusion 10 and Recommendation 1).

31. With these two caveats, the policy review draws on the following types of documents:

a) Overall policy documents of the Governments of the Netherlands and Sint Maarten, e.g., the *Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands*; Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations; documents prepared by the Ministry of BZK for Parliament and other relevant documents in Parliament (*kamerstukken);* annual reports of the Ministry of BZK; letters and other publications addressed by the Government of Sint Maarten to the Netherlands;

b) Financial source documents of the Ministry of BZ*K* concerning reservations and disbursements under article 8, i.e., tranche payments to the World Bank and disbursements to parties implementing direct support activities, with the understanding that this policy review would not reconstruct financial reporting, but rely to the greatest possible extent on respective overall synthetic financial reporting of the Ministry of BZK;

c) Public information provided by the World Bank, notably the Administration Arrangement between the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank, Annual and Semi-Annual Trust Fund reports, all electronic documentation on the Trust Fund Dashboard, and, for all recipient executed projects, Public Project Documents, periodic Project Implementation Supervision Reports, Public Information Documents, and published Environmental and Social Documentation;

d) Authorized non-public information as well as all agreements between the World Bank and implementing partners in Sint Maarten; Steering Committee minutes (including of the Technical Working Group), N.B. all with these sources will not be quoted or shared;

e) Documentation related to direct support projects and programmes, e.g., if available, project documents; progress and final reports; minutes of meetings, as appropriate;

f) Reviews by the General Accounts Chambers in the Netherlands and Sint Maarten *(Algemene Rekenkamers)* as well as reports by other oversight mechanisms, e.g., the *College Financieel Toezicht;*

collaboration of WB and authorization to share confidential information (with terms of reference attached). The Ministry of BZK responded on 17 January 2022.

[90] https://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information, website consulted on 22 August 2022.

[91] https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/288241548255246039/AMS-6-21A-Information-Classification-and-Control-Policy.pdf, website consulted on 22 August 2022.

g) Other sources, e.g., scientific publications; archives of news media in Sint Maarten and the Netherlands; and press coverage in the countries on current affairs, as appropriate[92].

32. By and large, the documentation is sufficiently robust to allow for evidence-based findings and well-grounded conclusions and recommendations. This does not apply to documentation on direct support activities where some caveats exist (see section 7). The information collected in this manner was completed through interviews with major stakeholders and resource persons and a field visit to Sint Maarten.

4.3.2. Interviews

33. The Ministry of BZK provided a list of potential interviewees in the Netherlands, in Sint Maarten and in the World Bank. A selection of interviewees was made by the evaluators and some additional resource persons were added to the list, through consultation between the two evaluators (see section 3.3.). The Ministry of BZK also sent messages to selected interviewees to introduce the evaluators but had no further involvement in the actual interviews. It was decided that interviews would mostly be undertaken jointly between the evaluators of parts I / III and part II, so as to avoid over-burdening of resource persons. All interviews in the Netherlands were held by video- or audio-conferencing due to the prevailing Covid-19 related public health situation.

34. Some 50 resource persons were interviewed in the Netherlands. Most resource persons were government staff having been involved in post-Irma activities within the Ministry of BZK. Based on their consent, their names and roles are mentioned in Annex VI. Interviews in Sint Maarten took place in person during the field visit (see below – list of names in Annex VI). In the World Bank, extensive interviews took place with the Program Manager throughout the review.

35. In advance of the respective appointments, semi-structured interview guides were shared with prospective resource persons (see Annex VI). At the start of each interview, the evaluator would clearly explain the scope and objectives of the policy review and the purpose of the interview and assure the confidentiality of responses, i.e., that any information and viewpoints that were shared with the evaluators would not be attributed to individual respondents in the report and in general.

4.3.3. Visit to Sint Maarten (8-20 November 2021)

36. Ecorys consultants and the author of this report undertook a joint mission to Sint Maarten between 8 and 20 November 2021[93]. The Office of the Prime Minister kindly planned and facilitated meetings based on suggestions communicated in advance. The purpose of these meetings was, for the evaluators, to gain information on results and context on the ground and to hear about viewpoints and perspectives of stakeholders in Sint Maarten.

37. Interviewees in Sint Maarten included some technical staff of line ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Education), staff of the National Reconstruction Program Bureau (NRPB), the management team of the Sint Maarten Medical Center, staff of implementing organisations of Trust Fund projects (e.g., VNG-International / R4CR, Red Cross Netherlands, UNICEF-NL, Qredits).

38. The evaluators had also requested meetings with the Prime Minister and / or other members of the current Government, but such meetings were not granted for unknown reasons. It was also not possible to meet with some implementing organisations of direct support activities, e.g., the Police Force (KPSM), Customs, Border Control and the detention centre Point Blanche apparently because of conflicts in scheduling. Important information in this regard could, however, be collected from staff of Dutch staff stationed on the island, e.g., in the Representation of the

[92] For example, https://dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl/ , https://stmaartennews.com/, https://www.thedailyherald.sx/ websites consulted on 22 August 2022.
[93] On 15 and 18 November 2021 the Ecorys team was on Saba and Sint Eustatius, respectively.

Netherlands, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Royal Marechaussee and a programme manager supplemented to the detention centre.

4.3.4. Triangulation of information

39. The policy review adheres to commonly accepted professional principles, norms and standards in evaluation, e.g., the "*Better Regulation Agenda*" of the European Union[94], "*Norms and Standards*" of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG 2016)[95], "*UNEG Ethical Guidelines*" (UNEG 2008)[96] and OECD-DAC "*Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance*"[97]. All information was to the greatest possible extent triangulated, i.e., drawn from different sources, critically assessed and compared, with a view to draw well founded evidence-based findings and reliable and credible conclusions. The review aimed at greatest possible impartiality and objectivity, without bias or personal perspectives or viewpoints. Conclusions and recommendations are meant to be constructive and practical with a view to allow for an improvement of policies in the future.

40. By and large, the evidence collected for this review is sufficiently robust to allow for meaningful conclusions and recommendations. The evidence on direct support activities is not entirely satisfactory. The evaluation process remained unaffected by some external risks, which could have made interviews and the field trip difficult or impossible, notably the Covid-19 pandemic and the hurricane season in Sint Maarten (June to November). Challenges to access to the documentary and other evidence both on Trust Fund projects and direct support activities were mostly overcome, but this did require some efforts and took more time than expected at the outset.

4.3.5. Limitations

41. Several limitations need to be mentioned. In the first place, this policy review cannot draw on a proper results framework with specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound objectives concerning the Dutch contribution to reconstruction in Sint Maarten. Secondly, there are also no comprehensive project evaluations and reviews. Direct support activities started in 2018, notably related to border control are documented through reasonably complete reports, but without data collection based on systematic monitoring. Financial data are also not completely conclusive. These shortcomings could only partially be compensated through interviews and the field visit. The picture remained nevertheless somewhat patchy because few staff in the Ministry of BZK have a complete overview due to high staff turnover in the ministry as well as because of the lack of access to key partners in Sint Maarten (the political leadership and technical staff in charge of border control and public law and order).

42. Trust Fund projects are regularly monitored and accounted for, but documentation that is available in the public domain does not always allow to fully understand underlying factors. The strict information policies of the World Bank required the evaluator to request for complementary information through a somewhat cumbersome and time-consuming process. This involved formal requests to be submitted to the Bank through the Ministry of BZK.

43. The scope of this evaluation is limited to projects and activities funded from article 8 of the Netherlands Budget of Kingdom Relations. By its very nature, this funding was only to be a *contribution* to reconstruction efforts in Sint Maarten. This policy review is therefore not an evaluation of reconstruction in Sint Maarten in its totality. To the extent that results can be demonstrated, it must be borne in mind that it will not be possible to establish an exclusive cause-

[94] EU Better Regulation : guidelines and toolbox https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en website consulted 30 June 2021, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[95] UNEG Norms and Standards, http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914 website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[96] UNEG Ethical Guidelines http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/2866, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[97] OECD DAC, Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, 1991, https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/2755284.pdf website consulted on 22 August 2022.

effect relationship between the inputs and outputs, outcomes and impact. The latter may have benefitted from other resources, e.g., citizens' own means, private sector investments, insurance payments, resources provided by the Sint Maarten Government, including, to a significant degree, by liquidity support mobilized by the Government of the Netherlands, e.g., through the Caribbean Mechanism for Reform and Development (COHO)[98] (see also section 6.1.). Due to the fungibility of all these resources, the contribution analysis can at best establish credible association of results with Art. 8 inputs.

5. Design of reconstruction in Sint Maarten

5.1. Overall design of reconstruction efforts

44. The Government of the Netherlands and the other countries of the Kingdom provided comprehensive emergency support to Sint Maarten in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Irma that struck on 6 September 2017. This was in compliance with art. 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom, which stipulates that the four countries of the Kingdom provide each other mutual help and support. Due to the autonomy of the three Caribbean countries since 10-10-10, the understanding has also been that such help and support would require an explicit request to be addressed by a country in need to the other countries, including the Netherlands. After Hurricane Irma, it took some time for the Government of Sint Maarten to formulate requests for emergency assistance. In the face of the devastation on the island and threats to public law and order, the Netherlands did not wait for formal requests and took immediate action to respond to perceived emergency needs.

45. Longer term reconstruction needs were considered at an early stage, i.e., while emergency assistance was still under way. As early as on 15 September 2017, a little more than a week after the hurricane, a Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of the Windward Islands and an inter-departmental programme commission were created in the Netherlands. On 13 October 2017, the then Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Mr. R.H.A. Plasterk, addressed a letter to the Government of Sint Maarten[99] announcing that a significant financial envelope could be made available for the reconstruction of the island, provided Sint Maarten gave its consent to two conditionalities, viz. a) the establishment of an Integrity Chamber[100]; and b) strengthening of border control. Both conditions were described as essential for the support to benefit the population of Sint Maarten in a sustainable manner.

46. The wording of the letter suggests that both reform proposals had already been discussed between the governments before Irma, but additional requirements were now added. It was proposed that members of the Integrity Chamber would be appointed by the Kingdom Council of Ministers *(Rijksministerraad)* and that the institution should give binding advice. Strengthening of border control would entail a greater role for the Royal Marechaussee and Netherlands Custom Control under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice of Sint Maarten.

5.2. Funding and conditionalities

47. In the letter of 13 October 2017, there is no mention of a request for support to reconstruction submitted or to be submitted by the Government of Sint Maarten. Consent to conditionalities was expected by 31 October 2017, which was, however, not forthcoming. There is evidence that then Prime Minister in Sint Maarten, Mr. William Marlin, did not wish to agree to the conditions. This led to two votes of no-confidence in the Parliament of Sint Maarten and an instruction by the Kingdom Council of Ministers *(Rijksministerraad),* as a result of which Prime Minister Marlin had to leave office on 24 November 2017[101]. The interim Government, which took

[98] *Rijkswet Caribisch Orgaan voor Hervorming en Ontwikkeling (COHO).* Liquidity support to Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten amounts to EUR 1.0 billion.
[99] Letter of the Netherlands Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations addressed to the Government of Sint Maarten on 13 October 2017.
[100] For further details see section 8.3.
[101] Kst-34773 of 7 December 2017 – Letter by the State Secretary of BZK addressed to the Senate *(Eerste Kamer).*

over, eventually consented to the conditions soon after[102]. A national ordinance (*landsverordening)* established the Integrity Chamber on 18 December 2017 and a regulation concerning the strengthening of border control was made official on 19 December 2017.

48. In the Netherlands, a new government was formed on 26 October 2017[103] as a result of elections held on 15 March 2017. State Secretary Mr. R. Knops took charge of Kingdom Relations. On 10 November 2017, the Council of Ministers of the Netherlands agreed on an envelope of EUR 550.0 million to be reserved for reconstruction in Sint Maarten, provided conditionalities were met. A separate envelope was approved for Saba and Sint Eustatius to the amount of EUR 67.0 million. Reconstruction funds were to be disbursed by the Ministry of BZK by the end of 2021[104] and would be released in tranches in the form of donations, loans and in-kind support. The option of involvement of an international organisation in reconstruction of Sint Maarten was considered right from the beginning.

49. The decision to spend more than half a billion euros on reconstruction was made at a political level. There was very limited technical underpinning of this decision (see section 4.1.). It was in part a rough extrapolation from funds spent on reconstruction in the wake of Hurricane Luis in 1995 and in part based on a rapid needs assessment on the ground considering what private insurers would compensate and what could be mobilised in Sint Maarten itself. Debates with Parliament in the Netherlands focused not so much on the amount, but primarily on safeguards for adequate spending to benefit the population in Sint Maarten, with a particular emphasis on appropriate institutional arrangements that were supposedly required. There was apparently also no attention for what such a huge injection into the small economy of Sint Maarten, 2021, might entail.

5.3. Options considered for implementation

50. At the outset, the first option of simply handing the entire amount over to Sint Maarten and let the island administration handle reconstruction by itself was quickly discarded by the Ministry of BZK. This was due to a lack of confidence that Sint Maarten would be able to handle the funds appropriately by itself. A second option that was considered was direct and broad involvement of the Netherlands. It was concluded that this would run counter to the spirit of 10-10-10 emphasizing the autonomy of the country of Sint Maarten. A third option was to involve some kind of intermediary to handle reconstruction efforts.

51. In the wake of Hurricane Luis in 1995, an intermediate structure established between Curaçao and Sint Maarten, an institution named USONA[105], had been entrusted with the implementation of projects. But this organisation had ceased its activities in Sint Maarten with the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles. Implementation through Dutch partner organisations, e.g., VNG-International, the Red Cross or UNICEF-Netherlands, already involved in operations during the emergency phase, was also not considered for this amount of funding. The only alternative was found to be involvement of an international organisation, which would act as an honest and capable broker, enjoying the trust of the Netherlands.

52. For a short while, the option of involving the United Nations (UN) system was considered. The UN Resident Coordinator based in Port-of-Spain undertook some lobbying in The Hague at the end of 2017 drawing attention to the facts that some UN agencies had already been present in Sint Maarten during the emergency phase, that Sint Maarten successfully participated in various Caribbean cooperation arrangements, and that, most importantly, the UN system through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations

[102] Kst-34 773. Interim Prime Minister Rafael Boasma was replaced by Interim Prime Minister Ms. Leona Marlin-Romeo on 15 January 2018.
[103] Under the leadership of Prime Minister M. Rutte, who entered his third term. The cabinet is therefore commonly referred to as Rutte-III.
[104] In 2021, the deadline for disbursements was extended until 30 June 2022. Implementing partners, e.g., the World Bank for the Trust Fund, can spend the resources over a longer time frame.
[105] *Uitvoeringsorganisatie Stichting Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Antillen (USONA).*

Office for Project Services (UNOPS) etc. had experience in large-scale reconstruction efforts world-wide (e.g., post-Tsunami). Although UN involvement in reconstruction was favourably considered by some interlocutors in the Netherlands, e.g., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was by and large not found convincing enough. The Ministries of BZK and of Finance had already considered the World Bank as a potential partner in this endeavour as early as in October 2017.

53. On the occasion of the Annual Meeting of the World Bank Group in Washington DC on 13-15 October 2017, informal consultations took place between the delegation from the Netherlands and senior Bank management, about a possible role that the Bank could play in planning for the reconstruction of Sint Maarten in spite of the fact that as a high-income country Sint Maarten would not be eligible for bank lending. But it was concluded that the Bank had relevant international expertise and experience in reconstruction and strengthening of resilience and that options for cooperation needed to be explored further.

54. In Sint Maarten, elections for a new Parliament took place on 26 February 2018. The formation of a new government was concluded on 25 June 2018, when the caretaker Prime Minister, Ms. Leona Marlin-Romeo, was appointed to lead the new cabinet (commonly referred to as Marlin-Romeo II following the interim cabinet Marlin-Romeo I). The formation process coincided with forthright action undertaken by the Government of the Netherlands, namely, beyond launching early recovery activities - to be completed by mid-2018[106] - adopting a two-pronged approach for the medium term. The larger share would be spent through the World Bank Trust Fund (initially estimated at a maximum of EUR 470 million) and the difference basically through early recovery and direct support. Direct support activities would in principle be those, for which Trust Fund implementation was not possible or desirable[107].

6. The World Bank executed Trust Fund

6.1. The establishment of the Trust Fund in 2018

55. The Government of the Netherlands pursued the establishment of the Trust Fund with great urgency during the first weeks and months of 2018. As stated in the letter to Parliament of 23 March 2018, the broad objective was to support material and non-material reconstruction in Sint Maarten, where needed, and to strengthen the country's ability to withstand possible natural and other disasters[108]. The World Bank responded expeditiously to this request, as the Netherlands was found to be a trusted and highly appreciated partner for IDA and IBRD on the world scale. The Bank was ready to consider a relatively unique institutional set-up, a single-donor and single-recipient trust fund, whereby donor and recipient were linked through kingdom relations.

56. The Administration Arrangement between the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank was signed on 16 April 2018. The interim Prime Minister of Sint Maarten and the interim Minister of Finance were present at the signing ceremony in Washington DC. But the Sint Maarten Government was no formal party to the arrangement. The trust fund option had not been considered or approved in the Sint Maarten Parliament, and the Sint Maarten Government had not been officially consulted. No decision had been made in this regard in the Kingdom Cabinet (*Rijksministerraad).* From the perspective of the World Bank, it was sufficient to have an agreement with the Government of the Netherlands as a donor, while grant agreements on specific projects would be concluded with implementing partners in Sint Maarten, including the Sint Maarten Government itself, being considered as the recipients.

[106] See separate report on parts I / III.
[107] At a later stage direct support funds also served to provide technical assistance to Trust Fund activities. See section 8.
[108] Kstk 34-773 Letter to Parliament 25 March 2018. See also section 4.1.

6.2. Urgent priorities vs. strategic orientations

57. The announcement that the Netherlands would invest EUR 550.0 million in general and up to EUR 470.0 million in reconstruction through the World Bank, with first tranches to be released in 2018 initially estimated at EUR 112.0 million and EUR 150.0 million, stirred great expectations in Sint Maarten. The expediency observed by both the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank in establishing the Trust Fund created the impression that project activities would commence very quickly after signature of the Administration Arrangement and respond to needs of the population on the ground within a short timeframe. The Government of the Netherlands, more specifically the Ministry of BZK, was apparently under this impression as well, as the intended early recovery phase involved only a comparatively small fund of EUR 7.0 million, which was to respond to immediate needs for housing, shelters, income generation and psychosocial care in 2018 (see report on parts I and III of the policy review).

58. The sense of urgency felt in Sint Maarten and in the Netherlands was also fed by a concern of a new hurricane season between June and December 2018, with an expected peak in September 2018. If a new natural disaster had struck in 2018, the country would have been less prepared than in 2017. On the ground, it was clear that activities deployed under the early recovery phase, however useful and important, did not respond to the full scale of people's needs. Major social and economic infrastructure, e.g., houses, shelters, schools, the Sint Maarten Medical Center, the Princess Juliana International Airport, and the huge under-managed waste disposal on Pond Island were in urgent need of repair and rehabilitation. Expectations in Sint Maarten and the Netherlands that these priorities could be addressed expediently and quickly and yield results in the short term were not fulfilled. Based on international experience, the World Bank was aware that the setting up of capacity in countries without previous experience with the Bank would take time. In the Netherlands, the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, more familiar with the World Bank, were apparently also more realistic in their expectations, but this message somehow did not register with the Ministry of BZK.

59. In line with its experiences with reconstruction projects in other parts of the world, the World Bank started with support to the Government of Sint Maarten in drawing up a comprehensive National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). The process was started in January 2018 and completed in May 2018. Within the broad NRRP assessment of damage caused by Hurricane Irma and the definition of a general roadmap for reconstruction, the Trust Fund to be established by the Netherlands would determine its own priorities, viz. strengthening access to the country and economic development, solid waste and wastewater management, as well as good governance and social services. The NRRP, following the Administration Arrangement for the Trust Fund, set out a longer timeframe. The early recovery phase in 2018, would be followed by recovery in 2019, recovery and resilience in 2020-2021 and resilience and development in 2022-2025. These timelines were established on the assumption that the funding gap would be closed or at least narrowed through other funding, e.g., loans on international capital markets[109].

60. The NRRP estimated damages and losses caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria at USD 2.7 billion (USD 1.4 billion and USD 1.3 billion, respectively). Recovery and resilience activities over a seven-year period would require an estimated USD 2.3 billion. The sectors with the greatest needs would be housing (22.8 percent), tourism and commerce (19.0 percent), governance and public financial management (9.4 percent), sanitation and solid waste management (8.3 percent), airport (7.6 percent, and education, culture, youth and sport (5.1 percent). The NRRP drew attention to a significant funding gap between the promised Trust Fund (USD 580.0 million corresponding to EUR 470.0 million at the April 2018 exchange rate) and the needs estimated at USD 2.3 billion. Additional sources of funding would include insurance claims estimated at USD 497.0 million and insurance payments for property estimated at USD 320.0-430.0 million. The remainder would have to be found from the private sector, individual savings, other international support and the national budget. It should be noted that the NRRP also included a Building Back Better vision.

[109] The Netherlands strongly opposed borrowing on international capital markets, as it would have to act as borrower of last resort in case of an unsustainable debt burden.

61. To what extent the funding gap has been closed since 2018 has not been systematically investigated. As from early 2020, the country, like the rest of the world, suffered from the effects on the economy of the Covid-19 pandemic. The main source of income, which is tourism, including the cruise ship industry, suffered from a serious downturn between 2020 and 2021. The Trust Fund Annual Report 2021[110] cites an estimate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that the pandemic caused an estimated 24 percent contraction of GDP in 2020[111]. On the other hand, Sint Maarten also benefitted from significant liquidity support to compensate for the loss of income due to the pandemic under the Caribbean Mechanism for Reform and Development (COHO)[112]. While this type of support is mostly geared towards legal and administrative reform and operational expenses of the Sint Maarten Government, part of this funding also allows to cover capital investments. It may be assumed that the funding gap announced in the NRRP has to a certain extent been closed by resources that were complementary to the contribution of the Netherlands to reconstruction under Article 8.

62. Within the broad framework of the NRRP, specific priorities and objectives were formulated for the Trust Fund. According to the Administration Arrangement, the Trust Fund would address three thematic areas: a) community recovery in social sectors; b) economic recovery through reconstruction of critical infrastructure and businesses; and c) governance recovery strengthening the country's readiness in facing natural disasters and climate change. The strategic focus areas were eventually elaborated further in a Strategic Framework Document 2019-2025[113]. A systematic overview of strategic focus areas and objectives is presented in Table 3. It should be mentioned that the World Bank has initiated a Trust Fund wide mid-term review to assess progress made towards achieving objectives in 2018 - 2021[114].

Table 3: Strategic Focus Areas

Focus Area 1 Promote Sustainable Economic Recovery	Focus Area 2 Invest in citizens and resilient communities	Focus Area 3 Build the Foundation and Capacity to Improve Long Term Resilience and Good Governance
Objective 1: Sustainably restore air access and improve connectivity	**Objective 4**: Repair and increase access to housing especially for the vulnerable	**Objective 7**: Improve capacity for disaster response
Objective 2: Support tourism activity through access to finance, resilient utility services	**Objective 5**: Increase access to quality health, education and sports services	**Objective 8**: Strengthen fiscal resilience and modernize the public sector
Objective 3: Establish a sustainable solid waste management system with improved sanitation services	**Objective 6**: Strengthen social safety nets and promote employment, particularly for vulnerable youth and households headed by women	

63. As from March 2018, even before the establishment of the Steering Committee[115], concrete projects were discussed, e.g., addressing emergency recovery, emergency debris removal and management, hospital resilience and preparedness and emergency income support and training (see overview of projects in section 6.4.). Under standard Bank procedures, all these projects required extensive preparatory studies, which took some time. Apart from that, Sint Maarten had to meet some legal, managerial and institutional conditions for funds to be released. This was also the case for other potential implementing partners (e.g., NGO's). As a result, there were delays in starting up operations on the ground.

64. Border control which was a central concern to the Netherlands fell outside World Bank's sphere of mandate, policies and procedures for Trust Funds. Nor was the Integrity Chamber

[110] Sint Maarten Trust Fund, Annual Report January 1-December 31, 2021.
[111] Sint Maarten Trust Fund Annual Report January 1 – December 31, 2021.
[112] Rijkswet Caribisch Orgaan voor Hervorming en Ontwikkeling (COHO). Liquidity support to Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten amounts to EUR 1.0 billion.
[113] World Bank Reconstruction, Recovery and Resilience Trust Fund, Strategic Framework 2019-2025, 1 August 2019.
[114] Mentioned in the Trust Annual Report 2021. In addressing the review objectives, the mid-term review will apply the adapted OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) quality criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability.
[115] See section 6.3. Steering Committee meetings took place on 12 June, 13 July and 5 November 2018.

referred to as an important control mechanism in the process. This is surprising as these areas of attention had been defined by the Netherlands as core conditionalities for the approval of reconstruction funds. Initial failure by Sint Maarten to comply with conditionalities even led to the fall of the then Government in November 2017 and new elections in early 2018. The Netherlands did not bring up either of these conditions in its discussions with the World Bank. Border control and other areas related to law and order were relegated to direct support outside World Bank involvement. The Bank was apparently also found to have enough procurement rules and other safeguards by itself to warrant adequate spending of the funds.

65. Finally, it should be mentioned that the World Bank also produced several analytical and strategic reports, some of which are available in the public domain. For example, in 2020 a Public Expenditure Review[116] was conducted as well as the Sint Maarten 2020-2022 Tourism Recovery study[117]. In support of proposed project activities, sectoral studies were undertaken, e.g., the 2020 Rapid Housing Assessment[118] and several studies on debris management in 2018[119].

6.3. Institutional arrangements related to the Trust Fund

66. The NRRP was formally a venture led and owned by the Government of Sint Maarten with strong support provided principally by the World Bank. The plan was eventually unanimously approved by the Parliament of Sint Maarten, which developed ownership for the document. But it is noteworthy that drawing up the plan involved some 170 national and international experts, the majority of whom came to Sint Maarten from the World Bank and other external organisations within a relatively short period of time in early 2018.

67. The Administration Arrangement mentions that the document, including its annexes, is not an international treaty and is not eligible for registration as a treaty under article 102 of the United Nations[120]. The text includes many standard provisions of World Bank Trust Funds. But it also contains a few adjustments at the request of the Government of the Netherlands. One peculiarity is that it is a single-donor trust fund with only one recipient country, Sint Maarten. Another is through a variety of ways in which the Netherlands would be closely involved in the management of the Trust Fund. The Netherlands insisted on maintaining the right to modify the initially agreed periodicity of tranche payments and even on exercising the authority to unilaterally suspend the Trust Fund if deemed necessary. Given the single donor / recipient model, the Netherlands is in a position to be more engaged in the specifics and details of implementation than is customary in other Trust Funds due to the narrow geographical scope of spending. Also, the World Bank appreciates the Netherlands' highly detailed knowledge of what is happening on the ground in Sint Maarten. It should also be mentioned that the Steering Committee has decision-making power over yearly workplans and over the allocation of funding to projects as well as the mandate to monitor progress and guide implementation. However, the Steering Committee does not have the authority to intervene in the implementation of projects, nor in project related decision-making. This is the province of the World Bank and the recipient country as set out in the grant agreements signed between them.

68. A tripartite Steering Committee was to become the governance body consisting of a representative of the World Bank, a representative of the Netherlands, and a representative of Sint Maarten (the latter the Prime Minister or his / her designee). The Steering Committee would meet at least bi-annually and approve strategic priorities and annual work programmes as well as budget allocations. The decisions of the Steering Committee would be by consensus, preferably on a no-objection basis. The Steering Committee would be supported by a Technical Working Group.

69. A distinction was made between a) Bank executed activities, essentially strengthening of institutional frameworks and operational capacity, programme management and administration and project implementation support; and b) recipient executed activities, which basically consist of

[116] World Bank 2020, St. Maarten Public Expenditure Review.
[117] World Bank 2020-2022 Sint Maarten Tourism Recovery Priority Action Plan.
[118] World Bank 2020 Rapid Housing Assessment Sint Maarten.
[119] For example, World Bank 2018 Air Screening Results at Pond Island Municipal Waste Disposal and Debris Sites Sint Maarten.
[120] Administration Arrangement, paragraph 10.

the implementation of projects. In addition, the need was felt to create in Sint Maarten an institution that could operate outside the budget of the Government of Sint Maarten, as its budget was not balanced and diversion of funds to cover public spending deficits was to be avoided. On 15 March 2018, an Interim Recovery Committee (IRC) was created that would handle responsibilities on the side of Sint Maarten. It lay the groundwork for the creation of a more permanent institution, the NRPB became fully operational in January 2019. It was to be an autonomous administrative authority *(zelfstandig bestuursorgaan)*, i.e., a legal entity. The NRPB's main task would be to prepare, coordinate, implement and evaluate projects financed under the Trust Fund. In addition, it would also be mandated to identify and implement recovery, reconstruction and resilience projects financed from other sources than the Trust Fund.

70. In its communications to Parliament, the Netherlands Ministry of BZK made it clear that it favoured project implementation not only through governmental institutions, but also through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector and possibly other international organisations. Guided by debates in the House of Representatives (*Tweede Kamer),* the Government expressed special interest in promoting NGOs and private companies (including potential providers from other territories of the Kingdom, e.g., Bonaire and Curaçao) to become

involved in reconstruction activities[121]. This insistence by a donor was at variance with the rules on international competitive bidding practiced by the World Bank. While the World Bank followed these rules, it did agree to meet with stakeholders including companies and NGOs from the Netherlands and other parts of the Kingdom to encourage interest and explain the rules and procedures for participating in Trust Fund implementation. This was also necessary, because companies from outside the Kingdom tended to show but limited interest in Sint Maarten due to the remoteness of the island and the small size of its economy.

71. The entire budget of the Trust Fund was to be released to the World Bank in four tranches. The first and second tranches were released in 2018 amounting to EUR 112.0 million and EUR 150.0 million respectively. A third tranche of EUR 90.0 million was transferred in November 2020. The fourth tranche amounting to EUR 86.115.000 was sent to the World Bank in October 2021. The total now adds up to EUR 438.115 million. This amount is lower than the EUR 470.0 million originally foreseen, as deductions were made for disbursements by the Netherlands Government through bilateral channels. The amount of EUR 15.3 million was used for liquidity support to Sint Maarten in 2018. It was also agreed between Sint Maarten and the Netherlands in 2021 that EUR 15.0 million would be deducted from the Trust Fund budget and made available through Covid-19 related liquidity support (COHO) (see also table 1 in section 3.1. and section 8.1.).

72. The Trust Fund Annual Report 2021 mentions that the total disbursements received from the Ministry of BZK corresponds to USD 511.964.051. In addition, USD 13.873.811 in investment income has been generated for the Trust Fund by the World Bank's Treasury Department since Trust Fund inception. The total amount received is hence USD 525.837.862. The Annual Report also states that as of 31 December 2021 USD 171.315.05 had been disbursed, USD 186.350.471 were undisbursed and another USD 159.153.020 were still available. If the administrative fee of USD 9.0 million is added, the above-mentioned received amount of USD 525.837.862 is accounted for. Details are presented in table 4.

Table 4: Status of Trust Fund disbursements as of 31 December 2021 (in USD)[122]

Funds received		Status of disbursements		
Received from the Government of the Netherlands	**511.964.051**	Disbursed operational (RETF + BETF)[123]	165.932.155	
Investment Income to date	**13.873.811**	Disbursed non-operational (PM&A)[124]	5.382.900	
		Total disbursements to date		**171.315.055**
		Undisbursed operational ((RETF + BETF)	185.093.371	
		Undisbursed non-operational (PM&A)	1.257.100	
		Total undisbursed to date		**186.350.471**
		Funds available for disbursement and allocation of confirmed activities		**159.135.020**

[121] Kstk. 34773, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal d.d. 23 maart 2018.
[122] World Bank Trust Fund Annual Report 2021, Appendix C.
[123] RETF = Recipient-executed Trust Fund, BETF = Bank-executed Trust Fund.
[124] PM&A = Program Management and Administration.

		Administration fee to date	**9.037.316**
Total funds received	**525.837.862**	**Total disbursements**	**525.837.862**

6.4. Overview of projects

73. Table 5 contains an overview of Trust Fund projects as of 31 December 2021 as reported in the Trust Fund Annual Report 2021. The second column mentions the recipient of the respective grants which in most cases is the Government of Sint Maarten with the NRPB as Project Implementing Unit. An exception is the Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness Project, for which a grant agreement was concluded directly with the Sint Maarten Medical Center (SMMC). The Airport Reconstruction Project involves a more complex arrangement with a grant provided to the Government of Sint Maarten, which in turn provides a loan to Princess Juliana International Airport (PJIA). Projects to be implemented by NGOs are concluded with respective organisations, e.g., the Red Cross Netherlands for the Roof Repair Project, VNG-International for the R4CR Project, and UNICEF Netherlands for the Child Resilience and Protection Project.

74. The third column mentions the date on which the project was approved. The subsequent columns mention Trust Fund commitments and disbursements as of 31 December 2021.

Table 5: Trust Fund projects (as of 31 December 2021)[125]

Project	Recipient	Approval	Trust Fund Commitments USD million	Trust Fund Disbursements USD million
Projects under implementation:				
Emergency Recovery Project (ERP-I)	Government of Sint Maarten	10 July 2018	100.20	49.33
Emergency Income Support and Training Project (EISTP)	Government of Sint Maarten	02 August 2018	22.50	19.91
Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness	Sint Maarten Medical Center	16 August 2018	28.61	21.4
Emergency Debris Management Project (EDMP)	Government of Sint Maarten	21 December 2018	25.0	18.01
Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project	Sint Maarten / Princess Juliana International Airport (PJIA)	9 December 2019	92.0	21.48
Red Cross Roof Repair Project	Red Cross-NL	30 December 2019	3.75	3.75
Enterprise Support Project (ESP)	Government of Sint Maarten	30 December 2019	35.0	12.19
Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project (R4CR)	VNG-I / R4CR	26 June 2020	7.23	2.10
Child Resilience and Protection Project	UNICEF - NL	22 October 2020	5.0	1.77
Sint Maarten Digital Government Transformation Project (DGTP)	Government of Sint Maarten	18 March 2021	12.0	0

[125] Source: Trust Fund Annual Report 2021.

Fostering Resilient Learning Project preparation grant (FRLP)	NRPB	11 March 2021	1.8	1.73
Recipient executed Trust Fund Projects under preparation[126]:				
Fostering Resilient Learning Project (FRLP)	NRPB	Estimated approval Q1 2022	30.0 (estimated)	
Additional funding Emergency Debris Project[127]	NRPB	Estimated approval Q4 2021	25.0 (estimated)	
Long Term Waste Management[128]	NRPB	Estimated approval Q3 2022	10.0 (estimated)	
Mental Health Project	NRPB	Estimated approval Q1 2022	8.0 (estimated)	

75. In section 6.5. and 6.6, projects will be briefly summarized with a focus on results achieved and some general observations will be made. Section 6.7. will present available evidence on costs incurred and benefits obtained. The status of the different projects at present is assessed, i.e., roughly at mid-point between the establishment of the Trust Fund in 2018 and its current end date end-2025.

6.5. Effectiveness – results achieved[129]

6.5.1. Emergency Recovery Project I (ERP-I)

76. The Emergency Recovery Project I (ERP-I) was approved on 10 July 2018, barely three months after the establishment of the Trust Fund, under an emergency procedure according to World Bank rules, for an initial amount of USD 55.0 million. On 28 April 2021 the budget was increased to reach USD 110.2 million in total. It was to address a variety of emergency needs in Sint Maarten, e.g., the restoration of critical infrastructure (including shelters), repairs of roofs and social housing, emergency equipment and training, restoration of electricity and water systems. It was also to assist the Government of Sint Maarten in setting up the necessary institutions for Trust Fund administration, especially the NRPB, which became operational as from January 2019. An important early achievement of the project was the effective insurance of Sint Maarten, in September 2018, under the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) against the impact of future hurricanes and other natural disasters.

77. Disbursements on social goals of the project could only commence in March 2019, i.e., once the Sint Maarten Government had created the necessary legal and institutional settings, and a clearer picture had emerged as to insurance, bonding and financial requirements to be met by local contractors through local banks. Implementation of the project was an intense learning process throughout 2018 – 2021, both for partners in Sint Maarten, who were not familiar with procedures and requirements of the World Bank, and for the World Bank, which had to acquaint itself with realities on the ground in Sint Maarten. According to Trust Fund annual and semi-annual reports, start-up of activities and implementation were also hampered by the small size and limited capacity of local contractors, the limited appetite of external contractors to undertake relatively small contracts in Sint Maarten, time needed for material deliveries, as well as difficulties in obtaining visas and work permits for external contractors and individuals selected for technical assistance[130]. The lack of streamlined processes for work and residency permits, and business licenses and taxes for foreign companies and foreign staff posed significant challenges throughout project implementation. In addition, as from 2020, foreign companies and consultants faced travel restrictions due to Covid-19, which were only somewhat eased intermittently but still prevailed at the end of 2021.

[126] Not included: a potential housing project, which will be discussed further during Q1 2022. See section 6.5.14.
[127] Allocated but not yet under preparation.
[128] Allocated but not yet under preparation.
[129] Most of the information on results achieved has been drawn from Annual and Semi-annual Reports of the Trust from the years 2018-2021.
[130] Trust Fund Annual Report 2019.

78. The Annual Trust Fund Report 2021 provides information on the overall disbursement rate of ERP-I. Despite above-mentioned constraints, overall disbursement was USD 49.3 million, which compared favourably with the initial budget of USD 55.0 million. The budget was increased by a bit more than USD 45.0 million on 28 April 2021.

79. A review of Annual and Semi-Annual Trust Fund Reports of 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 yields insights into tangible achievements of the ERP-I. Major cumulative results (completed or nearing completion in December 2021) include *inter alia*: a) repair of 410 homes out of 519 targeted (including 141 private homes and 269 social units, of which 109 were repaired under the project and 160 units retroactively[131]); b) repair of 11 shelters (of a total of 12 in Sint Maarten); c) repair of three priority schools out of 19 targeted (slow progress due to the need to temporarily relocate students and Covid-19 restrictions and also the need to conduct an environmental screening for asbestos and mould assessments in all 19 schools); d) improvement of working conditions of first responders (repair of two police stations; communication and breathing equipment as well as three fire trucks for the Fire Department; four ambulances by March 2022); e) repair of the radiosonde building for the Meteorological Department; f) restoring water and electricity utility services (restoration of four water tanks; trenching to advance the underground piping and cabling of the water and electricity distribution network); g) conduct of a terrain and bathymetric survey for the mapping of multiple hazard risks and related training; and h) continuation of the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCIRF) and preparation of membership in the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA).

80. ERP-I initially also funded the NRPB in its entirety. At a later stage, other projects contributed to the financing of NRPB. As of mid-2021, all key project implementation staff positions were filled (51 positions to date). The NRPB now has capacity in safeguards, procurement, financial management, project and contract management, engineering, and monitoring and evaluation. Under a Framework Consultancy Agreement, the engineering capacity to undertake technical assessments, designs, drafting procurement packages and supervising works has been boosted.

6.5.2. Emergency Income Support and Training Project (EISTP)

81. The Emergency Income Support and Training Project (EISTP) was approved in an emergency procedure soon after the signature of the Administration Arrangement. Approval occurred on 2 August 2018 and foresaw a budget of USD 22.5 million. First disbursements took place as early as in August 2018. The project built on an existing joint initiative of the Sint Maarten Government and the private sector, an attempt of a hotel group to retrain and to re-employ its workforce, which had become unemployed in the aftermath of the hurricane. The first component of the EISTP has been to provide temporary income support and improve employability of un- and underemployed workers, initially in the hospitality sector and progressively in other sectors. A second component is to strengthen the social protection system. As of 31 December 2021, disbursements were relatively high: USD 19.9 million. The bulk of this amount, USD 18.4 million, was spent on component 1: income support and training activities.

82. Component 1 was implemented by the Sint Maarten Training Foundation under the supervision of the NRPB in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health and Social Development and Labor. It was concluded in September 2020 overshooting its target of 1,800 participants by 9 percent. As of September 2020, the programme had benefitted 1,960 unemployed and underemployed individuals, of whom 69 percent were women, 16 percent young and 76 percent unemployed. The graduation rate was 94 percent, as 1,844 participants received certifications in hospitality, culinary arts and / or construction.

83. Component I of the Trust Fund project was closed in September 2020, but the Sint Maarten Training Foundation could continue its activities on a subsidy of the Sint Maarten Government, which at that time already benefitted from Covid-19 related liquidity support granted

[131] Presumably under a reimbursement procedure for households that were found eligible after having made the investments themselves.

by the Netherlands to Sint Maarten. The programme was thus extended until April 2021. A total of USD 4.4 million in total were mobilized in this manner[132].

84. Component 2 foresees strengthening of the social protection system's capacity for shock response and protection of the poor and aims to develop a modernized social registry system for the Ministry of Public Health, Social Development and Labor (VSA). The contract for the design and development of the registry was signed in October 2020. That activity was still ongoing at the end of 2021. In addition the SENA (a household level survey) was delayed by Covid-19 restrictions and was expected to be launched in 2022[133].

6.5.3. Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness Project (HRRP)

85. The Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness Project (HRRP) was approved on 16 August 2018 under an emergency procedure given the importance of ensuring continuous high standard medical care in post-Irma Sint Maarten. An initial budget of USD 25.0 million was approved, to which additional funding USD 3.61 million was added in March 2020 for Covid-19 related equipment and facilities. By 31 December 2021 disbursement from the Trust Fund stood at USD 21.4 million. It should be mentioned that the Sint Maarten Medical Foundation mobilized USD 75.0 million by itself. The Government of Sint Maarten also contributed additional funding under Covid-19 related liquidity support from the Netherlands, including technical assistance provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS).

86. The Trust Fund project could build on existing pre-Irma plans to upgrade and expand hospital facilities. The objective of the project has been to improve the preparedness and capacity of hospital services on the island, the Sint Maarten Medical Center (SMMC) being the main health provider on the Dutch side of the island as well as for neighbouring islands like Saba, Sint Eustatius and Anguilla. Component 1 co-finances the new building of Sint Maarten General Hospital with the aim of making it hurricane category 5 resilient, thereby substantially increasing hospital capacity and improving health services. Component 2 aims at upgrading the existing hospital and enhancing the quality and scope of hospital services, including updating critical guidelines and carrying out routine technical audits of their application.

87. Trust Fund annual and semi-annual reports of 2020 and 2021 mention that results under both components are highly satisfactory. Under component 1 (USD 17.0 million Trust Fund cofinancing), the final designs for the new hospital building were delivered on time in March 2021 and the selection of a contractor was under way. Under component 2 (USD 11.3 million cofinancing), as of 30 June 2021, 75 percent of all essential upgrades of existing hospital facilities have been completed or are well under way. These include a) five additional double-bed rooms; b) the medical gas distribution system; c) the upgrade and expansion of the operating room complex; d) the dialysis and oncology expansion. Several other completed improvements include roof reinforcement and upgrades to the ICT, the fire detection system, the back-up generators, and the Auxiliary Care Facility for Covid-19 patients. The additional funding of USD 3.6 million has been used to purchase medical supplies and equipment, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, and non-medical equipment for Covid-19 triage and isolation areas. Progress has also been made with the updating and improvement of the Emergency Disaster Preparedness Plan (EDP) and Evacuation Plan, including a Hurricane Preparedness Plan.

88. A measure of success is that the number of referrals abroad has decreased significantly. The World Bank reports that the number of medical referrals to overseas facilities decreased from 5,880 in 2017 to 461 in 2020. This corresponds to a 92 percent decrease over the four years. This is notably due to the addition of ophthalmology, orthopedics, neurology, pulmonology, obstetrician-gynecologist care, pain management and radiology specialties. The reduction in referrals abroad significantly contributes to the lowering of Sint Maarten health care costs.

[132] This includes a previous contribution by the Government during the period February – July 2018. See Trust Fund Annual Report 2021.
[133] Trust Fund Annual Report 2021.

6.5.4. Emergency Debris Management Project (EDMP)

89. Municipal waste management and landfill capacity have been long-standing problems in Sint Maarten that largely remained unaddressed since the 1990s. Hurricane Irma exacerbated these problems causing pollution and unsafe conditions for the population living in the vicinity of the landfill on Pond Island and beyond. Massive amounts of debris and municipal waste caused fires and flareups, some of which may also have been lit by thieves in search of copper. Toxic smoke became a public health hazard in 2017 and 2018. The fires have since been extinguished and largely controlled, but the landfill is still unstable and a threat to the environment. Hurricane Irma also caused other debris, e.g., many ship- and car-wrecks which needed to be taken care of, while there was also a general need for shoreline cleaning.

90. The Emergency Debris Management Project (EDMP) was identified as a priority for the Trust Fund at an early stage. It was approved on 21 December 2018 with a commitment of USD 25.0 million. Disbursements as of 31 December 2021 amounted to USD 18.01 million. Due to the complexity of the problem, progress in terms of achieving tangible results on the ground has been slow, as much time had to be spent on research and negotiations with the Government of Sint Maarten and other parties involved.

91. An immediate priority was to address the subsurface fires, which were initially suppressed through standalone fire control mechanisms. The World Bank came to an agreement with the Sint Maarten Government in January 2020 to integrate fire control within routine landfill management activities, whereby waste disposal could only take place in designated areas with appropriate health and safeguards in place. The project was correspondingly restructured on 3 June 2021.

92. Problems related to the landfill were extensively researched between 2019 and 2021, however hampered by Covid-19 related travel restrictions for international experts. The aim has been to provide the technical and strategic underpinning required for landfill upgrading. Studies included one short-term and one long-term plan for waste management, a regional market study for waste management in the Caribbean, two feasibility studies and a sector financial framework (the latter still under review at the World Bank). On 4 March 2021, the Sint Maarten Council of Ministers approved a high-level roadmap, which has since also been endorsed by the Steering Committee. The roadmap sets deadlines for the preparation of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) and the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). Extensive work is also under way to ensure sustainability of landfill operations. The project will finance recontouring and reorganisation of the landfills to allow for future adequate disposal of waste.

93. A comprehensive package of technical assistance to the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment, and Infrastructure (VROMI) is being prepared to strengthen waste and landfill management capacity and support the resettlement activities. Specialized staff has been recruited by the NRPB. The Netherlands is providing a high-level focal point to the Government of Sint Maarten under direct support, who will notably support the Resettlement Action Plan. Equally under direct support, VNG-International is being recruited to support the Sint Maarten Government for sector reforms under the National Solid Waste Management Strategy (see section 7.2.3.).

94. The priority as of 2021 was resettlement of the population living in the vicinity of the landfill, which is under threat of landslides and health hazards due to the toxic environment. No works to recontour / reorganize the landfill can be undertaken prior to the resettlement of this population for safety reasons. A specific site for resettlement was designated in cooperation with the Ministry of VROMI and the Sint Maarten Housing Development Foundation (SMHDF) and consultations with affected households and businesses were started. Many of those involved seemed to opt for individual compensation packages instead of moving to the designated area. As partners in Sint Maarten have no experience with resettlement of populations, the World Bank provides extensive technical assistance to ensure that its safeguards are met. The technical expertise in the NRPB has been strengthened.

95. Tangible results of the project have been shipwreck salvaging and shoreline cleaning. A total of 139 shipwrecks were removed from Simpson Bay Lagoon and Mullet Pond, a result which exceeded the original target of 90 shipwrecks. 10.5 km of shoreline were cleaned. The intention is to sink one vessel as an artificial reef for recreational purposes[134].

96. As of the end of 2021, funding of the EDMP was to be topped up by USD 25.0 million from Trust Fund resources and project preparation was under way[135]. In addition, a new long-term Solid Waste Management Project is being prepared, which could have a budget of an additional USD 10.0 million. Its broader objective will be to implement key elements of the governments long-term waste management strategy and its Roadmap for Sustainable Waste Management (see also section 6.5.12.).

6.5.5. Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project

97. Princess Juliana International Airport (PJIA) is a major airport in the Caribbean, which before Hurricane Irma handled over 1.8 million passengers and more than 62,000 aircraft movements per year. It serves both Sint Maarten and Saint Martin and is an important hub for neighbouring islands Saba and Sint Eustatius as well as Saint Barthélemy and Anguilla. Post-Irma, the traffic recovered to nearly 1.5 million passengers in 2019, which corresponded to almost 85 percent of pre-Irma levels. The reduction was partly also due to capacity shortages in the tourism sector because of damages incurred by Irma.

98. The reconstruction of the Airport was considered a priority as from the start-up of the Trust Fund, because of its economic importance. However, forthright implementation was hampered by major governance and management issues between 2018 and 2020, which needed to be resolved before Trust Fund resources, initially estimated at USD 50.0 million, could be released. In addition, as early as in 2018, the possibility of a soft loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) of USD 50,0 million was considered. This loan was, however, also subject to the same conditions.

99. PJIA is operated by Princess Juliana International Airport Operating Company N.V. (PJIAE), which in turn is fully owned by the Princess Juliana International Airport Holding Company N.V. (PJIAH). PJIAH is 100 percent owned by the Government of Sint Maarten. Since 2012, PJIAE had attracted substantial investments on the international capital market resulting in substantial debt service payments to private sector bond holders. Post-Irma, in the beginning of 2018, PJIA was technically in default on its 2012 bonds due to its failure to meet its minimum operating profit vs. debt service ratio and that the minimum debt service coverage would not be met. Bond holders held post-Irma insurance payments in escrow and insisted on payment of the remaining debt service. Initial requests to bond holders that they should waive their right to accelerate repayments were unsuccessful.

100. The Government of the Netherlands was not disposed to release a USD 50.0 million grant from the Trust Fund and to support the USD 50.0 million soft loan from the EIB for reconstruction, as long as financial covenant compliance could not be ensured. Intense negotiations followed between 2019 and April 2020 with the bond holders by the Governments of the Netherland and Sint Maarten. This involved direct support activities being deployed by the Netherlands for legal assistance as well as eventually support to financial and administrative management of the airport by Schiphol Group Nederland (see section 7). In 2019 the Netherlands also provided a bridging loan of USD 15.0 million as part of direct support to the Government of Sint Maarten, which made this loan available to PJIA. The bridging loan was reimbursed by PJIA within six months as agreed (see 7.1.).

[134] It may be useful to note that shipwreck removal on the Dutch side has prompted the French authorities to follow suit and that cleaning of the French side of the lagoon is now also underway.
[135] As decided by the Steering Committee in March 2022, the budget was increased to USD 60.0 million for landfill reorganisation and expert management. Policy measures to manage the Waste sector must be taken by the Government of Sint Maarten to make these landfill investments sustainable. Measures include the establishment of a waste authority and of a financial framework for the operation of the waste sector.

101. In various communications to Parliament, the State Secretary of BZK in the Netherlands expressed dissatisfaction with the slow progress made in discussions with Sint Maarten concerning airport reconstruction. He reported that the Sint Maarten Government apparently pursued financing alternatives at less favourable conditions, presumably to escape stringent conditionalities from the Dutch side. These conditionalities were a) a complete integrity check of the management of the holding and operating companies, b) a corporate governance risk assessment by the World Bank to address issues arising from the integrity check, and c) the requirement of external technical assistance to the management of both the holding and the operating companies[136].

102. The conditions were eventually complied with, albeit with some hesitancy on the Sint Maarten side. This led to changes in the composition of management, especially in the holding company. The World Bank conducted a Corporate Governance Assessment in 2019, which led to a Corporate Governance Improvement Plan for adoption by the Sint Maarten Government. It must be said that the process coincided with a period of political instability in Sint Maarten. The Romeo-Marlin II cabinet came to fall on 22 September 2019. It was claimed that the crisis around airport reconstruction was a major factor in the political turmoil.

103. The Project was eventually approved on 9 December 2019, but did not become effective until 21 April 2020, when two final conditions at the insistence of the Ministry of BZK were in place[137]. In the first place, the Royal Schiphol Group was to provide technical assistance to both the holding and operating companies as from 20 February 2020[138]. Secondly, an agreement was reached with the bond holders, who released USD 72.0 million in insurance proceeds in a cooperation agreement signed on 4 April 2020.

104. This cleared the way for the release of a USD 72.0 million grant from the Trust Fund to the Government of Sint Maarten. The NRPB was to become responsible for the financial management and oversight of the Airport Project[139]. This included USD 50.0 million for reconstruction, USD 21.0 million for selected operational expenditures in case of shocks and USD 1.0 million for project management. This amount of USD 21.0 million would eventually be released in case it was not used. Trust Fund resources for the airport thus total USD 72.0 million, matched by the soft loan from the EIB of USD 50.0 million and the PJIAE's own contribution in the amount of USD 7.0 million.

105. Since PJIAE is a separate profit-oriented legal entity, the Sint Maarten Government decided to release the funds provided under the Trust Fund to PJIAE not as a grant, but as a loan at basically the same concessional terms as the EIB loan to PJIAE of USD 50.0 million. This arrangement was concluded between the Sint Maarten Government and PJIAE with support of the World Bank and the Netherlands. The on-lending set up is acknowledged in the Grant Agreement between the World Bank and Sint Maarten with the proviso that some conditions need to be met. Key among them is that the terms be equivalent or better than the terms provided by the EIB under its loan. For the purposes of Trust Fund administration, the expenditure remains a grant to Government, commensurate with the Trust Fund setup. Monies are disbursed to Government under the Grant only against advancement of works on the ground. i.e., as long as this project produces the results for which resources were provided. The intermediate lending steps are not of concern to the Trust Fund.

106. The reimbursement of the loan (by PJIAE to the Sint Maarten Government) and the release of a certain part of the amount on hold in the World Bank to the Government of Sint Maarten (at the request of and subject to certain conditions being met by PJIAE) will over time create the

[136] *Kstk 35151 Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal d.d. 28 februari 2019*. It must be noted that the Corporate Governance Assessment assessed structural weaknesses in the corporate structure of PJIAE and PJAH based on the international standards established by OECD DAC and partly based on the IFC's due diligence methodology. Integrity checks of individual board members is not part of this type of assessment.
[137] The timeframe is just a little longer than the World Bank standard 90 days for this type of process.
[138] It should be mentioned that the newly appointed Chief Executive Officer of the PJIA had already engaged services of the Schiphol Group in January 2019, as no in-house expertise was available for reconstruction. This initiative was not welcomed by some parties in the Sint Maarten Government.
[139] The PJIA does not have direct access to project funding. All payments are made by the NRPB.

significant capital expected to be in the order of USD 90.0 million. This amount will be at the disposal of the Sint Maarten Government. Reflows are expected as from 2027. The proposal is to use this capital for the establishment of a National Resilience Fund / Disaster Risk Finance Facility. Discussions as to governance, management and operation of such a fund / facility had, however, barely begun at the end of 2021. Technical assistance by the World Bank was started. The proposal offers interesting perspectives for the medium and long term for Sint Maarten to address national disasters in a more sustainable way (see also section 10).

107. The project disbursed USD 21.48 million by the end of 2021. A request for bids for main reconstruction work, which included a virtual tour of the premises, was issued in October 2020. As a result of a competitive process, a main construction contract to the amount of USD 89.0 million was awarded in July 2021 and signed in August 2021. The World Bank also provides technical assistance so that social and environmental safeguards are met. The reconstruction of the terminal is expected to be completed in the third quarter of 2023.

6.5.6. Red Cross Roof Repair Project

108. The Red Cross Roof Repair Project was approved on 30 December 2019 and closed on 31 December 2020. The entire budget of USD 3.75 million has been spent. The project implemented by the Red Cross Netherlands largely achieved its target, as 182 of the initially targeted 200 damaged roofs affected by Hurricane Irma for vulnerable households were repaired. 75 of the households that benefitted from the support were female-headed. 63 craftsmen were trained to become skilled local construction workers. The project was completed on-time within a year despite an interruption between March and May 2020 caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. It should be mentioned that the target of 200 house repairs, agreed to by the implementing partner, was relatively modest as compared to the overall needs in the housing sector[140] (see also section 6.7.2. on Building Back Better).

109. The successful and on-time completion of this project was probably largely because the Red Cross Netherlands was already well established on the island since the emergency and early recovery phases. It had in fact implemented projects funded on the emergency and early recovery budgets of Kingdom Relations in 2018 (see report on parts I and III). These were completed in 2018 and there was a one-year gap between early recovery activities and the project under the Trust Fund. However, the organisation was involved in home and shelter repair and various other social undertakings on a continuous basis on other funding mobilized in the Netherlands and from the International Red Cross[141]. There was also close cooperation with other partner organisations, e.g., VNG-International and UNICEF Netherlands.

110. Beyond additional funding, the World Bank introduced more stringent procurement and social and environmental safeguards which were found to be cumbersome by the Red Cross. However, the organisation also considered that they had some added value, e.g., the requirement to remove waste materials from building sites. On the downside, project preparation was rather lengthy and labour-intensive, whereby the Red Cross had to pre-finance the related costs. There was hence some risk involved for the implementing organisation.

6.5.7. Enterprise Support Project (ESP)

111. The Enterprise Support Project was approved on 30 December 2018 and became effective in May 2020. The budget amounted to USD 35.0 million, of which USD 12.19 million were disbursed as of 31 December 2021. This corresponds to 34 percent of the budget. The project aims at supporting micro, small and medium sized enterprises in accessing financing for asset replacement, non-structural repairs, and working capital, channelled through the NRPB and local

[140] This is why for larger scale repairs national programmes are developed and implemented through larger contracts with contractors such as under ERP1.
[141] *Rode Kruis 2021, Terugkoppeling 2017-2021, Nationale Actie "Nederland helpt Sint Maarten".*

participating financial institutions. The rationale of the project is to provide financing and support to enterprises that under normal circumstances do not qualify for loans from commercial banks.

112. The World Bank's assessment was that a large percentage of micro, small and medium sized enterprises in Sint Maarten were unable to obtain financing from local commercial banks because of lack of collateral or adequate insurance. While this is true, as far as commercial banks were concerned, there is no mention of the fact that a Dutch NGO named Qredits, a social lender and not a commercial bank, had already been in existence on the island since 2017 (a short while before Hurricane Irma) specifically focussing on a clientele requiring micro-credits. According to the Qredits Social Impact Report of 2020[142], a total of 334 loans had been disbursed by year-end 2020 in Sint Maarten, including 290 micro-credit loans and 44 bridge loans. 85 percent of customers that received loans three years ago still had active businesses in 2020.

113. Qredits benefitted from a grant of EUR 555.000 from the early recovery budget of the Ministry of BZK (see report on parts I and III)[143]. The subsidy covered three elements: a) the interest differential between regular interest of 9.75 percent and soft loan conditions at 2.0 percent interest for 90 loans with a maximum of USD 25.000 per loan over an average maturity period of five year with a grace period of one year; and b) additional personnel costs for processing loan requests and support to micro-lenders. Both small-scale entrepreneurs already in business and starters who had lost their jobs elsewhere due to the hurricane were eligible for loans. 64 percent of loan applications were approved corresponding to 96 loans with a credit volume of USD 2.3 million. At the end of the early recovery phase in June 2018, Qredits requested the Ministry of BZK to extend the project, which would allow to cover an additional 100 soft loans at the same conditions, as demand from the private sector was high. The Ministry did not approve this request, as the intention was to include this type of project in the Trust Fund. Qredits was therefore obliged to process new loan applications at less favourable conditions, i.e., 9.75 percent with a grace period of six months. As of 30 September 2018, Qredits had 131 outstanding loans, of which 96 at soft loan conditions. Many more loan applications could not be honoured.

114. Once early recovery support by the Ministry of BZK had ceased, Qredits strongly lobbied with both the Ministry and subsequently also the World Bank with the aim of becoming part of micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) lending under the Trust Fund. As from May 2020, i.e., a full one and a half years after the unsuccessful request of Qredits to the Ministry of BZK, the Trust Fund ESP project became effective with the selection of local participating financial institutions: the Windward Islands Bank, Banco di Caribe and Qredits. As a non-governmental social lender, Qredits did not naturally meet criteria of the World Bank applying requirements for commercial lending institutions (banks). While Qredits was primarily interested in donations to sustain its operations, the World Bank intended to develop sector wide interventions in support of MSMEs by offering participating financial institutions (banks) incentives to finance them, but also by letting them take some of the risks related to financing (as appropriate to bring MSMEs more sustainably into their client group). The World Bank found that Qredits did not score high on two key indicators of successful financial institutions: self-sustainability and low percentage of non-performing loans. According to the Bank, the ESP project took an appropriate sector-wide approach (which is international best practice) and provided significant volumes of capital, incentives and support to allow a range of financial institutions to serve the financing needs of SMEs in Sint Maarten.

115. As of 15 June 2021, according to the World Bank Annual Report 2021, 103 firms were approved to receive financing through the three participating financial institutions and additional applications were in the pipeline at different stages of review. The bulk of the vetting of loan applications is performed by the NRPB, which applies World Bank procurement guidelines to the grant portion of financing packages related to the purchase of replacement assets (2/3 of the packages re grants). In accordance with World Bank policies, certain types of activity are excluded, e.g., activities like trading wildlife, gambling or prostitution. It is still too early to assess the performance of the supported enterprises in terms of repayment and business success. As of

[142] *Qredits 2020 Sociaal Jaarverslag Cariben.*
[143] Qredits *Eindverslag subsidieverstrekking* 2017-0000662632.

end 2021, the project was scheduled to end on 31 December 2025. A particular challenge is the current requirement that loans should be repaid by the current end of the Trust Fund[144].

116. While interest rate payments are retained by implementing financial institutions, the principal component of the repayment of the loans flows back to the NRPB, possibly to be used for future loans. There has so far been no discussion of how this would be managed and if this would allow NRPB to handle a loan portfolio on a sustainable basis once the Trust Fund is closed. An aspect to consider in this regard is that NRPB is not meant to be a financial institution by itself. There is still the possibility that any balance in project resources is eventually credited to the Trust Fund and like other unspent Trust Fund resources to be returned to the Netherlands, when the Trust Fund is closed.

6.5.8. Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project (R4CR)

117. The Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project was approved on 26 June 2020 and declared effective on 31 July 2020. The grant of USD 7.23 million was accorded to VNG-International (VNG-I), a Dutch organisation under the tutelage of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG). The project renamed in Sint Maarten Resources for Community Resilience (R4CR) was to improve the capacity of local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to support and implement reconstruction and resilience activities. As of 31 December 2021, the project had disbursed over USD 2.1 million or almost 30 percent of total project funds.

118. Project preparation took more than a year (between May 2019 and June 2020) and involved a labour-intensive process for VNG-International to comply with World Bank requirements. Until the approval of the project, VNG-International had to shoulder costs by itself, as reimbursements on the Project Preparation Grant were made available only after project approval. VNG-International was reasonably familiar with the Bank's procurement and safeguard guidelines, as it had been involved in at least one similar Bank financed project in another country. A project coordinator was appointed as from August 2020, who was specifically selected with relevant experience in this regard in mind. In interviews, representatives of local CSOs unanimously expressed the view that they have found it very challenging to meet Trust Fund requirements.

119. The project comprises a training and small grants component. As of 31 December 2021, 1.970 people were served by the project, which should ultimately reach 10.000 people. Training activities addressed capacity gaps in proposal submission, project management, financial management, monitoring and evaluation and reporting. Grants have been awarded to 12 civil society organisations (CSOs) for services to the elderly, youth, and disabled persons for minor upgrade to community spaces and environmental projects. In mid-2021, 12 additional grants were handed out, which mainly focused on psychosocial and emotional support, youth employment and skills development, day care and afternoon school services, programs addressing gender-based violence, recreation and sports, nature and environment and arts and cultural activities.

6.5.9. Child Resilience and Protection Project (CRPP)

120. The Child Resilience and Protection Project (CRPP) was approved on 22 January 2021 for implementation by UNICEF-Netherlands. The budget amounts to USD 5.0 million, including a Project Preparation Grant of USD 512.000,00 which was approved in April 2020 and closed in October 2021. The actual preparation process started already in 2019. On 31 December 2021, disbursements from the Trust Fund stood at USD 1.77 million. NRPB is not directly involved. The project aims to strengthen the capacity of Sint Maarten's education and child protection systems to respond to needs of the children and adolescents because of natural disasters and external shocks. The project comprises three components: a) a school-based child resilience and well-being programme; b) a child protection programme to address child abuse and neglect; and c) a disaster and emergency preparedness programme for schools.

[144] This challenge is now softened by an agreement with the Netherlands to extend the Trust Fund's closing date to end 2028.

121. UNICEF-Netherlands has been established on the island at least since January 2018. UNICEF Netherlands is a Dutch NGO, the main mission of which is to raise funds for the global United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) being part of the UN system. In countries and territories where the global UNICEF would not usually intervene, in particular Caribbean countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, UNICEF Netherlands can offer support services that are part of UNICEF's global mandate. Early recovery activities were implemented with funding from the Ministry of BZK under article 8 between January and end September 2018. This funding was blended with resources received from Red Cross Netherlands, which allowed it to continue operations until end March 2019. The assistance comprised two major groups of activities: a) psychosocial assistance for children affected by Hurricane Irma on Sint Maarten; and b) Life skills education through sports for adolescents (see report on parts I and III of the article 8 policy review).

122. There is a notable time gap in the funding of operational activities on the ground. Early recovery funding ended in September 2018, as far as funding from article 8 was concerned (and in March 2019 with additional funding from the Red Cross), while the Trust Fund project became effective only during the first half of 2021. While activities are quite similar in substance and largely designed by UNICEF itself, there is no evidence that the Trust Fund project explicitly builds on previous experience from the ground up.

6.5.10. Sint Maarten Digital Government Transformation Project (DGTP)

123. The Digital Government Transformation Project was approved on 18 March 2021 and endowed with a budget of USD 12.0 million. The project is implemented by the NRPB and the Ministry of General Affairs. It aims to improve access to and efficiency of selected public services for citizens and businesses as well as the resiliency of government systems. Digitization of government documents and services was felt to be needed, because during Hurricane Irma a lot of archives were destroyed. By the end of 2021, the World Bank conducted various studies and project preparation activities to develop a digital transformation strategy, generate an interoperability framework that will allow ministries to connect with one another and exchange data, and improve the workflow and user-friendliness of the public service centres. The project was expected to become effective in January 2022.

6.5.11. Fostering Resilient Learning Project Preparation (FRLP) – under preparation

124. A major project to support the Sint Maarten 2018 Education Master Plan with an estimated budget of USD 30.0 million is under preparation: the Fostering Resilient Learning Project. A Project Preparation Grant of USD 1.8 million was approved on 11 March 2021 and the full project is scheduled for clearance by end-March 2022. The project provisionally aims at the following results: a) the rebuilding of safe and inclusive schools, b) restoring a community learning and cultural environment, and c) strengthening of the Management Information System of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (MECYS).

6.5.12. Additional Financing to the Emergency Debris Management Project – under preparation

125. Additional funding to the amount of USD 25.0 million was allocated by the Steering Committee to the Emergency Debris Management Project in March 2021. The additional funding was meant to allow the original project to reach its objectives, notably additional costs for a) the resettlement of people living in the vicinity of the landfill; b) complete the handling of metal wrecks and car wrecks; and c) implement the Design, Build and Operate Contract for the Temporary Debris Storage and Reduction (TDSR) facility; and d) finance additional project management costs[145].

126. The Steering Committee also allocated an additional USD 10.0 million for Long Term Waste Management. Once the resettlement is complete, the Government of Sint Maarten will have to

[145] It should be mentioned that major developments occurred in 2022, which fall outside the purview of this review.

further develop the solid waste management action plan. This will have to include essential institutional, legal, and financial reforms to ensure that the infrastructure remains sustainable after project completion with an appropriate management and environmental protection framework.

6.5.13. Improving Mental Health Services in Sint Maarten – under preparation

127. In July 2021 the Steering Committee allocated USD 8.0 million to improve Sint Maarten's capacity to deliver mental health services through support to Sint Maarten's Mental Health Foundation (MHF). The project scope and direction are still being discussed and are expected to be approved by mid-2022.

6.5.14. Potential Housing Project – under consideration

128. In July 2021, the Steering Committee started considering the option of a potential housing project worth USD 20.0 million. The project would be a social housing project, which would aim at strengthening the SMHDF's financial and operational capacity, help address market failures in the housing sector and potentially upgrade public spaces in vulnerable neighbourhoods. The initial assessment sought to clarify whether such a project could be completed within the current timeframe of Trust Fund activities.

6.6. Summarizing remarks on results achieved by projects under the Trust Fund

129. Analysis of the data suggests that four projects - the ERP-I, the EISTP, the Hospital Project and the EDMP – were agreed upon within a very short timeframe after the signature of the Administration Arrangement on 16 April 2018, i.e., in August 2018. soon after for three of these projects (ERP-1, EISTP and the Hospital). They were also implemented expeditiously. Two major projects - the Airport Project and the Debris Management Project -, although initiated with great urgency as from 2018, were much slower in getting off the ground, which was due to their relative managerial complexity. The much smaller NGO projects were initiated as from mid-2019 only and started more recently, i.e., as from 2020.

130. The ERP-I was a blanket project addressing a variety of emergency needs during the start-up of the Trust Fund and during the years to come. The most important outcome was the establishment of the NRPB in early 2019. The project also served as a laboratory to assess the required regulatory framework and capacities (or lack thereof) in the public and private sectors in Sint Maarten and create minimum conditions for other Trust Fund projects. Concurrently, the EISTP showed visible results in terms of income support, retraining and job creation, building on an existing initiative in the tourism sector badly damaged by the hurricane. The project can therefore clearly be considered a success story. At a later stage, in 2020, the Netherlands considered that unemployment and underemployment were mainly due to Covid-19 and no longer induced by Hurricane Irma and that other resources could be mobilized for income support, retraining and job creation.

131. As is demonstrated in the Bank's annual reports, all projects were well aligned to the NRRP and the Strategic Framework Document 2019-2025 under the NRRP. As from the start, all three sectors had major activities that were initiated, e.g., the social sector with the Hospital Project, the EDMP and various public utility services under ERP-I, the economic sector with the Airport Project and the EISTP, and governance recovery for disaster preparedness with respective components built into all projects. Lagging were social needs of the population at the grass-root level, e.g., badly needed repairs to shelters, housing, schools and other social infrastructure, in spite of some initiatives under the ERP-I. These are typically areas addressed by NGOs, which were slow in becoming involved. NGO-implemented projects came off the ground as from 2020 only, as this type of social needs was not prioritized before 2019.

132. This is surprising, as all partner organisations that were ultimately selected for Trust Fund project implementation (Qredits, VNG-International, Red Cross Netherlands, UNICEF Netherlands) had already been active in post-Irma recovery in one way or another. Most notably, with the exception of VNG-International, they had implemented projects under the early recovery

component of article 8 funding from the Ministry of BZK. Although covering much of the same ground, albeit at different scales in terms of funding volumes, there was a clear disconnect between early recovery and Trust Fund activities. At no time was the World Bank requested by the Ministry of BZK to connect to or build on early recovery activities. There was not only a gap in terms of time between 2018 and 2020, but also a major difference in approach and procedures. This will be analysed further in the section below on efficiency and in conclusions of the review (see sections 6. 7 and 9).

6.7. Efficiency of Trust Fund implementation

6.7.1. Costs and benefits of World Bank involvement

133. The decision to spend the larger part of the envelope of EUR 550.0 million through a World Bank executed Trust Fund was made rather quickly at a political level in the Netherlands in November 2017 (see section 5). The World Bank agreed to this request by supporting Sint Maarten in drawing up a comprehensive NRRP which contained a broad post-Irma damage assessment and a generous estimate of financing needs (USD 2.7 billion). The estimate was largely in excess of funding offered by the Netherlands through the Trust Fund (initially EUR 470.0 million). Even spread out over 7.5 years, the planned injection of funds under the Trust Fund into the small island economy of Sint Maarten was considerable with a risk of exceeding its absorption capacity.

134. A distinction was made between Recipient Executed Activities and Bank Executed Activities. For Bank executed activities, the Trust Fund could be used for: a) staff costs; b) short-term consultants and temporaries; c) contractual services; d) equipment (including vehicles) and office premise lease costs; e) equipment purchased (including vehicles); f) media, workshops, conferences, and meetings; g) travel expenses. According to the Administration Arrangement, the Indirect Rate for the World Bank, defined as a percentage of personnel costs, was initially set at 17 percent of the grant accorded by the Netherlands in line with standards commonly applied by the Bank.

135. Trust Fund documentation in the public domain provides only broad and aggregated information on costs incurred for the different projects. It is beyond the remit of this policy review to assess if budget estimates for each of the projects and actual spending have been reasonable. The aim is here to understand the context and rationale as they underpin results. Several general features stand out in this regard: a) the periods of time required for project preparation and start-up of activities on the ground after approval by the Steering Committee perceived as relatively long by local stakeholders and some implementing partners[146]; and b) the high number of studies and other project related documents, many of which address the Bank's social and environmental safeguards.

136. For all projects, delays were due to political and social realities in Sint Maarten. The Airport Reconstruction Project could only be started once the bond holders had been satisfied and managerial issues in the holding and operating companies were addressed. The Bank and the Netherlands Government intervened strongly and successfully to create adequate conditions for the reconstruction of the Airport. Debris management had been neglected for many years resulting in serious health and environmental hazards. Resettlement of the population living in the vicinity of the dump has been an indispensable precondition to a proper clean-up and a more rigorous management of debris. For understandable reasons, this has taken time, which is due to reasons largely not related to the involvement of the Trust Fund.

137. The Bank applies the highest possible social and environmental standards. This proved beneficial especially for the Airport reconstruction and for the Hospital Resiliency Project. The

[146] Contrary to local perceptions, the World Bank contends that project preparation and start-up were actually relatively more expeditious that in other countries (15 percent faster than for World Bank disbursements in Latin America and the Caribbean overall; 22 percent faster than World Bank disbursements in the Caribbean and 25 percent faster than disbursements in small island states in the Caribbean.

Medical Center already met these standards to a large extent before Trust Fund support and found it relatively easy to comply with additional requirements. The Bank's social and environmental standards do evolve over time, which has to a certain extent complicated and slowed down the EDMP. All projects required financial, procurement and safeguards infrastructure to comply with World Bank policies and procedures. There were no national frameworks in these areas, and they had to be built from scratch. In addition, some major projects require major regulatory institutional and policy changes which take time and political will to implement. This has been time-consuming with yet uncertain outcomes. This has been true especially for projects with NGOs and CSOs as implementing partners.

138. The Bank now works with the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF)[147] that became effective on 1 October 2018. It is worth noting that the older projects started with previous operational guidelines continue to be guided by former safeguards, while newer ones need to abide by the new regime. This means that NRPB has to handle two sets of guidelines which are significantly different. It should be mentioned that the Government of the Netherlands through its participation in Bank policy formulation at the global level played an active part in the design of the framework. It contains comprehensive and detailed benchmarks and guidelines in areas such as labour, non-discrimination, climate change mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity, community health and safety, and stakeholder engagement, including public participation and grievance mechanisms. The ESF uses a risk-based approach that applies increased oversight and promotes responsiveness to changes in project circumstances.

139. World Bank procedures can be trusted to include safeguards to ensure adequate justification of expenses in terms of volume / use and prices / standard rates. There are rigorous guidelines and protocols for the screening of all implementing partners and guarantees against all forms of corruption. At the same time, prices for example of building materials and equipment tend to be much higher on the island than elsewhere, as they need to be imported from overseas involving transport costs and, in some cases, administrative hassles.

140. For Sint Maarten many of the Trust Fund requirements were new and meeting them has been challenging both for the Government and for implementing partners. The regular budgetary process of the Government has not been apt to handle Trust Fund resources and contract award and management. This is a major responsibility of the NRPB which largely operates outside regular Government finances. The NRPB has gradually built up the necessary expertise to apply the Trust Fund procurement guidelines, fiduciary responsibilities and social and environmental safeguards. This should over time ease the burden on the Bank's project support and supervision. However, as of now the latter remains quite considerable.

141. Legal impediments, e.g., the requirement of tax exemptions, have so far prevented the Bank from opening an office in Sint Maarten (see section 8)[148]. Since 2020, Bank staff and consultants have faced travel restrictions related to Covid-19. The Trust Fund annual reports mention several other factors that constrained international competitive bidding. For example, it has been a challenge to attract qualified international firms because of the relative remoteness of the island, the small size of the market, high costs involved, competition on the local labour market, and difficulties in obtaining visas and work-permits for expatriates. In practical terms, the preference seems to have been to grant contracts to local firms, capacity of which is limited, and to firms from within the Kingdom. This is partly because of the same reasons as for foreign firms, e.g., shortage of labour and materials, but also because of their inability of local firms to submit acceptable bids, to meet insurance, bonding and financial requirements through local banks and, during implementation, not to exceed agreed budgets.

142. Smaller implementing partners, especially NGOs and CSOs, experience dealing with the Trust Fund as very bureaucratic and at times exasperating. They also claim that the process

[147] https://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-framework, website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[148] It should be noted that legislation for international organisations was approved by the Sint Maarten Parliament in 2022. The Establishment Agreement for the World Bank in Sint Maarten is scheduled to be approved by the Rijksministerraad in July 2022.

involves high transaction costs for them as well, e.g., during preparation and bidding, which are only partly compensated. At the same time, the increased demand on building materials has raised prices on the local market, which has made forecasting of building costs difficult. They also report that they find it troublesome to comply with World Bank requirements making it necessary to make adjustments to proposals and / or protocols during implementation. All these factors explain to a large extent, why start-up and implementation of the smaller social sector projects have been perceived as rather slow.

6.7.2. Building Back Better

143. According to the non-binding Appendix to the Administration Arrangement on Guiding Principles of the Government of the Netherlands the objective of the Dutch contribution is to *support the material and non-material reconstruction and recovery of St Maarten wherever necessary, so as to restore vital infrastructure and sustainably boost the country's resilience to the effects of possible future disasters, natural and otherwise*[149]*.* In addition, Building Back Better should encompass strengthening of Sint Maarten's resilience in terms of economic diversification, enhancement of good governance and the strengthening of civil society. Building Back Better should include a long-term vision for both people and the environment.

144. For analytical purposes, at least three dimensions can be distinguished in this ambitious agenda: a) Material reconstruction of buildings and other physical infrastructure considered vital for social peace and national security to hurricane 5 resistant standards; b) Improved disaster management capacity and disaster preparedness; and c) a broad agenda of good governance, strengthening of civil society, economic diversification and policies aiming at sustainable development in pursuit of social and environmental goals.

145. Assessing Building Back Better for physical infrastructure is difficult because there are no clear baselines. There is a consensus that the quality of physical infrastructure (housing, shelters, schools, police stations etc.) was poor already before Hurricane Irma and there had already been a huge gap in deferred maintenance when disaster struck. In a general sense, any new building would therefore probably be an improvement. However, the challenge to make sure that all new buildings will withstand category 5 hurricanes involves a very high standard for construction works at higher costs than without this requirement. The Trust Fund annual reports contain several observations on experiences made and dilemmas faced in building activities.

146. There are general assurances that the most important physical infrastructure projects, which are the Airport Terminal and the Hospital Projects, will meet standards of hurricane 5 resilience to the greatest possible extent. These standards been factored into the calculation of required investments for both projects. The Airport as a government owned company and the Sint Maarten Medical Center as a foundation have included in their business plans operational expenses for interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

147. The situation is more problematic for other physical infrastructure, notably housing that is affordable to most of the population. Building Back Better is hampered by social, economic and technical factors. In the first place, demand for affordable housing hugely exceeds supply[150], as the SMDHF, the agency in charge of social housing for the Sint Maarten Government, has a waitlist for 9.000 units, while currently handling a small portfolio of 769 units. Under the Trust Fund, the ERP-I, 269 homes in total have been supported in the SMHDFs Belvedere complex. An additional 106 private homes were also repaired under ERP-I. With a significant number of people living in overcrowded and sub-standard housing without access to basic services and waiting for adequate housing there is tremendous pressure to speed up building activities.

148. Roof repair and house improvements also face other serious social and technical challenges. Outside SMHDF social housing, an estimated 20-25 percent of the population live in informal settlements, and about 15 percent of building structures are informal. Supporting this

[149] Administration Arrangement of 16 April 2018, Appendix on Dutch Guiding Principles.
[150] Rapid Housing Assessment in 2020 and Note on the Sint Maarten Housing Project of 16 January 2022.

population requires at least clarification of ownership and tenancy. Furthermore, experience has shown that it does not make sense to place a hurricane-proof roof on a building that has a weak foundation and structure. Ensuring social and environmental safeguards as well as economic feasibility is a process that requires many time-consuming studies almost on a case-to-case basis. The higher the ambition to Build Better, the more there will be a challenge to meet emergency needs in a timely and cost-effective manner.

149. Capacity development for disaster management and emergency preparedness has been built into the Trust Fund Strategic Framework Document 2019-2025 (see 6.2.) as a specific focus area. The objectives to a) improve capacities for disaster response and b) strengthen fiscal resilience are reflected in all projects, albeit in a variety of ways. Important components of the ERP-I project are the CCIRF and membership in the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). The NRPB is an institution created under ERP-I that can operate effectively and efficiently outside the government budgetary process. The Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness Project has contributed to a lasting improvement of medical services in Sint Maarten and greater capacity to respond to emergency situations. The Airport Terminal Project may in the future contain a provision for a National Resilience Fund / Disaster Risk Facility from reimbursements to the Government of Sint Maarten, which will be major contribution to emergency preparedness in the medium- and long-term. All these innovations can be considered major steps in response to the institutional Building Back Better challenge.

150. The overall goals of good governance both in the public and private domains, economic diversification and sustainable social and environmental goals are the overriding themes in the Strategic Framework of the Trust Fund and appear in virtually all project activities. Despite promising partial results, it is still too soon to assess in a comprehensive way, to what extent and in what ways these high goals are achieved.

6.7.3. Involvement of the Government of the Netherlands

151. The Administration Arrangement defines the role of the tripartite Steering Committee, which exercises significant decision-making power over the design and execution of the Trust Fund. The Steering Committee, which operates by consensus and preferably on a non-objection basis, approves strategic priorities and annual work programmes as well as project allocations. This ensures at a very formal level that the Netherlands is strongly involved in the management of the Trust Fund.

152. With meetings taking place three or four times a year, the mechanism has worked well and has entirely served its purpose. There has been continuity in the Dutch representation, as the same title holder has remained in place since the beginning. The position has been held by a senior person, who held several political offices in the past and who has apparently enjoyed a good working relationship with the State Secretary of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who was in office during the period under review. The same is true as far as the representative of Sint Maarten is concerned, who reports directly to the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten and who is a former Prime Minister himself. The World Bank is represented by the Country Director for the Caribbean who has authority over the World Bank programme in Sint Maarten and the responsibility of leading the dialogue with Sint Maarten and the Netherlands. The relation between the three members is amicable and constructive and involves many informal consultations between official meetings.

153. Beyond participation in the Steering Committee, the Ministry of BZK follows Trust Fund operations on a day-to-day basis. For the World Bank such close involvement of a donor is unusual, as in similar other Trust Funds it is considered that the Bank is “entrusted” with responsibilities allowing it to entertain a high degree of autonomy. In the face of the Netherlands' need for detailed information due to its high level of involvement in Sint Maarten, the World Bank offered to provide the Regular Monitoring Reports every two weeks, a rhythm that has recently been brought down to every six weeks. The Ministry charges a programme support cost to the overall budget of EUR 550.0 million (EUR 8.0 million - see section 3.1). It is obvious that this close

contact represents a considerable transaction cost in addition to costs incurred for Trust Fund administration by the World Bank and Sint Maarten itself.

7. Direct support

7.1. Overview of activities

154. As shown in Table 1 in section 3.1., the original budget of EUR 80.0 million for direct support covered liquidity support to Sint Maarten for the year 2017 amounting to EUR 22.8 million and programme support cost for the Ministry of BZK in the amount of EUR 8.0 million. A further EUR 7.0 million were allocated to early recovery activities in 2018, of which EUR 6.8 million were disbursed. The net amount available for direct support was hence EUR 42.4 million.

155. Table 6 contains an overview of direct support activities as pieced together from financial overviews of the Ministry of BZK and available documentation on specific activities and groups of activities. There was no coherent plan or results-based management (RBM) framework (see section 4.1.). It was initially broadly intended to fund the implementation of conditionalities that the Netherlands had originally defined for the overall reconstruction budget of EUR 550.0 million: a) strengthening of border control; and b) establishment of the Integrity Chamber (see 5.2). Border control eventually remained a major focus area of direct support, whereas the Integrity Chamber was funded from another budget article of the Kingdom Relations Budget in the end.

156. Direct support activities included a variety of project activities that were approved and implemented on an ad-hoc basis responding to needs expressed by the Sint Maarten Government and / or by the Netherlands. Activities include delivery of equipment, training, and other forms of technical assistance, e.g., advisory services, legal support, and technical studies. They can be grouped together as follows: a) border control (immigration, customs, coast guard, police force KPSM); b) public law and order (KPSM, public prosecutor, detention centre / crime fund); c) public social services (ambulance services, fire brigade, and light masts for sports fields); and d) bilaterally implemented support to World Bank executed Trust Fund activities (see Table 5). Direct support also included supplementary funding to the Representation of the Netherlands in Sint Maarten (VNACS[151]) and expenditure related to the present policy review. The latter two remain outside the purview of this report.

157. Financial figures must be interpreted *cum grano salis.* The Ministry of BZK has been unable to present a conclusive financial overview for this policy review as of 31 December 2021. Raw data that have been made available distinguish between *emergency assistance*, on the one hand, and *reconstruction,* on the other, albeit somewhat arbitrarily. They do not systematically attribute disbursements in 2018 to *early recovery* and *direct support*. Furthermore, the labelling of activities is often only a number without further descriptions. Finally, there are many adjustments upward and downward, which is mostly due to exchange rate fluctuations. To the extent that reports are available, financial data provided by implementing partners are sometimes more helpful.

Table 6: Overview of disbursements for direct support activities in Sint Maarten

Category	Recipient	Approval / reservation	Disbursements EUR	Total disbursements EUR	Observations
Border control	Cooperating services under Mutual Agreement under	2018-2021	7.092.000 to KPSM +2.556.000 to Customs Sint Maarten + 2.004.000 to Customs Netherlands +	16.392.000	Approximately EUR 1.0 million not spent by KPSM / Customs Sint Maarten to be returned to the budget. Reporting available.

[151] *Vertegenwoordiging van Nederland in Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maarten.*

	ORVG (see below)		4.740.000 to Coast Guard Netherlands		
Public law and order	Public prosecutor	2018	250.000	250.000	Digitalisation. Reporting available.
	Ministry of Justice: KPSM	2018	626.000	626.000	Command centre, vehicles, uniforms, technical assistance. Reporting available
	Ministry of Justice: Detention / Crime Fund	2019	300.000	300.000	Primarily partition wall repair Reporting available.
	Ministry of Justice: Detention / Crime Fund	2021	131.750	131.750	Training of staff and repair of electronic devices.
	Ministry of Justice: Detention / Crime Fund	2021	200.000	200.000	Contribution to construction works.
Support to Trust Fund activities	Lawyers (Airport legal fees)	2019-2020	657.552	657.552	Related to Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project. No reporting available due to confidentiality between client and lawyers.
	Schiphol Group Nederland (Airport technical assistance)	2019-2021	1.642.744	1.642.744	Related to Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project. Reporting available.
	Ministry of VROMI	2021-2022	2.500.000	2.500.000	Purchase of a storm water pump in 2021- 2022 originally to be funded under ERP-1.
	Ambulance services (training)	2021-2022	478.923	478.923	Originally to be funded under ERP-I.
	Fire brigade	2021-2022	701.908	701.908	Purchase of a submersible pump (*dompelpomp)* – originally to be funded under ERP-1.
	NRPB	2021-2022	32.931	32.931	Hiring of high-level focal point in Sint Maarten

					Government for resettlement.
	Debris Management	2021-2022	720.000 + 10.824	730.824	Technical assistance to waste sector reform.
Other activities	Fire Brigade	2018	33.213	33.213	Equipment provided by Institute for Public Safety (IFV / IPV). No further information available.
	VROMI?	2018	6.775	6.775	Quick scan debris. No information available.
	VNG-I (Technical assistance VROMI)	2019	70.229 + 214.136	284.366	VNG-I technical assistance to Ministry of VROMI. Reporting available.
	Ministry of Sports / National Sports Institute: Lighting of sport fields	2019	62.000	62.000	NOC*-NSF. Reporting available.
	IMF-CARTAC	2020	2.000.000	2.000.000	IMF-CARTAC. Reporting available.
Total				**27.030.986**	

N.B. Not considered in this table: a) Allocations / disbursements / expenditure for emergency assistance in 2017 and early recovery in 2018 (see report on parts I / III); b) Allocations / disbursements for Saba and Sint Eustatius (see above and report on parts I / III); c) Liquidity support in 2017 (see section 8); d) reimbursed bridging loan to Sint Maarten Government / PJIA in 2018; e) Releases of tranches to the World Bank Trust Fund (see section 6.3); f) Allocations / disbursements / expenditures for the Representation of the Netherlands (VNACS); g) Programme support cost of the Ministry of BZK; h) Allocations / disbursements for this policy review.

7.2. Effectiveness and efficiency

7.2.1. Border control

158. Strengthening of border control was seen as a top priority of post-Irma reconstruction in the Netherlands within one month after the hurricane struck. As allowed by art. 38 of the Charter of the Kingdom, a Mutual Agreement *(Onderlinge regeling grenstoezicht)*[152] was concluded between the Netherlands and Sint Maarten in this regard. The underlying consideration was that

[152] *Onderlinge regeling van Sint Maarten en Nederland als bedoeld in artikel 38, eerste lid, van het Statuut van Koninkrijk der Nederlanden tot versterking van het grenstoezicht van Sint Maarten (Onderlinge regeling versterking grenstoezicht Sint Maarten)*. Signed on 20 November 2017. Also referred to as "ORVG".

border control was particularly crucial in a period of crisis, as the well-being of the population was at risk because of smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal (labour) migration and uncontrolled imports and exports of money and goods.

159. In April 2018, an Operational Approach Paper (*Plan van aanpak)* was adopted, key elements of which were a) operationalization of the Mutual Agreement with a lead role accorded to the Royal Marechaussee and the Netherlands Customs Administration of the Netherlands; and b) expansion of the existing consultation mechanism between the Public Prosecutor, KPSM, Customs of Sint Maarten and Coast Guard (*Vierhoeksoverleg*) with Royal Marechaussee and the Immigration Department (*Toelatingsorganisatie)*. Political responsibility would rest with the Minister of Justice of Sint Maarten. The emphasis of activities was on training of human resources of Sint Maarten, twinning of staff from the Netherlands and Sint Maarten, and regular mutual consultations between all parties involved. An Alpha Team was created composed of staff of KPSM, Royal Marechaussee, Immigration and Customs. Cooperation with French border control was to be strengthened. In order to reinforce the border security necessary investments were made in equipment (vehicles, computers, scanners, information equipment etc.)[153].

160. The initial duration of the Operational Approach was two years, i.e., until 1 January 2020. This period was extended three times, the last time until 30 June 2021[154]. The final report of cooperating services of 8 June 2021[155] mentions the following main achievements at the output level: a) good functioning of the mutual consultation mechanisms, including contacts with the French partner agencies; b) strengthening of capacities of Sint Maarten staff through additional human resources, training, twinning and joint operations; c) successful equipment of respective services with vehicles, computers, scans, radars etc. At the outcome level, there is an improved monitoring of inward and outward movements at all borders, an increase in sanctions against illegal migration and imports and exports of goods as well as a general improvement in information management. Based on available reporting and interviews with Dutch stakeholders, there is hence sufficient evidence on results to conclude that strengthening of border control has been effective.

161. Financial reporting of the Ministry of BZK confirms the entire amount of EUR 16.4. million has been disbursed by the Ministry of BZK, partly to KPSM and the Customs Service in Sint Maarten and partly to the Customs Administration and the Coast Guard to accounts in the Netherlands (see Table 6). There has been underspending in Sint Maarten of around EUR 1.0 million. A financial audit should provide clarity, but the process has been rather slow.

7.2.2. Public law and order

162. The fight against crime and subversion has been high on the agenda for the Netherlands. Related concerns have existed since long before Hurricane Irma struck, but the disaster uncovered, among other things, inadequacies in national police capacity in the face of widespread looting and social unrest in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, as well as in the bad quality of the detention centre Point Blanche. The crime problem goes far beyond mere incidents, as there seems to be widespread financial and economic criminality on the island, including corruption, fraud, money laundering, human trafficking etc. Since some "politically exposed persons" or their family members are involved or at least suspected of involvement in these practices, this type of criminality is felt to be undermining good governance and the public order to a considerable extent.

163. The fight against crime comprises three dimensions: a) *investigation* into illegal activities, which is primarily the responsibility of the police force; b) *prosecution* which is carried out by the public prosecutor; and c) after condemnation by a judge *execution* of the sentence, which may

[153] See kstk 34773 No. 17, *Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal d.d. 18 december 2018.*
[154] A new approach under the ORVG is now being elaborated called Immigration and Border Protection Services (IBPS).
[155] *Eindrapportage Onderlinge Regeling Versterking Grens, Voortgangscommissie* 8 June 2021

involve detention. Under article 8, direct support has been granted to all three respective institutions: the KPSM, the public prosecutor and the detention centre Point Blanche.

164. There is but limited specific reporting on support to the police force (KPSM) beyond border control. In 2018, the KPSM benefitted from a disbursement of EUR 626.000 for an upgraded hurricane-proof command centre (shared with the fire brigade and ambulance services), vehicles and uniforms. Technical assistance was provided equivalent to up to 34 full-time employment positions. This involved joint operations on the ground between Sint Maarten and Dutch officers (twinning)[156].

165. Digitalization of the Public Prosecutor's Office in Sint Maarten was found to be particularly urgent because hard copy files can easily be lost when a natural disaster strikes. With a software called Priem it is possible not only to store all cases electronically but also exchange data among offices across the kingdom. The introduction of the system was in principle foreseen in Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten with contributions from the Netherlands and each of the countries. Sint Maarten received EUR 250.000 from the Netherlands, whereby the contribution from Sint Maarten is still outstanding. The entire contribution from the Netherlands has been spent.

166. With available data, it is not possible to assess effectiveness and efficiency of these specific activities funded under article 8. However, the funding surely contributed to the relative success of the fight against crime during recent years. In its annual report of 2019[157], the Public Prosecutor's Office draws attention to a significant number of successful cases, in which both institutions and individuals, including "politically exposed persons" were indicted and convicted for major financial and economic crimes. Noteworthy was the *Emerald* case which involved the harbour authority being defrauded of up to USD 10.0 million. Of particular interest was also the *Larimar* case which involved corruption of a member of parliament and former minister for the sake of winning public tenders.

167. The detention centre Point Blanche was already in a bad condition before the hurricane struck. Its geographical location on the top of a hill exposed it to serious additional structural damage during Irma. During the emergency and early recovery phases funds were spent on transferring some detainees to other parts of the kingdom, including the Netherlands, as well as supplementing Dutch detention personnel on a temporary basis (see report on parts I and III). The capacity of the Point Blanche prison has remained largely insufficient. The Netherlands considered it necessary to undertake major works to improve the physical structure of the building. The reason was that the building did not meet common security and human rights standards.

168. For the detention centre, actual allocations during the emergency and early recovery phases for transfers of detainees and temporary detention in other parts of the kingdom as well as supplementary Dutch detention personnel amounted to EUR 585.000 (see report on parts I and III). For physical infrastructure works under reconstruction funds of article 8, a modest allocation of EUR 300.000 was approved in 2019, which was used for partition wall repairs. For 2021 and 2022, disbursements of EUR 131.750 and EUR 200.000 have been approved. They concern technical assistance to the management of the prison, repair of electronic devices, as well as a contribution to construction works to be implemented with involvement of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). It should be mentioned that the Netherlands Government is also allocating substantial funds to the detention centre outside Art. 8.

169. The Netherlands considers that detention is primarily a responsibility of Sint Maarten, and that Dutch support is conditional to this focus area being considered a priority in Sint Maarten. This condition, expressed repeatedly to the Sint Maarten side, was initially but partially been met. One possible consequence is that due to the limited detention capacity, some court orders, including concerning "politically exposed persons", could not be executed. While negotiations on

[156] Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal d.d. 18 december 2018.
[157] *Openbaar Ministerie, Parket Procureur Generaal Curaçao, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius & Saba, Jaarverslag 2019,*

the detention centre with the Sint Maarten Government were slow in the beginning, there are indications that there has been progress since 2020. The appointment of a programme manager to the detention centre, who is supplemented by the Ministry of BZK, but who works under the authority of the Sint Maarten Ministry of Justice, has been an important milestone in this regard.

7.2.3. Support to Trust Fund activities

170. In addition to funds transferred in tranches to the World Bank (see section 6) a significant amount of money has been allocated to related activities under direct support. There was no comprehensive plan for this type of support at the outset. Decisions on these activities were made on an ad-hoc basis by the Ministry of BZK. There is also limited narrative reporting on these activities which would allow for an assessment of effectiveness and efficiency. Documentation is mostly limited to mere invoices. Major sums have also been allocated as recently as in 2021 which explains that reports cannot yet be expected.

171. Outside the Trust Fund, major amounts have been spent on legal fees and technical assistance in connection with the Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project. At the height of disagreements with bond holders and within the management structure of PJIA, international lawyers were hired in 2019 and 2020 at a total cost of around EUR 657.552. Given the positive outcomes for the Airport, it may be assumed that these services played their part. At the same time, the Airport received a bridging loan of EUR 13.321.512 (USD 15.0 million) on 4 March 2019 at 0.0 percent interest rate, which was reimbursed within six months as agreed[158]. Finally, as from 2020, the Airport has benefitted from technical assistance provided by Schiphol Group Nederland. Specialists in financial and administrative management were added to the holding and operating companies. The total cost in 2020 and 2021 was around EUR 1.6 million. There are indications that support provided by the Schiphol Group has been well appreciated and that it has had a beneficial effect on airport management.

172. When the World Bank executed Trust Fund was established in 2018, the rehabilitation of public social services was in principle to be covered by the Fund. Under the ERP-I Project (see 6.5.1.), water and electricity services were restored, houses, shelters and schools repaired, and buildings and equipment provided to the police force, the fire brigade and ambulance services. This has therefore not been a focus area for direct support beyond the early recovery phase. Nevertheless, several additional projects for this purpose have been approved under direct support because they could not be accommodated in the Trust Fund. The fire brigade will benefit from the purchase of a of a submersible pump (*dompelpomp)* at a cost of around EUR 700.000 in 2022. The Ministry of VROMI is to be equipped with a storm water pump at a cost of EUR 2.500.000 in 2022. In the same vein, a budget of around EUR 500.000 was reserved in 2021 for the training of ambulance services. Investments made in 2021-2022 are too recent for an assessment as to their effectiveness and efficiency.

173. The table of expenditures of the Ministry of BZK also shows allocations in 2021-2022 for the NRPB to the amount of EUR 32.931 and EUR 720.000. The first amount is to cover the costs of the Sint Maarten Government's high-level focal point for resettlement. The second amount is a subsidy allowing the NRPB to hire VNG-International to provide technical assistance on waste sector reforms[159]. The investments are too recent to be assessed as to their effectiveness and efficiency.

7.2.4. Other activities

174. The Ministry of VROMI benefitted from significant technical assistance provided by VNG-International in 2018 – 2019, which cost a total of almost EUR 360.000 according to the Ministry of BZK[160]. Technical assistance involved a total of 560 person / days and related costs. A team of nine experts was assigned to Sint Maarten with specializations in municipal financial and

[158] *Overbruggingskrediet Princess Juliana International Airport* signed on 28 February 2019.
[159] According to VNG-International, the total amount for waste disposal is EUR 890.000.
[160] According to VNG-International, the expenditures under the project amounted to 235.013 Euro.

administrative management, including domain affairs and permits, inspection and information technology. The aim of the project was to enable the Sint Maarten Government to deal with the challenges and increased workload caused by Hurricane Irma.

175. Most unfortunately, as the project was only designed to reduce backlogs and not to produce lasting effects in terms of policy or institutional capacity, VNG-International's reporting on results of its support to the Ministry of VROMI is rather generic and does not allow to distil specific outputs and outcomes. Reported results nevertheless include: a) improved capacities in the Permits Department in handling the backlog in permits requests; b) a strengthened organisation of the Department of Domain Affairs to deal with complex requests of long lease and collection of fees; c) improved expertise within the Inspections Department for carrying out inspection requests, as well as general inspection in the context of the building ordinance and environmental norms; d) improved resilience of the organisational performance by the Ministry of VROMI[161].

176. No specific information is available on relatively small activities, e.g. the provision of material to the fire brigade by the Institute for Public Safety (IPV / IFV) and a quick scan for debris management in 2018. In 2019, personal contacts between senior staff of the Ministry of BZK and management of the Netherlands Olympic Committee (NOC*NSF) resulted in a small project for the benefit of the Raoul Illidge Sports Complex in Sint Maarten under the aegis of the Ministry of Sports and the National Sports Institute of Sint Maarten. The complex, having suffered from damage during Hurricane Irma, was equipped with led lighting, which made sports games after sunset possible. The contribution from the Netherlands Ministry of BZK amounted to EUR 62.000. The International Olympic Committee also provided a subsidy of EUR 100.000. The project is considered of particular interest as it offers disaffected youth an opportunity to engage in healthy leisure activities. According to a social media posting of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport of 14 March 2019, the project has entirely served its purpose[162].

177. In June 2020, the Ministry of BZK signed a Letter of Understanding with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning a contribution of EUR 2.0 million to the Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center (CARTAC). This is listed as an allocation from reconstruction funds under article 8. The purpose of this grant is to support Sint Maarten and Curaçao with capacity development with the caveat that the IMF will use its best efforts to ensure that at least two thirds of the amount will be spent on capacity development activities for Sint Maarten, or regional activities Sint Maarten benefits from.

178. The formulation is rather open-ended and there is no indication in the Letter of Understanding that the expected assistance is specifically geared towards reconstruction activities in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma. It must be said that reporting by the IMF in 2021[163] does not reflect the requirement that two thirds of the resources should be dedicated to Sint Maarten. It is a balanced macro-economic assessment of the economies of Curaçao and Sint Maarten with a strong emphasis on post-Covid 19 developments. There is also but scant reference to Hurricane Irma in the introduction. The Ministry of BZK has provided the additional explanation that the rationale of this disbursement from article 8 was that good macro-economic management had been a condition for liquidity support (see 8.1.) and that involvement of IMF-CARTAC was useful in this context.

7.3. Summarizing remarks on projects under direct support

179. The overall direct support budget was initially not mapped out in a coherent approach plan. Beyond a provision for liquidity support to Sint Maarten for the year 2017, the budget was a convenient all-purpose reserve for the Ministry of BZK to be tapped into as needs arose. Major unplanned needs were the financing of legal fees and technical assistance related to the airport reconstruction as well as for debris management studies, both focus areas already covered by the

[161] VNG-International August 2019, Technical Assistance to Sint Maarten, Support to the Ministry of VROMI.
[162] https://www.facebook.com/MinistryOfEducationCultureYouthandSportsAffairs/posts/2048233081892570 Website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[163] 2021 Article IV Consultation Discussions – Press Release and Staff Report, IMF Country Report no. 21/186, August 2021.

Trust Fund. The budget was destined to cover activities that could not be funded through the Trust Fund, e.g. some investments for public social services. Disbursements accelerated in 2020-2021, when the deadline of 31 December 2021 for disbursements by the Ministry of BZK was looming. Significant amounts of money were disbursed in 2020-2021, e.g., for support to the Ministry of VROMI, the fire brigade, ambulance services and other social services. One major investment, a contribution of EUR 2.0 million for IMF-CARTAC, seems to be justified as an expense related to reconstruction needs in the wake of Hurricane Irma primarily in the context of liquidity support (see 8.1.).

180. Direct support activities were not designed with a results-based management approach. They have also rather inadequately been reported on. As much as the Ministry of BZK appreciated frequent and detailed reporting on Trust Fund activities by the World Bank, it seems to have been relatively lenient in its reporting requirements vis-à-vis other implementing partners, e.g., the border control cooperating services (ORVG), the KPSM for activities outside border control, lawyers and Schiphol Group Nederland, and the VNG-International. The problem is compounded by the inadequate data- and document filing system in the Ministry of BZK. To the extent that reports could be found, they contain very little useful information on outputs, outcomes and impact. This makes an adequate assessment of effectiveness and efficiency impossible (see also Conclusions 3 and 10 as well as Recommendations 1 and 4).

8. Beyond this review: liquidity support, recent Covid-19 related activities (COHO) and the Integrity Chamber

8.1. Liquidity support

181. According to the terms of reference for the present policy review, several focus areas and activities directly or indirectly related to article 8 remain outside this evaluation. Liquidity support to the Government of Sint Maarten amounting to EUR 22.78 million in 2017 and EUR 15.3 million in 2018 was funded from article 8 as loans. Assessing effectiveness and efficiency of this support would require a full-fledged public expenditure review of the budget of Sint Maarten in those years, which is far beyond the remit of this policy review. It should also be mentioned that macro-economic developments are monitored under the IMF-CARTAC project (see 7.2.4).

182. A specific development should, however, be mentioned. During the second half of 2018, the Steering Committee allocated USD 30.0 million from the Trust Fund, which were to be provided to Sint Maarten as liquidity support under the World Bank's Development Policy Operations (DPO) mechanism. Under a DPO, a policy matrix is agreed upon with triggers related to policy or legislative reforms. Once these reforms are adopted by the recipient country, the World Bank disburses an agreed amount of support without conditions how the amount is to be spent (unconditional cash).

183. The Bank and Sint Maarten agreed in principle on two DPO disbursements, each to the amount of USD 15.0 million. However, no matrix was defined for either disbursement. Payments would be due once Sint Maarten had operated public finance reforms that were to be agreed upon. Although the DPO mechanism is usually discussed bilaterally between the Bank and the recipient country, the Netherlands claimed strong involvement in the negotiations concerning the finance reforms. With the fall of the Romeo-Marlin Cabinet in September 2019, the preparation of DPO liquidity support was put on hold.

184. Discussions restarted with the new government in Sint Maarten in 2020. At that time, the Ministry of BZK considered liquidity support to help Sint Maarten counter the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Several provisions agreed upon in principle during DPO negotiations were now turned into conditionalities for the Caribbean Mechanism for Reform and Development (COHO)[164] (see section 8.3.). The Ministry of BZK expressed the point of view that DPO support was becoming superfluous with the newly available COHO support.

[164] *Rijkswet Caribisch Orgaan voor Hervorming en Ontwikkeling (COHO).*

185. While Sint Maarten made a plea that the original DPO agreement was to be respected and a least the first tranche of USD 15.0 million was to be released, it was eventually concluded that the DPO mechanism would be halted with the understanding, however, that the corresponding amount might be made available through the Trust Fund, if in the end there was a positive balance.

186. The Netherlands Government included liquidity support under COHO to the amount of EUR 15.0 million for public financial management and tax reform. This amount was deducted from the last tranche payment to the Trust Fund at the request of the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten in July 2021.

8.2. Covid-19 related support (COHO)

187. Since the beginning of 2020, Covid-19 has had a serious effect on the economy and social fabric of Sint Maarten. The main source of income of the country, the tourism sector, almost came to a standstill, though some fragile signs of recovery have been observed in recent months. This has had serious consequences especially for public finances.

188. To help the Government of Sint Maarten meet this new challenge, the Netherlands has developed a significant package of liquidity support, which is released in tranches. The support is, however, conditional to Sint Maarten engaging in a comprehensive package of reforms as defined in the Caribbean Mechanism for Reform and Development (COHO), which will also cover the Kingdom countries of Curaçao and Aruba. The respective national ordinance *(landspakket)* is still under negotiation. In the meantime, a technical working group within the Ministry of BZK is conducting business related to the design and implementation of the mechanism.

189. One requirement of interest related to the Trust Fund is that it is necessary to draw up legislation for the establishment of a representative office of the World Bank in Sint Maarten. This legislation should grant tax exemption and other privileges and immunities to World Bank staff posted to Sint Maarten[165].

190. The approach chosen in the preparation of this new support package stands in marked contrast to the approach adopted in 2017-2018 for post-Irma reconstruction in Sint Maarten. COHO is to be enshrined in a law to be adopted in the Kingdom Council of Ministers *(Rijksministerraad)*. This can only happen if the parliaments of all four Kingdom countries endorse the law. This procedure was not adopted for the post-Irma reconstruction package in 2017-2018 (see section 5). It should be noted that the political process required for COHO endorsement in the three Caribbean countries of the Kingdom has been rather slow. There are concerns that COHO conditionalities too strongly weigh on the autonomy granted to the Caribbean countries under the 10-10-10 version of the Kingdom Charter. The Netherlands Council of State *(Raad van State)* expressed similar reservations in a recent advice[166].

8.3. Integrity Chamber

191. The Integrity Chamber is another mechanism that is related to article 8, but not part of it. When the EUR 550.0 million grant for reconstruction was considered in 2017, the establishment of the Integrity Chamber was one of the two firm conditionalities of the Netherlands that Sint Maarten had to accept (the other being strengthening of border control). The rationale was that public finances in Sint Maarten were to be considerably improved, before such a major financial contribution could be made available to the country. Hurricane Irma thus gave new impetus to a

[165] It should be noted that the Cabinet of the Kingdom *(Rijksministerraad),* in its session of 24 June 2022, approved the conclusion of an agreement *(verdrag)* between the Kingdom and the World Bank concerning the establishment of a small office of the World Bank in Sint Maarten. For this to happen, additional legislation needs to be adopted in Sint Maarten concerning tax exemption and other privileges and immunities.
[166] *Raad van State, Samenvatting advies over Rijkswet Caribisch orgaan voor hervorming en ontwikkeling, gepubliceerd op 24 maart 2021* https://www.raadvanstate.nl/@124853/samenvatting-advies-rijkswet-coho/ website consulted on 22 August 2022.

proposal that had already been negotiated since at least 2015, when a national ordinance (*landsverordening)* was decreed[167] for its establishment.

192. A new national ordinance was signed on 18 December 2017[168] following strong pressure exercised by the Government of the Netherlands (see section 5.2.). It is a tripartite structure composed of one representative of Sint Maarten, one representative of the Netherlands and a chairperson from the Netherlands. Annual reports of 2019 and 2020 suggest that the process of becoming operational has been slow. Funding and staffing of the new institution have materialized since 2018, but the outreach of the institution seems to have remained limited. It is important to note that the Integrity Chamber was funded from outside article 8 and that it has not been referenced in any documentation concerning the Trust Fund and direct support reconstruction activities.

9. Conclusions concerning reconstruction in Sint Maarten

9.1. The overall design of support to reconstruction

Conclusion 1: The Dutch contribution of EUR 550.0 million to reconstruction in Sint Maarten, in addition to emergency assistance and including early recovery support, was a generous offer that emanated from a deep and lasting sense of solidarity in the Netherlands with other parts of the Kingdom based on centuries of shared history.

193. In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Irma on 6 September 2017, the Netherlands stood by Sint Maarten with rapid and unbureaucratic deployment of humanitarian assistance. The political leadership of Sint Maarten being formally in charge of ensuring public safety and security as well as coordinating relief to the population with a clean-up, with shelters and functional public utilities, *inter alia*, proved not to be fully operational at that time. In line with the provision under article 36 of the Kingdom Charter, the Netherlands stepped in and provided comprehensive support and assistance. The initial humanitarian assistance was followed by support to early recovery during the first half of 2018 (see report on parts I / III).

194. The Netherlands also acted very quickly in developing a longer-term vision as to the provision of support to reconstruction efforts. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations addressed a letter to that effect to the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten on 13 October 2017[169]. The letter announced the allocation of a significant financial contribution to the reconstruction of Sint Maarten, provided conditions for proper spending of these resources were in place: a) the establishment of an Integrity Chamber; and b) strengthening of border control. A political decision on the size of the financial envelope to the amount of EUR 550.0 million was made soon after, in November 2017 (see 5.1.). The offer made by the Netherlands was undoubtedly very generous and based on a deep sense of solidarity with other parts of the Kingdom based on centuries of shared history.

195. The commitment of the Netherlands towards Sint Maarten and other countries of the Kingdom goes beyond a mere concern that Dutch taxpayers' money should be well spent. The Netherlands pursues a policy aiming at ensuring that all citizens of the Kingdom enjoy similar standards of good governance, economic development, and social welfare. The engagement therefore goes far beyond support to humanitarian assistance and to economic and social development practiced by the Government of the Netherlands under Official Development Assistance in other parts of the world.

Conclusion 2: The generous offer of the Dutch contribution to reconstruction could have been communicated in a culturally more empathetic and sensitive manner to Sint Maarten, as it was wrapped in conditionalities that primarily reflected long-standing

[167] *Landsverordening no. 18 van de 21ste augustus 2015 tot instelling van de Integriteitskamer (Landsverordening Integriteitskamer).*
[168] *Afkondigingsblad van Sint Maarten 2017, no. 41.*
[169] Letter of the Netherlands Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations addressed to the Government of Sint Maarten on 13 October 2017.

Dutch concerns, at a time, when Sint Maarten still struggled to meet basic humanitarian needs.

196. When the decision to contribute EUR 550.0 million to reconstruction in Sint Maarten was made, a primary concern in the Netherlands was that the new Kingdom Charter of 10-10-10 required the other now autonomous countries of Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten to assume their own responsibilities as to their social and economic development. There were misgivings in the Netherlands as to the integrity of the political leadership in Sint Maarten and to its ability to handle such a huge influx of resources in an adequate manner. Too direct involvement of the Netherlands was also deemed undesirable because of the new Charter.

197. As much as this rationale for the conditionalities was understandable and factually correct, the way in which they were conveyed to Sint Maarten was rather abrupt and unempathetic, as may be inferred from a close analysis of the contents of the letter. The letter announcing the generous support could have expressed more sympathy with a people, including its leadership, who at that moment lacked a roof above their heads, and were deprived of the most basic social services and economic infrastructure. As much as the influx of illegal migrants and uncontrolled trafficking with goods were part of the problem, it is doubtful that these concerns were at the top of the mind of political leaders in Sint Maarten at that time. It is therefore not completely surprising that there was a breakdown of constructive communication between the Governments of the Netherlands and Sint Maarten in November 2017. The Sint Maarten cabinet was replaced, and Dutch conditions were met soon after (see 5.1.).

198. The approach chosen by the Ministry of BZK in this case, expressing its solidarity and generosity wrapped in a set of demands and conditionalities, is not uncharacteristic for a style of communication that can be found in many more letters and messages to the Sint Maarten Government between 2017 and 2021. As in this case, some of these communications have remained unanswered and / or acted upon on the Sint Maarten side, unless there was considerable pressure exercised by the Netherlands, e.g., the threat of withholding liquidity support. A more suave style of communication respecting cultural sensitivities might at times have produced better outcomes. At the same time, some governance issues in Sint Maarten have been so deep-seated that a principled approach for the use of Dutch tax-payers money has been unavoidable.

Conclusion 3: The laudable intent of the Netherlands Government to invest EUR 550.0 million in reconstruction of Sint Maarten was a high-level political decision in the Netherlands, which lacked an in-depth needs assessment and a more or less detailed results framework spelling out goals and objectives, expected impact, outcomes and inputs.

199. As pointed out in section 4.1., the legal text of article 8 and accompanying documents, e.g., letters addressed by the State Secretary of BZK to Parliament, were rather succinct and unspecific, as far as goals, objectives, impact, outcomes and outputs of reconstruction in Sint Maarten were concerned. The determination of the overall budget was also not based on in-depth needs assessments on the ground. The purpose of Dutch support is defined in generic terms, e.g., restoration of basic services, economic development and access, resolving the waste management problem, and promoting good governance, including improved border control, public law and order, and financial management.

200. As the bulk of the overall budget was to be channelled through a World Bank executed Trust Fund, the World Bank assumed a major support role to the Sint Maarten Government at an early stage in designing the NRRP, i.e., already during the preparation of the Trust Fund. The NRRP drew up a relatively detailed assessment of damage caused by Hurricane Irma and defined a general roadmap for reconstruction. Within this broad roadmap, timebound goals and objectives for the period 2018 – 2025 were defined that were eligible for Trust Fund support. The process culminated in the adoption of a Strategic Framework in 2019. Certain priorities on the Dutch side, e.g., border control, public law and order and the Integrity Chamber, remained outside the purview of the Trust Fund. For the latter activities, no results framework was formulated.

201. As explained in section 4.3.5., the absence of a proper results framework for article 8 severely limits the evaluability of reconstruction in Sint Maarten. While this limitation is less felt for Trust Fund activities due to the existence of the NRRP, the Strategic Framework and project-specific results frameworks, it represents a major drawback for the assessment of direct support activities, none of which are supported by a proper definition of objectives, impact, outcomes and outputs. Reporting on these activities, to the extent that it is available at all, also remains rather generic and unspecific in this regard. This has had consequences for the evaluation of effectiveness under this policy review, which cannot fully comply with requirements defined in the guidelines of Periodical Policy Reviews[170], namely, to assess achievement of expected outputs and outcomes (see also Conclusion 3).

Conclusion 4: As entrusting reconstruction funds directly to Sint Maarten and too direct Dutch involvement were not deemed desirable options in the Netherlands, the establishment of a World Bank Trust Fund was a well justified way out.

202. Once the two conditions were met in Sint Maarten for the spending of the EUR 550.0 million, several options were considered for the operationalization of activities. A simple transfer of the funds to Sint Maarten or direct involvement of the Netherlands were quickly discarded, as explained above. Several options for an international organisation to assume the role of a trusted partner for the implementation of the larger part of reconstruction efforts were considered and resulted in the selection of the World Bank.

203. The World Bank presented excellent credentials to be entrusted with the bulk of support to reconstruction efforts. Its reputation was based on projects implemented successfully elsewhere in the Caribbean and in other parts of the world, many of which presented more complex challenges. The Bank had also developed considerable expertise concerning specific issues faced by small island states. No other institution could present a similarly coherent and comprehensive set of skills and organisational strengths for supporting reconstruction efforts.

Conclusion 5: Neither the Netherlands Ministry of BZK nor the Government of Sint Maarten initially had realistic expectations as to benefits to be derived from Trust Fund execution and challenges associated with this mode of operation.

204. In the Netherlands there was a strong sense of urgency to come to the support of the people of Sint Maarten beyond the emergency phase, which was completed at the end of November 2017. A small fund of EUR 7.0 million was made available for early recovery projects to be completed in principle by mid-2018. They addressed immediate social needs, e.g., housing, shelters, schools, waste management, psychosocial support, *inter alia*. Projects were mostly entrusted to local and Dutch NGOs, e.g., the White-Yellow Cross, the SMDF, the Red Cross Netherlands, UNICEF Netherlands, and Qredits Microfinancing. Release of funding by the Ministry of BZK was apparently swift and unbureaucratic (see report on parts I and III).

205. As from mid-2018, at the beginning of the new hurricane season which lasts from June to November each year, reconstruction was to be well on its way. Both the Netherlands and the World Bank acted swiftly and concluded an Administration Arrangement as early as on 16 April 2018. In Sint Maarten, the announcement that EUR 550.0 million would soon come their way created high hopes and expectations among policymakers and in the population. This put considerable pressure on the (caretaker) Government (see 6.2.). Neither Dutch nor Sint Maarten policymakers had a clear idea what reconstruction activities through a World Bank executed Trust Fund would entail. A major concern was that the country should be better prepared for the 2018 hurricane season. This expectation could by no means be fulfilled.

206. Although supported by the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of BZK did not have realistic expectations as to the *modus operandi* of the World Bank and when reconstruction activities would be fully operational and how much time would be required to see

[170] *Regeling Periodiek Evaluatieonderzoek* 15 March 2018 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0040754/2018-03-27, website consulted on 22 August 2022.

results on the ground. Advice provided by the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs did not register with the Ministry of BZK. Initial estimates were full operationalization and early results by mid-2018. The creation of an adequate management structure, the establishment of the NRPB, took more time than expected. Operationalization of activities under ERP-I as well as for the Disaster Management and Airport Reconstruction Projects also met with unexpected challenges for a variety of reasons as indicated in section 6.6. Smaller social projects to be executed by partner organisations started up in earnest only in 2020-2021.

Conclusion 6: The World Bank executed Trust Fund has played its role well as a neutral and trusted intermediary for the Government of the Netherlands.

207. From the perspective of the Netherlands Government the Trust Fund has proved to be an effective mechanism ensuring adequate spending of resources and avoidance of too direct confrontations with partners in Sint Maarten. Issues and challenges that arise are resolved at the project level by the World Bank and Sint Maarten in dialogue, and when needed in the tripartite Steering Committee that guides Trust Fund operations. Both the Netherlands and Sint Maarten have had themselves being represented by the same senior officials since the beginning. Both enjoy the trust of their respective political leadership. They have entertained amicable and constructive relations among themselves (see 6.6.3.).

Conclusion 7: In Sint Maarten the Trust Fund modality is sometimes felt to be an extended arm of the Netherlands and compliance with the numerous World Bank guidelines and safeguards is at times seen as an undesirable burden and distraction.

208. The reaction has been more muted in Sint Maarten. While the well-funded contribution to reconstruction is welcomed, the requirements embodied in the Bank's procurement policy and guidelines as well as the Bank's stringent safeguard policy are at times felt to be rather undesirable burdens and distractions. Trust Fund support is sometimes perceived as an extended arm of the Netherlands. With such a heavy external involvement by the Netherlands and the World Bank, Sint Maarten initially experienced difficulties in developing a sense of ownership and leadership in line with what might be expected in an autonomous country in the Kingdom. There are nevertheless indications that Government interest and involvement in Trust Fund projects and its support to these projects have grown considerably at the ministerial and technical levels. However, in general terms, the ambiguity of Kingdom Relations inherent to the 10-10-10 Charter, a built-in contradiction between autonomy on the one hand, but dependence on external support with strings attached, on the other, lies like a thick blanket over Trust Fund relations and operations.

Conclusion 8: Pressing social needs of the population in Sint Maarten, e.g., adequate housing, shelters, schools, and psychosocial support, have been attended to too slowly, at least as far as funding from article 8 of the Kingdom Budget was concerned[171], as there was a considerable gap and discontinuity between limited early recovery activities in 2018 and start-up of related Trust Fund activities in 2020-2021.

209. Along with the need to rehabilitate the Airport Terminal and the Sint Maarten Medical Center as well as to engage in debris management, all major infrastructural works, the most pressing needs in the wake of Hurricane Irma were felt to provide especially the poor and vulnerable parts of the population with adequate roofs above their heads, shelters for the homeless, classrooms for the children and psychosocial support especially for the young. Early

[171] It should be mentioned that between 2017 and 2021, Sint Maarten received substantial funding from the Nationaal Rampenfonds (NRF) in the Netherlands (see *Fonds NRF voor wederopbouw na Orkaan Irma, eindrapportage bestedingen,* March 2021 https://nationaalrampenfonds.nl/media/files/204-21-22-07c-nr-irma.pdf Website consulted on 22 August 2022. Total expenditure amounted to USD 7.3 million between November 2017 and 2021. Although the NRF intended to coordinate activities with the Ministry of BZK and the World Bank, there is no evidence that close cooperation actually materialized.

recovery addressed these needs, albeit with a very limited budget of EUR 7.0 million (see report on parts I / III).

210. Early recovery projects ceased to receive support from art. 8 budgets in mid-2018. The Trust Fund was slow in addressing these needs. ERP-1, though approved in July 2018, started disbursements on social goals as from March 2019 only, once minimum requirements for World Bank involvement had been met, albeit on a limited scale (see 6.5.1.). The Red Cross Roof Repair and the Enterprise Support Projects were approved end of 2019 and became effective in 2020. In both cases, NGOs that had overseen early recovery projects – the Red Cross and Qredits – were not supported from article 8 for almost two years. The gap was even longer for UNICEF, as the Child Resilience Project was only approved in January 2021. Another project, the Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project also became effective in 2020.

211. Continuation of the early recovery activities would have served as a useful bridge of support to the population (albeit on a smaller scale and with different standards) while larger more structural national scale programmes of the Trust Fund were prepared. Such Trust Fund programmes could have been prioritized within the shortest possible time after Trust Fund establishment. Benefits from World Bank support would still have accrued only after some time given that its approach was based on systematic and transparent national criteria of eligibility including appropriate evidence to allow for fair distribution of benefits.

Conclusion 9: To avoid the gap and discontinuity in responding to social needs of the population between 2018 and 2020, funding the partner organisations involved in early recovery projects (e.g., Red Cross Netherlands, UNICEF Netherlands, Qredits, SMDF etc.) could have been continued under the direct support component of article 8. This would, however, have entailed a drawback for Sint Maarten.

212. The decision to limit scope and duration of the early recovery phase was partly due to unrealistic expectations as to how quickly the Trust Fund could take over on social goals in an effective and efficient manner. If the decision had been better informed, the early recovery phase could at least have had a more consequential budget and a longer time-period. The Governments of Sint Maarten and the Netherlands could also have insisted that the Trust Fund would address social needs as a matter of priority right as from Trust Fund establishment. At the same time, it is well known how the World Bank approaches such projects in other parts of the world and that comprehensive programmes would require a good deal of preparatory work. With hindsight, an obvious alternative could have been not to entrust the World Bank with these projects but situate them in the direct support component alongside activities aiming to support border control and public law and order. This would however have had the drawback that Sint Maarten would not have benefitted from the advantages of the World Bank approach.

213. Local and Dutch partner organisations may be assumed to possess the necessary credentials to implement social projects, e.g., on housing, repairs of shelters and schools and offering psychosocial support etc. in a competent and effective manner, albeit not on a scale that was possible with World Bank support to Sint Maarten. Implementation under direct support would most probably also have come at a lower cost. It should be mentioned that these NGOs as well as VNG-International usually entertain excellent relations with the Sint Maarten Government. The Ministry of BZK could have managed the process from a distance, in the same manner as what had already been practiced successfully in the early recovery phase. A more consequential direct support budget may have required more human resources in the Ministry with the necessary managerial and technical skills. Additional staff could have been drawn from other ministries and public services in the Netherlands on funding to be provided from the technical support component.

9.2. Effectiveness: achievements and challenges at mid-point of the reconstruction process

Conclusion 10: While the World Bank reports more than adequately on project results and challenges met on the way, the Ministry of BZK demonstrates weaknesses in its documentation of direct support activities.

214. Within the limits agreed between the Ministry of BZK and the World Bank about the use of information (see 4.3.1.), Trust Fund executed projects are well documented, both as far as their design and their implementation and results achieved are concerned. It is possible to distil objectives, expected outcomes and outputs and their relative realization considering their starting date. In its aggregate reporting, mostly in its annual and semi-annual reports, the World Bank mentions challenges that have been encountered, e.g., with the legal framework in Sint Maarten, the limited size of the economy, and administrative impediments.

215. By contrast, activities funded under direct support are much less well designed and documented. Financial documentation of the Ministry of BZK is not always well labelled and adjustments due to exchange rate fluctuations can often not be related to specific disbursements. Even more importantly, implementing partners report on activities in very generic terms. For this policy review, an inordinate amount of time (a full year) was spent to trace documents in financial archives and in Digidoc. This is due to shortcomings in the institutional memory of the Ministry.

Conclusion 11: Implementation through the Trust Fund has resulted in good achievements on major infrastructure projects, notably the Airport Terminal Reconstruction, the Hospital Resilience, and the Emergency Debris Management Projects

216. At mid-point of the current implementation period for article 8 funding, the reconstruction of major infrastructure in Sint Maarten shows good achievements or at least results that could realistically be expected. The World Bank has demonstrated great competence on such major projects. Procedural guidelines and safeguards are really designed for such projects and have a very beneficial effect. Especially for the Airport and Debris Management projects, they did present challenges for the Government of Sint Maarten and agencies involved in the implementation, as they required new laws and regulations (in the case of debris management) and different management practices. The Sint Maarten Medical Center already worked according to standards that are compatible with World Bank safeguards.

217. In the case of the Airport Reconstruction, the success has been largely due to good cooperation between the World Bank with both the Netherlands and Sint Maarten. The intervention of the Netherlands was crucial in satisfying the bond holders who held in escrow insurance payments. The Netherlands also played a crucial role in attracting cofinancing on a loan basis from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The World Bank helped drawing up a financing plan, in which the private company running the airport would be granted loans from the Government of Sint Maarten, matching the EIB loan, on the grant from the Trust Fund, that will allow for the medium-term establishment of a National Disaster Resilience Fund in the medium term. Technical assistance provided by the Schiphol Group Netherlands to financial and technical management seems to be very effective in ensuring operations with fewer managerial issues than in the past. If there are no unexpected technical challenges during the construction of the terminal, the project should be completed in 2023, i.e. well before the end of the Trust Fund.

218. The Debris Management Project is very complex and therefore takes time. Priority was initially given to stabilizing the dump and to extinguishing the fires and preventing new ones. This has had major benefits for public health on the island. The next step of offering the population living on the dump perspectives of resettlement or compensation is time-consuming but is apparently conducted with great care and successfully. More sustainable debris management requires sophisticated studies and major policy changes. Follow-up projects to the present one are currently designed, whereby it cannot be expected that they will be completed by the end of the Trust Fund.

219. When judging progress and effectiveness of these infrastructure projects, it is necessary to let a certain sense of realism prevail. It may be helpful to make comparisons with similar projects in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the World, many of which have faced huge unexpected legal and technical challenges. Damages from the fireworks disaster in Enschede in 2000 took many years to repair. The construction of metro lines in Amsterdam and a high-speed railway line in the Netherlands took much more time than initially foreseen and exceeded original cost estimates. Building a new airport in Berlin was delayed for many years and showed huge cost overruns. One should also look at reconstruction works after Irma and other hurricanes elsewhere in the Caribbean, e.g., in Dominica, Montserrat, Puerto Rico or Texas. By comparison, Sint Maarten does not do too badly.

Conclusion 12: Implementation through the Trust Fund has resulted in reasonable achievements in other projects under implementation since 2018 and 2019, while it is too early to assess results for projects started in 2020 and 2021.

220. The most comprehensive project apart from the large infrastructure projects mentioned above has been the ERP-I, which became operational in 2018 already. It was meant to address most urgent needs (housing, shelters, schools, public utilities etc.) as well as to create the institutional setting required for Trust Fund administration in Sint Maarten. The most important outcome of the project was the establishment of the NRPB. In practice, it has served as a laboratory for the introduction of World Bank procedures in Sint Maarten with a relatively limited outreach as compared to the needs in Sint Maarten (see sections 6.5.1. and 6.6.)

221. The EISTP and Red Cross Roof Repair Project set themselves realistic, yet modest targets as compared to the needs. The EISTP built on an existing initiative in the private sector and provided income support and vocational training to unemployed and underemployed workers. The targets in terms of numbers of people supported exceeded expectations. A second component, the establishment of a modern social registry in the Ministry of Public Health, Social Development and Labor (VSA) started only recently (see section 6.5.2.). The Red Cross Roof Repair also largely achieved its target with 182 roofs that could be repaired.

222. Projects started in 2020-2021 include the ESP, the R4CR Project, the Child Resiliency Project and the Digital Transformation Project. The preparation and start-up phases of these projects were lengthy and there was no continuity to projects implemented during the early recovery phase largely by the same implementing agencies (see conclusions 7 and 8). It would be premature to attempt an assessment of their effectiveness at this stage.

Conclusion 13: Direct support has produced good results on border control, while achievements in areas related to public law and order are supported by less evidence. The modality has also served as a flexible resource pool for the Ministry of BZK to address technical assistance and other needs in Sint Maarten on an ad-hoc basis.

223. There is convincing evidence that border control has been considerably strengthened because of direct support funding. This had been a top priority for the Government of the Netherlands since before Hurricane Irma, but it became even more urgent during the post-Irma crisis. Most importantly, the Royal Marechaussee and Netherlands Customs became part of a consultative mechanism, with resulting intensive capacity development directed at the KPSM, Sint Maarten Customs, the Coast Guard and Immigration. Illegal border crossings of people in and out of the country were reduced as well as were smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal (labour) migration and uncontrolled imports and exports of money and goods. There has been improved practical cooperation with the French side on the island, e.g., in Coast Guard operations, but more formal arrangements have been limited, as this would have to involve decision-making in Paris.

224. Results related to areas of public law and order are less supported by evidence. Digitalisation of the Public Prosecutors Office contributed to improvements in the overall fight against crime. So did support to the KPSM. By contrast, progress in the rehabilitation of the Point Blanche detention centre was initially rather slow, which seems to be largely because this was apparently not considered a priority by Sint Maarten. There are, however, signs that there has

been better communication between the Netherlands and Sint Maarten in this regard since 2020 (see section 7.2.2.).

225. Direct support activities were not mapped out in any detail at the outset and remained a convenient source of funding for various needs outside the Trust Fund that have arisen in recent years. The Netherlands Government could thus grant comprehensive technical assistance to the Ministry of VROMI and to the Airport, including the funding of legal services and support to financial and technical management. More recently, direct support funding has also been used for activities related to debris management outside the Trust Fund. Direct support to debris management and the Airport complement respective Trust Fund activities and significantly contribute to their success.

Conclusion 14: The ambitious and complex political agenda of Building Back Better has received adequate attention under article 8 funding, but it is still too soon to assess its effectiveness in all its dimensions.

226. Building Back Better has been a political agenda especially in the Netherlands. It was included in an Appendix to the Administration Arrangement concluded with the World Bank. It implicitly also guided direct support activities. Although the Appendix is non-binding, it largely converges with reconstruction goals of the World Bank not only for this Trust Fund. As stated before (see section 6.6.2.), the agenda encompasses three dimensions: a) Material reconstruction of buildings and other physical infrastructure to hurricane 5 resistant standards; b) Improved disaster management capacity and disaster preparedness; and c) a broad agenda of good governance, strengthening of civil society, economic diversification and policies aiming at sustainable development in pursuit of social and environmental goals.

227. Elements of Building Back Better were incorporated in the Strategic Focus Areas of the Trust Fund and, albeit more implicitly, in direct support activities. Major infrastructure projects, such as rehabilitation of the airport and medical centre as well as debris management, are executed with hurricane 5 resistance as a goal to the greatest possible extent. Such a standard is more difficult to meet with home repairs, rehabilitation or rebuilding of shelters and schools and other social infrastructure. In these works, one is faced with a huge dilemma between the urgency of necessary interventions and the aim to offer the highest quality of constructions (see 6.6.2.).

228. Improved disaster preparedness and management is exemplified by the promotion of CCIRF insurance and membership in the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) under ERP-I. The medium-/long-term perspective of the establishment of a National Disaster Fund with reimbursements by PJIA to the Government of Sint Maarten opens the possibility of self-sustaining disaster management. Direct support activities also clearly aim at strengthening disaster preparedness with equipment for the Ministry of VROMI and the fire brigade, digitalization of the Public Prosecutor's Office and a much-improved detention centre (cf. report on parts I and III).

229. In terms of the realization of broad goals like good governance, economic diversification and sustainable social and economic development, there are encouraging partial results, but by and large it is too soon to conclude on the achievement of these high goals in a comprehensive manner.

Conclusion 15: The huge volume of funding under article 8 in combination with strong roles exercised by the Trust Fund and the Netherlands, have unexpected side-effects in Sint Maarten which cannot yet be fully assessed.

230. The insistence on good governance, on adequate procurement rules and social and environmental safeguards by the Trust Fund and the Netherlands has had the positive side-effect that capacities of managerial and technical staff in Sint Maarten have been improved, e.g., in the NRPB, in line Ministries and in partner organisations. The newly acquired skills can be used not only in current jobs, but also in future employment situations. It is too early to measure these positive side-effects in a comprehensive way.

231. Some features of the Trust Fund and involvement of the Netherlands may have had less desirable side-effects, the full extent of which can also not be assessed at this stage. One side-effect has been that the application of high standards of scrutiny in the financial management, procurement, and safeguards areas have placed heavy administrative and procedural burdens on Sint Maarten. Such burdens may have been disproportionate to the island's size and capacity. Another is that, at least in the short run, the intensive demand for building materials and construction workers drives up prices and has an inflationary effect. Finally, demanding administrative procedures and the need to comply with guidelines may paralyze or at least slow down progress both in government and even more so in NGO and CSO action (see 6.7.1.). Stakeholders in Sint Maarten may have been initially prevented from developing a sense of ownership and leadership because of too heavy-handed external management.

232. According to some stakeholders in Sint Maarten, Trust Fund priorities could also crowd out other development challenges, e.g., non-addressed dimensions of climate change mitigation, freshwater and wastewater management, the road infrastructure and public transport etc. While post-Irma reconstruction (and currently to Covid-19 related funding needs) have been the most important issues that needed to be addressed, the Government of Sint Maarten would normally have to weigh their relative importance in a broader context and define its own political priorities with a long-term vision. This will become more important, as post-Irma effects (and possibly also Covid-19 requirements) recede over time.

9.3. Efficiency: learning from experience on implementation modalities

Conclusion 16: The World Bank and main implementing partners of direct support (border control agencies, public law and order institutions, lawyers etc.) can be trusted to apply highest accountancy standards, fight corruption, and ensure best possible spending in terms of volumes / use and standards / prices.

233. A key concern of the Government of the Netherlands has been that article 8 resources stemming from Dutch taxpayers' contributions are well spent in an environment that has been prone to various forms of corruption and insufficient public governance and budget control. The World Bank's strict procurement guidelines and social and environmental safeguards offer the best possible guarantees that these high standards are respected.

234. Similarly, agencies in charge of border control and maintaining public law and order (police force, customs, coast guard, public prosecutor) may be assumed to be free of corruption or at least have adequate mechanisms in place to detect any wrongdoing. The same holds true for institutions involved in various forms of legal and technical assistance, e.g., the international lawyers and Schiphol Group Netherlands supporting airport management, as well as other partner organisations involved in Trust Fund projects and other forms of technical assistance.

235. The propriety of purchases in terms of volumes, prices and utility could ultimately only be determined, if a full-fledged audit on operations by Chartered Accountants were available. The World Bank has its own internal procedures in this regard (see Conclusion 17). Direct support activities have been audited on various occasions by the General Accounts Chamber (*Algemene Rekenkamer*) in the Netherlands, whereby no improprieties were found[172].

Conclusion 17: The question whether results of Trust Fund projects were achieved at a justifiable cost cannot be answered, as there is insufficient insight into Trust Fund operations. High accountancy standards as well as ambitious Building Back Better goals do entail a higher cost than what would have been observed if these projects had not been implemented under the Trust Fund.

[172] *Algemene Rekenkamer 2018 en 2020, Focus op de Nederlandse bijdrage aan de wederopbouw van Sint Maarten; 2020* The Legend of Lokhay, mini-audit; 2018, 2019, 2020 en 2021, *Resultaten verantwoordingsonderzoek Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) en BES fonds (H).*

236. Due to the single audit principle under World Bank policies, external partners are precluded from assessing the efficiency of World Bank executed Trust Fund operations. This policy review also had no access to World Bank audits. It is therefore beyond the remit of this policy review to evaluate the efficiency of the Trust Fund projects. A few tentative remarks may nevertheless be made.

237. The World Bank contends that all Trust Fund projects are assessed on an economic rate of return basis. Given the single audit principle agreed upon by all parties, including the Netherlands, these data cannot be externally verified. While the cost / benefit ratio is likely to be adequate as far as the large infrastructure projects (airport, hospital, debris management), this may be less true for smaller social projects (EISTP, Red Cross Roof Repair, ESP, Civil Society R4CR, Child Resilience). It has taken a long time to prepare these projects, get them approved and start operations. Had the partner organisations selected for their implementation been allowed to pursue their operations started during the early recovery phase under the direct support modality of the Ministry of BZK, this would surely have sped up the process and pressing needs of the population in terms of housing, shelters, schools etc. would have been responded to more expeditiously. However, the scale of operations would have been at a much lower level and Sint Maarten would not have benefitted from the much more comprehensive World Bank approach.

Conclusion 18: To the extent that projects under the direct support modality are sufficiently documented, costs and benefits can be said to have been in balance.

238. Most activities under direct support present difficulties to assess their efficiency. This is partly due to the paucity of traceable reporting. However, results can be demonstrated for the areas of border control and public law and order. By contrast, it is harder to demonstrate specific effects of legal services and technical assistance for the airport and of studies on debris management, as they are part of a more complex set of measures under the Trust Fund. Finally, several activities were approved in 2021 only and do not warrant an assessment as to their effectiveness and efficiency yet.

Conclusion 19: If funding for reconstruction in Sint Maarten had amounted to significantly more (an increase by 20 percent to EUR 660.0 million) or less (a decrease by 20 percent to EUR 440.0 million), this would have affected the scope of reconstruction efforts in Sint Maarten.

239. As indicated in section 6.2., the NRRP estimated damages and losses caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria at USD 2.7 billion (USD 1.4 billion and USD 1.3 billion, respectively). Reconstruction needs thus by far exceeded the maximum contribution that the Government of the Netherlands was willing to make. If up to 20 percent funding had been made available unfunded needs identified in the NRRP could have been addressed. The question is whether this would have been a wise decision, as even the current funding spending in Sint Maarten exceeded this small country's absorption capacity (see also Conclusion 15).

240. If by contrast significantly fewer resources had been made available (e.g., EUR 440.0 million corresponding to 20 percent less), fewer needs could have been addressed. It is likely that the rehabilitation of the hospital, the reconstruction of the airport and improved debris management would still have been included among the priorities. In the worst case, significant needs would have remained unaddressed. There were limited options to reduce contributions to these projects in seeking complementary funding from other sources (outside the Airport benefitting from EIB support and the Hospital having access to private sector support). Not being an independent country with access to the international financing system, Sint Maarten does not have access to the myriad of international funding mechanisms, whereby private sector funding for public goods is only possible against high rates of return anyway.

241. As mentioned under Conclusion 9, Trust Fund projects addressing social needs, e.g., the ESP (MSME), the R4CR Project (civil society organisations), the Child Resiliency Project, could have been entrusted directly to the partner organisations involved in the early recovery phase and without an unfortunate gap in activities. If the Ministry of BZK had situated these projects under

direct support rather than under the Trust Fund modality, this would also have produced some savings, albeit with the downside that the partner organisations would not have benefitted from the capacity building inherent to the procurement guidelines and social and environmental safeguards of the World Bank. On the other hand, it may be questioned, if these standards are perceived as quite appropriate at this level, as partner organisations have often experienced them more as a burden than as a benefit.

242. Under direct support funds, disbursements for border control and public law and order were considered high priority by the Government of the Netherlands and would have been made irrespective of whether more or fewer resources had been available. Support to Trust Fund activities, e.g., legal fees and technical assistance by the Schiphol Group, were also considered indispensable in 2018-2020, but alternative funding, e.g., by PJIA itself, could have been considered. In 2021, significant amounts of money were made available to a variety of causes, e.g., technical assistance to the Ministry of VROMI, purchase of a stormwater pump and a submersible pump as well as funding for IMF-CARTAC. This was optional and dependent on the availability of funding. Had less money been available, these disbursements could have been avoided, if fewer resources had been available. The rush to make disbursements in 2020-2021, i.e., before the deadline, suggests that more funds would have aggravated the problem.

Conclusion 20: In the hypothetical case that at this point of time significantly more or fewer means were available (20 percent savings or a 20 percent increase), projects and activities which have recently been approved and not yet commenced would have to be reconsidered as to their pertinence, scope and duration.

243. There are currently no indications that overall Trust Fund funding needs to be increased or decreased within the timeframe ending in 2025 according to provisions prevailing at the end of 2021. Trust Fund disbursements seem to be on track for all projects. At the same time, significant disbursements are planned for new projects, e.g., the Fostering Resilient Learning Project (USD 30.0 million), additional funding for the Emergency Debris Project (USD 25.0 million), the Long-Term Waste Management (USD 10.0 million), and the Mental Health Project (USD 8.0 million). All these cost estimates could be revised upward or downward, whereby entire projects could also be cancelled. Funding would also have to be reconsidered if the Trust Fund period were not to be extended beyond 2025.

244. Similar deliberations would have to take place for direct support projects disbursed recently. If ex-post significantly fewer resources were available, it would have to be investigated if certain activities approved in 2021 could still be reversed. Examples include the purchase of a stormwater pump for the Ministry of VROMI (worth EUR 2.5 million), the submersible pump for the fire brigade (worth more than EUR 700.000) and the contracting of IMF-CARTAC worth EUR 2.0 million). If significantly more resources were to be made available, new projects would have to be identified, which may be difficult, if these need to be related to Hurricane Irma.

10. Recommendations concerning reconstruction in Sint Maarten

10.1. Recommendations for the current remainder of the reconstruction phase (until 2025)[173]

Recommendation 1: To address shortcomings found in data and document storage systems of the Ministry of BZK (see Conclusion 10), it is recommended that the Ministry improves its financial management and its document storage system Digidoc with a view to enhance accountability for its disbursements.

[173] All conclusions and recommendations in this report have been drafted with the original end-date of 31 December 2025 for the Trust Fund in mind. It should be noted that the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom *(Rijksministerraad),* in its session of 10 June 2022*,* approved the request of the World Bank to extend the duration of the Trust Fund until 31 December 2028. The recommendations of this report may indeed still be useful for the actual shaping of the extension.

245. There is room for improvement in both financial and administrative documentation of disbursements made by the Ministry of BZK under article 8 (and most likely also under other budget headings). In financial overviews labelling of disbursements needs to be more consistent and systematic and possible ex-post corrections (due to exchange rate calculations or corrections of mistakes) need to be more systematically related to the respective budget lines. One would also expect that specific disbursements can be more easily linked to underlying administrative decisions / contractual agreements with implementing organisations as well as narrative reporting related to the agreements.

246. The Ministry of BZK should also be less lenient on implementing partners, as far as reporting requirements are concerned. While the World Bank spontaneously excels in its reporting discipline (e.g., presenting frequent Regular Monitoring Reports and Annual- and Semi-Annual Reports), the majority of implementing partners of direct support activities present rather generic narrative reports, from which no specific information can be collected on outputs, outcomes and impact as well as challenges met. Requirements should take into account smart objectives, outcomes and outputs that are part of the improved design of activities to the extent that these are available (see Recommendation 5).

Recommendation 2: Given that the rates of allocations and disbursements of both Trust Fund and direct support projects are basically on track, there is no need to consider an increase / decrease by 20 percent of this funding within the current timeframe of the project. An increase may be considered if the Trust Fund is extended beyond 2025.

247. All four tranches foreseen for the Trust Fund have now been disbursed (see section 6.1.), which may be taken as proof that spending is basically on track at mid-point of the current article 8 implementation period (2018-2025). Similarly, major allocations made in 2021 under the direct support modality, e.g., for debris management studies and improvement of the Point Blanche detention facility, have brought forecasted spending to a level that may be expected at mid-point of the implementation period. Experience does suggest, however, that the absorption capacity of Sint Maarten is limited, and that not all resources reserved or allocated can actually be spent. There is hence no need to increase the overall budget by 20 percent. On the other hand, a decrease by 20 percent should also not be considered as a policy option, as major projects requiring resources have just started or are still being prepared.

Recommendation 3: At mid-point of the article 8 implementation period, there is a need to establish realistic roadmaps for all projects determining whether they can be completed by 2025 or whether they require alternative arrangements and / or a longer timeframe after 31 December 2025[174].

248. Trust Fund projects show different levels of progress in terms of their implementation. Some projects, e.g., the EISTP, the Hospital Resiliency, the Airport Reconstruction, and the Roof Repair Project seem to be on track or are to be completed by 2025. Other projects, especially those addressing social needs, e.g., the ESP, the R4CR Project and Child Resilience Projects, started only recently, i.e., in 2020 and 2021, and may require a longer time frame. The Debris Management Project, including additions and long-term extensions, will surely require a timeframe beyond 2025. This also applies to new projects, e.g., the Fostering Resilient Learning Project.

249. A careful assessment should also be undertaken as to direct support activities currently under way or foreseen in the near future. Strengthening border control and public law and order could possibly be completed before 2025 under article 8 funding. Rehabilitation of the Point Blanche detention centre continues to be a priority. In the medium term, the principle that these are responsibilities of Sint Maarten under the Charter and that they should be funded under the national budget should be ensured. Finally, it is recommended not to fund activities under article

[174] It is understood that such a roadmap has already been established as part of the proposal to extend the Trust Fund until end 2028.

8, which are not or only marginally related to Hurricane Irma.

10.2. Recommendations beyond 2025

Recommendation 4: Should Sint Maarten be struck by another major hurricane or other disaster in the future, and if the Netherlands were to consider supporting reconstruction under article 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom, the Netherlands should help Sint Maarten in drawing up a needs assessment and a more or less detailed reconstruction plan applying results-based management principles, i.e., spelling out goals and objectives, expected impact, outcomes and inputs of reconstruction efforts and allowing for monitoring and evaluation.

250. Under the Charter of the Kingdom, reconstruction in the aftermath of a hurricane or other disaster is basically the responsibility of the country of Sint Maarten itself. The first step would be an adequate assessment of damages and needs on which a reconstruction plan could be built. In 2018, the NRRP drawn up in Sint Maarten with assistance provided by the World Bank was a good example of what needs to be done. The plan guided the design of the Trust Fund and, to a much lesser extent, direct support activities. Should a similar disaster strike the island in the future, the Netherlands should not necessarily have to rely on an institution like the World Bank to support Sint Maarten in drawing up an appropriate reconstruction plan.

251. At least the contribution of the Netherlands to such a plan, like the one under article 8, should be formulated along results-based management principles with a clear and logical definition of goals and objectives and underlying inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. Each of these elements should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound ("smart") and be accompanied by appropriate indicators and hypotheses. There is an abundant literature on how this can be done[175]. It should be noted that the Ministry of BZK in its preparatory documentation related to COHO has already moved into this direction.

Recommendation 5: If the roadmap for individual projects finds that several Trust Fund projects are unlikely to be completed by 2025, an extension of the Trust Fund Administration Arrangement until at least the end of 2028 should be considered. This may require additional resources[176].

252. Notwithstanding the careful assessment of all Trust Fund projects suggested under recommendation 2, there is a strong likelihood that at least the EDMP as well as the social projects that commenced in 2020-2021 (the ESP, R4CR and Child Resilience Projects) as well as the new projects (e.g., the Fostering Resilient Learning Project) will require a timeframe beyond 2025 for their implementation. As has already happened with the EDMP, it needs to be determined if the present budgets for these projects will suffice or if additional resources will be required. There may not necessarily be a need for a topping-up of the overall Trust Fund budget, already fully released in four tranches, but may involve shifting provisions between projects. It should be avoided that Trust Fund resources not spent by 2025 are reimbursed to the Netherlands.

253. While current direct support projects, e.g., support to border control and public law and order, including the rehabilitation of the detention centre, should be completed as much as possible by 2025, the modality may remain useful beyond 2025, as some of the projects currently implemented under the Trust Fund (e.g., the ESP, R4CR and Child Resilience Projects) could continue with direct support resources. This may require a strengthening of the respective expertise in the Ministry of BZK. A medium- and long-term vision for these activities should be developed as soon as possible, i.e., already during the current phase.

[175] See OECD – DAC Results-based approaches https://www.oecd.org/dac/results-development/results-based-approaches/ website consulted on 22 August 2022.
[176] As of mid-2022, the Rijksministerraad has already approved an extension to 2028. It has been agreed that this extension can take place without additional financing. Based on World Bank calculations this will be possible, though risks presented by rising prices may require within project and potentially portfolio level re-engineering of some Trust Fund projects and objectives (with marginal impact on broad outcomes).

Recommendation 6: The prospect of the creation of a National Resilience Fund / Disaster Risk Facility on reimbursements by PJIA to the Government of Sint Maarten (currently estimated at USD 80.0 million) offers an interesting perspective for strengthening Sint Maarten's capacity to prepare for and respond to future disasters in a more autonomous manner.

254. The Trust Fund Steering Committee should make it a priority to study how funds that will be fed by reimbursements due from loans should function with proper financial and managerial safeguards. A National Resilience Fund would be created as from 2027 with reimbursements by PJIA to Sint Maarten (estimated at around USD 80.0 million).

255. While planning for a National Resilience Fund should start as soon as possible, i.e., already under the current phase, its establishment will be gradual, in principle as from 2027. It should be examined how the World Bank could continue to provide technical assistance to the establishment of the Fund, through the Trust Fund and possibly beyond, if the Trust Fund were to be terminated in 2028.

Recommendation 7: Management of the National Resilience Fund should be entrusted to an autonomous authority that is situated outside the national budget of the Government of Sint Maarten, whereby oversight would possibly involve representation of the Netherlands in the governance structure. The NRPB could remain involved for the implementation of projects.

256. The National Resilience Fund should be protected from uses other than strictly circumscribed disaster preparedness and response needs. It should be situated outside the national budget and its financial and administrative management should be entrusted to an autonomous authority. The NRPB could remain involved for the management of projects in emergencies and for the implementation of capital investments. The NRPB would thus have to be granted a more long-term and permanent status. Additional resource mobilization from the Netherlands or from international capital markets could be envisaged. To the extent that resources originating in the Netherlands or requiring Dutch guarantees of a last-resort lender are involved, the Government of the Netherlands should be represented in the governance structure of the National Resilience Fund and of the NRPB.

Recommendation 8: As the Kingdom of the Netherlands participates in the continuous updating of World Bank policies through its representation in the Executive Board of the World Bank, experiences made in Sint Maarten with the application of World Bank procurement guidelines and social and environmental safeguards should be brought to the attention of the representation, as they may be a useful source of inspiration for policymaking especially concerning small island states.

257. The representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the World Bank Executive Board is an active and trusted contributor to the shaping of World Bank policies in general, and the continuous updating of Bank procurement guidelines and social and environmental safeguards. Experiences made in Sint Maarten with the practical application of these guidelines and safeguards should be monitored and evaluated on a continuous basis and lessons learned should be brought to the attention of the representation of the Kingdom. They could be particularly useful for policies and procedures related to small island states.

258. For this to happen the Ministry of BZK should upgrade its institutional monitoring and evaluation capacity and establish a new inter-ministerial consultation mechanism, in which ministries guiding the representation of the Netherlands in the World Bank should participate, notably the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. It should be explored how the Government of Sint Maarten could also be involved in such a mechanism.

ANNEX I

Terms of Reference - Part II

Uitvoeringsorganisatie
Bedrijfsvoering Rijk
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties

Request for tenders

UBR|HIS

Address for visitors
Rijkskantoor Beatrixpark
Wilhelmina van Pruisenweg 52
2595 AN The Hague

Postal address
Postbus 20011
2500 EA The Hague

More information
contactUBR.HIS@rijksoverheid.nl

Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba
Part II: Reconstruction of St Maarten

Limited bidding procedure
for
the Directorate-General for Kingdom Relations (DGKR) of
the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

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Contents

1. Introduction 4
1.1 The Client and UBR|HIS 4
1.2 Structure of this Request for Tenders 4
WHAT WE WANT 5
2. Description of the Public Contract 5
2.1 Description of the Public Contract 5
2.2 Splitting of the Public Contract 11
2.3 Duration of the Contract 12
2.4 Requirements 12
WHAT IS IMPORTANT AND HOW WE ASSESS 13
3. Award criterion 13
3.1. Award Subcriteria 13
3.2 Quality Award Subcriterion 1: external independent evaluator Requirements 13
3.4 Best price-quality ratio: price Award Subcriterion 14
4. Assessment of your Tender 15
4.1 Quality assessment 15
4.2 Price assessment 15
4.3 Assessment of the best price-quality ratio 15
5. Conduct of the procedure 17
5.1 Limited bidding procedure 17
5.2 Contact 17
5.3 Timetable for the Contract Award Procedure 17
5.4 Questions and inconsistencies 17
5.5 Submission of Tenders 18
5.6 Announcement of the Award Decision 18
5.7 Suspensive period and objections 19
5.8 Complaints procedure 19
5.9 Reservations of the Contracting Authority 19
6. How to tender 20
6.1 Tender via CTM 20
6.2 Formal Tender Requirements 20
7. Conditions 22
7.1 Contract and government terms and conditions 22
7.2 Invoicing 22
Glossary 23

Appendices in CTM

To be completed, approved and/or appended electronically by the Tenderer in CTM		
Appendix 1	General information form	In conformity with the enclosed template
Appendix 2	Price bid form	In conformity with the enclosed template (in PDF format, duly signed)
Appendix 3	Conformity Requirements	In conformity with the enclosed template
Declaration of agreement	Draft Contract	In CTM
Declaration of agreement	General Government Terms and Conditions for Public Service Contracts (ARVODI 2018)	In CTM

Background and other information for the Supplier	
Appendix A	Draft Contract
Appendix B	Question form for Information Notice
Appendix C	CTM Manual for Suppliers
Appendix D	Central government e-invoicing brochure
Appendix E	Letter to the House of Representatives on the design of the policy review of article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget[1]
Appendix F	Dutch Guiding Principles (pp. 14-16)

[1] The letter to the House of Representatives does not contain the most recent information on the period under study. The period under study was extended in December 2020 to 31 December 2022 (see Parliamentary Paper 33189, no. 13). The dataset has accordingly been extended to 31 December 2021.

1. Introduction

We, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Directorate-General for Kingdom Relations (DGKR), invite you to submit a tender for the limited bidding procedure known as 'Terms of Reference Part II – Policy review of article 8, Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba'. This Request for Tenders provides all the information you need to submit a Tender.

1.1 The Client and UBR|HIS

If you submit a Tender and we award the Public Contract to you, you will conclude a Contract with the Department for the Reconstruction of St Maarten of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

The Client

The Directorate-General for Kingdom Relations (DGKR) – with the associated representations of the Netherlands in the Caribbean – promotes the autonomy of Aruba, Curaçao and St Maarten. It does so in accordance with the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which lays down the rights and obligations of the constituent countries of the Kingdom. It also seeks to increase the self-reliance of those countries and the public bodies of Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba.

DGKR supports the ambitions of the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations and advises on policy and relations with the countries and the public bodies. It is also responsible for statutory tasks in the field of kingdom relations.

DGKR works in several areas: finance and economics, administrative development, security and representation. It also concerns itself with legal matters and working conditions for secondments to the Netherlands in the Caribbean.

UBR|HIS is overseeing this Contract Award Procedure

We have asked UBR|HIS to oversee this Contract Award Procedure. UBR|HIS is a central government agency specialising in the procurement of products and services. For more information on how UBR|HIS operates, read Business Etiquette: How we do business on the UBR|HIS website.

1.2 Structure of this Request for Tenders

Following this introduction:

- chapters 2 to 4 describe what we need, what we think is important and how we will assess which Tenderer has made the best offer;
- chapters 5 and 6 describe all aspects of the procedure and how to submit a Tender correctly;
- chapter 7 describes the Contract we wish to conclude.

This document closes with a glossary that defines specific terms. These terms are written with initial capitals in the body of the text so that you know they are defined in the glossary.

WHAT WE WANT

2. Description of the Public Contract

The Public Contract is described below. Note that the information on its scope is indicative. You cannot derive any rights from this information.

2.1 Description of the Public Contract

1. Background and aim of the evaluation

Under the 2019 budget, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will carry out a policy review of article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget (chapter IV of the national budget). The policy review will commence in 2020 and be submitted to the House of Representatives in 2022. These Terms of Reference (ToR) describe the scope of the policy review and the working agreements under which an external evaluator, in cooperation with the core team, will carry out the policy review of article 8, 'Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba' of the Kingdom Relations budget. These ToR relate specifically to part II of the policy review: reconstruction of St Maarten. The aim of the policy review is twofold. On the one hand, it must give the fullest possible picture of the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure already incurred for emergency aid to and reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba and, on the other, it must describe the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation structure put in place for the reconstruction of St Maarten, in theory and in practice. Final responsibility for this policy review will lie with the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations. A policy letter presenting the study design for the policy review has already been sent to the House (see Appendix E).

2. Description and definition of the evaluation subject

2.1 Background to the reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba
Hurricanes Irma and Maria swept over St Maarten, Saba and St Eustatius with destructive force in September 2017, devastating large parts of the islands. The Netherlands' initial response was to release a total of €55 million in acute humanitarian emergency aid for the three islands. Following this initial emergency aid, attention turned first to the early recovery phase of the islands, focusing on essential projects that could begin quickly. A plan for the reconstruction of the three islands was also drawn up during the early recovery phase. The Dutch government has made €550 million available for the reconstruction of St Maarten (comprising €80 million in direct support and €470 million through one of the World Bank's Trust Funds) and €67 million for the reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius. This €67 million was transferred to the various ministries from the Ministry of Finance's supplementary item. Funds were also transferred from the Kingdom Relations budget to other ministries. They are listed as such in the multiyear budget statement on article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget. Finally, there are also project funds in the budgets of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. These funds will not be included in the policy review.

Reconstruction is being coordinated by the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations, but the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management are also involved.

The State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations is financing part of the cost of the reconstruction of St Maarten through a reconstruction fund until 31 December 2025. This contribution will be subject to political conditions that St Maarten has agreed to: the establishment of an Integrity Chamber and the strengthening of border control. The Netherlands will strictly monitor compliance with these conditions during the reconstruction.

The main funding pathway for the reconstruction of St Maarten involves a Trust Fund set up by the World Bank. In addition to a World Bank representative, both the Netherlands and St Maarten

sit in the steering group that manages the Trust Fund. The Netherlands' priorities are economic development and accessibility, the waste problem and good governance. The Netherlands will also provide direct support for the reconstruction of St Maarten outside the Trust Fund. It will contribute, for instance, to the cost of law enforcement. At an earlier stage, the Netherlands directly contributed to emergency aid for St Maarten and to certain projects in the transitional phase in anticipation of the Trust Fund coming into operation.

Budget article 8 consists of two budget items that are covered by the policy review (see also table 1):

1. article 8.1: reconstruction,
2. article 8.2: emergency aid.

Besides emergency aid and reconstruction, the theory of change and evaluation questions also distinguish the early recovery phase. The early recovery phase is not recognised as such in budget article 8, and the activities and related budget are included under the direct support provided under article 8.1 (reconstruction). The establishment of the Integrity Chamber does not fall under budget article 8, even though it was a condition for the provision of aid, and will therefore not be included in the policy review. The establishment of the Integrity Chamber will, however, be described in the evaluation. By contrast, the strengthening of border control, another condition for the provision of aid, does fall under budget article 8 and will therefore be covered by the policy review.

2.2 Context and goal of the evaluation

Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba began at the end of 2017 and will continue on Saba and St Eustatius until 31 December 2021 and on St Maarten until 31 December 2025. Most of the reconstruction activities on St Maarten formally began when the Trust Fund commenced operations on 16 April 2018. A full policy evaluation therefore cannot be carried out at present as many activities still have to be completed. The policy review can be regarded as an intermediate step concerned principally with learning and identifying areas for improvement. The policy review will also account for the selection of activities and the expenditure already incurred. A final evaluation of the policy for the reconstruction of St Maarten (article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget) can be carried out after completion of the reconstruction activities on 31 December 2025. The final evaluation will be an ex-post evaluation with the primary goal of providing information on the end results of the reconstruction aid on all the islands and thus of the end results of the reconstruction policy.

The policy review will examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy conducted regarding article 8 in the period from September 2017 to 31 December 2021. The same period can be used when preparing the financial statement on completed and ongoing activities. The subject of the evaluation will be the activities implemented between September 2017 and the end of December 2021, whether or not they are completed by the end date.

The policy review will therefore comprise three parts:

Part I: emergency aid (including early recovery aid for St Maarten),
Part II: reconstruction of St Maarten (including direct support),
Part III: reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.

This component of the policy review will focus on part II: reconstruction of St Maarten (including direct support). As the activities for part II will continue until 31 December 2025, this part will be subject to a midterm review ahead of a full final evaluation of article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget after completion of the reconstruction programme. The study of part II will therefore focus on obtaining findings with a view to learning lessons and making recommendations for the remainder of the reconstruction programme.

2.3. Target group

The House of Representatives and the Senate, relevant ministries and the authorities on St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba that lent their cooperation.

2.4. Scope

The policy review will consider the policy conducted under policy article 8 of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the period from 17 September 2017 to 31 December 2021. The policy review of article 8 will not consider reconstruction activities funded from other ministries' budgets. The engagement's scope is confined to central government (ministries, agencies, etc.), significant (external) actors that are involved in the implementation of the aid and of course the beneficiaries on the islands. Information obtained by questioning the last two groups of actors will often be qualitative in nature.

2.5. Results

The project will deliver the following main products:

1. a midterm evaluation of the reconstruction of St Maarten (part II of the study), with a particular focus on learning and identifying what went well and potential areas for improvement so that recommendations can be made regarding the further performance of the Trust Fund. The policy review will also account for the selection of activities and the expenditure incurred.
2. A final report synthesising the outcomes of the policy evaluations of parts I and II with the midterm evaluation of part II.

2.6 Quality and process monitoring

An internal committee with an independent (external) chair, representatives of various line ministries that were/are involved in the reconstruction and a representative of DGKR itself has been appointed to monitor quality and the overall process. The independent expert also sits on the monitoring committee and will also fulfil his/her own function. The committee has an internal function comparable to that of a focus group, with members from policy departments and external parties. See also the explanation in section 5, 'Stakeholder roles'.

3. Problem definition and evaluation questions

See Appendix E (Letter to the House of Representatives on the study design) for the problem definition and evaluation questions.

4. Methodology

The policy review will consist chiefly of an ex-post synthesis study of the evaluations of individual policy instruments based on the three parts:

- Part I: emergency aid (including early recovery aid for St Maarten),
- Part II: reconstruction of St Maarten (including direct support),
- Part III: reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.

For the review of article 8.1 (reconstruction), part II on St Maarten will make use of periodic accounting reports, monitoring reports and other relevant reports prepared for this programme. Interviews will also be held with stakeholders. Not all the possible reports had been identified when these Terms of Reference were drawn up. This may influence the preparation of a detailed study design. When the Contract takes effect, the evaluator selected will receive a list of the available reports, and will further refine the study design in a concise (3-5 pages) inception report during the short inception phase. The reports and interviews will be analysed to establish how the project-based approach has contributed to the results achieved by the Trust Fund so far.

The method adopted for part II will focus on learning lessons and making recommendations for the remainder of the programme and will have more of the character of a midterm evaluation. This is because the reconstruction of St Maarten has not yet been completed. In due course, the final evaluation of part II can then be carried out after completion of the reconstruction activities for St Maarten (31 December 2025).

An external independent evaluator will be engaged to study part II using the knowledge and experience of the core team tasked with carrying out the policy review, consisting of staff from DGKR's reconstruction team. The main reason for this is that the core team is already working

closely with the main respondents and enjoys the confidence of the World Bank and stakeholders on St Maarten. This will be enhance the quality of the interviews. Furthermore, the core team's members regularly attend, or have attended, the meetings of the steering group and the Technical Working Group (TWG). This is a significant advantage as the reports are often summary in nature. Furthermore, the World Bank shares many valuable documents informally with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and it has said that it might not be able to share all these documents with an external evaluator. These reports cannot be shared and/or quoted in the study without the World Bank's permission. The study's independence is guaranteed by having an external evaluator carry it out with the assistance of the core team's knowledge and experience. Where possible, the core team will include all relevant World Bank documents relating to the performance of the reconstruction activities and other relevant sources in the evaluation.

Loans awarded under article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget can, depending on the purpose, be included in the evaluation, for example if they were awarded to promote a particular policy. In other cases, a description and explanation of whether or not a loan achieved its goal will suffice. The loan's goal will take account of the level at which the loan was awarded, for instance local.

The evaluation questions for part II of this review will be answered by means of a desk study and interviews.

- The desk study will focus on: a) the agreements made, including the Dutch Guiding Principles (see Appendix F), and the assessments made in the process leading up to them; b) reports on meetings of the steering group and the TWG; and c) other relevant documents.
- Interviews will be held with the three members of the steering group and the members of the TWG. Several interviews can also be held with other stakeholders, including those at the ministries on St Maarten, beneficiaries of the Trust Fund, and current and former staff at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations who were involved in making the agreements. Where feasible, interviews will be held in person (i.e. on site in St Maarten and Washington) as this will improve the quality of the information obtained. Digital interviews may also be held (via Skype, etc.) although this is not the preferred method. This depends on the development of the COVID-19 pandemic.

5. Stakeholder roles

5.1 Central government
Reconstruction is being coordinated by the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations but the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Housing, Welfare and Sport, the Ministry of Justice and Security and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management are also involved in the reconstruction.

5.2 External actors
A consultancy will be engaged to carry out the study and associated activities for parts I and III, and an external independent evaluator will be engaged to study part II and compile the final synthesis report, using the knowledge and experience of the core team, consisting of staff from DGKR's reconstruction team. The core team will provide input and take part in substantive meetings on the theory of change and analysis.

World Bank
The World Bank will provide access to public periodic accounting reports, monitoring reports and other reports prepared for this programme. Interviews can also be held with the World Bank.

Steering group and TWG
Reports on the meetings of the steering group and the TWG can be used in the desk study. Interviews can also be held with the three members of the steering group and the members of the TWG.

Other external actors
Several interviews can be held with other stakeholders, including those named in the

Methodology section above.

Quality and process monitoring
An internal committee with an independent (external) chair, representatives of various line ministries that were/are involved in the reconstruction, a representative of DGKR itself and an independent external expert has been appointed to monitor quality and the overall process.

External independent expert (see also Appendix E)
- After adoption of the final text, at least one external (academic) expert must prepare a written declaration that serves as an independent opinion on the preparation of the policy review and the way in which the policy review answered the key questions. This written declaration will be sent to the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom as a separate Appendix together with the final report and the policy response, via the Council's portal or otherwise.
- The external expert's task is to provide substantive and methodological comments and advice on the Terms of Reference, the individual studies and the final report, with a view to the adoption of the texts. The external expert will also inform the evaluation team of possible complications and political and other sensitivities of the study outcomes and report. The external expert's advice is purely advisory and is not binding.
- The external expert can give written notification if he or she does not agree with a report's contents or conclusions. If necessary, the report can include a statement presenting a dissenting opinion.

Recipients of the policy review results
The policy review's final synthesis report will be sent to the House of Representatives and the Senate, relevant ministries, the authorities on St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba that lent their cooperation, and the World Bank.

6. External independent evaluator

6.1 Role and responsibilities of the external independent evaluator
The external independent evaluator will lead the study of part II and will work with DGKR's core team tasked with the organisation and performance of the policy review as a whole. He/she is responsible for preparing the final report of the policy review, using the results of the study of part II and a separate report presenting the findings of the study of parts I and III.

He/she is partly responsible for providing updates on the progress of the policy review of part II. Like the progress of parts I and III of the policy review, the progress of the study of part II will be discussed during physical or virtual meetings of the monitoring committee, as will the draft final report on the policy review. The external independent evaluator will take part in these meetings.

6.2 Requirements regarding the external independent evaluator
The external independent evaluator must meet at least the following requirements regarding competences and relevant knowledge and experience:
- He/she must be independent of the study subject and of stakeholders involved in the policy review (no conflict of interest). The evaluation team must have no interest in the nature of the evaluation results.
- Academic education to at least masters level

6.3 Study proposal
Together with the core team, the selected evaluator will be in charge of the policy review and will further elaborate the tasks and responsibilities. This will culminate in a work plan setting out the tasks and responsibilities of the team members and the timetable.

Candidates for the position of external independent evaluator will be asked to submit a short study proposal meeting the following requirements:
- Understanding of the Terms of Reference and the evaluation requirements, as evidenced by a detailed evaluation strategy and methodology.
- A detailed timetable that fits in with the overall schedule for the policy review.

NB: The scope of the study (budget articles) may be expanded if the House of Representatives considers it necessary. The study design will not change, only the volume of the activities to be studied. If this happens, the budget and timetable will be amended accordingly.

7. Reports and timing

The policy review will consist chiefly of an ex-post synthesis study of the evaluations of individual policy instruments based on the three parts:
- Part I: emergency aid (including early recovery aid for St Maarten),
- Part II: reconstruction of St Maarten (including direct support),
- Part III: reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.

The reviews (studies) of articles 8.1 and 8.2 will be carried out separately, but there will be a single monitoring committee and independent expert. The studies will be separate because of the different nature of the reviews of the two articles. For both articles, it has been decided (in part) to engage a consultancy to perform the activities for parts I and III of the study and an external independent evaluator for the activities for part II and the final synthesis report. The core team will provide input and take part in the substantive meetings on the theory of change and analysis.

7.1 Report of findings of the policy review

The study of part II will produce the following reports:
- monthly reports on how the reports are progressing, submitted to the core team;
- a draft report on the study of part II submitted for discussion to the core team and the monitoring committee;
- the final report on the study of part II.

The final report on the overall policy review of parts I, II and III will produce the following reports:
- monthly reports on how the reports are progressing, submitted to the core team;
- during the study's inception phase, a brief (3-5 pages) proposal setting out the study design and strategy;
- a draft final report submitted for discussion to the core team, the monitoring committee and, in consultation with the core team, the local authorities on St Maarten, Saba and St Eustatius and the World Bank;
- the final report on the study of parts I, II and III.

In consultation with the core team tasked with designing and performing the policy review, the external independent evaluator will decide on the format of the final Dutch-language report. The Dutch-language report of the study findings of parts I and III will be published as an appendix to the final report on the policy review.

NB: In addition to answering the substantive questions of the policy review, the final report will contain:

Improvement section
The improvement section will consider the performance of the policy review in order to gain a better understanding of policy effectiveness and efficiency in the future.

Lower- and higher-funding variants
Finally, the policy review will include scenarios in which policy options are implemented with 20% less funding and 20% more funding.

7.2 Timing

The aim is to submit the review to the House no later than the final quarter of 2021.

Timetable for the policy review of article 8 of the Kingdom Relations budget, Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba	
Activity	**January 2021 – December 2022**
Engagement of consultancy (parts I + III) + independent evaluator (part II)	1 March 2021
Start of study of parts I + III	1 March 2021
Start of study of part II	1 March 2021
Fine-tuning of evaluation questions and methodology (inception phase)	1 April 2021
Delivery of draft inception report	1 April 2021
Feedback/approval of inception report	7 April 2021
Issue of first draft report on study of parts I + III	1 February 2022
Issue of first draft report on study of part II	1 March 2022
Written comments on the draft report on the study of parts I + III are provided to the evaluation team by the core team and local authorities on St Maarten (only emergency aid for St Maarten) and local authorities on Saba and St Eustatius (emergency aid and reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius). Comments on the draft report on the external evaluator's study of part II are provided by the World Bank. Copies of all comments are provided to the core team's leader (coordinator).	15 March 2022
After incorporation of any comments, second draft reports on the study of parts I + III and II are sent to the actors referred to above for comment.	1 April 2022
Response of the actors (no-objection basis).	7 April 2022
Monitoring committee discusses the draft reports on the study of parts I + III and II. Comments are provided to the evaluation team (study of parts I + III) and the external evaluator (study of part II).	15 April 2022
Incorporation of any comments and adoption of the reports.	1 May 2022
Start of the final report on the policy review (parts I + III and part II).	1 May 2022
First draft of final report on the policy review.	15 May 2022
The core team, local authorities on St Maarten (only emergency aid for St Maarten) and local authorities on Saba and St Eustatius (emergency aid and reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius) provide written comments on the draft final report on the study of parts I + III and part II to the external evaluator carrying out this study. Comments on the draft final report on the external evaluator's study of part II are provided by the World Bank. Copies of all comments are provided to the core team leader (coordinator).	1 June 2022
After incorporation of any comments on the second draft final report on the study of parts I + III and part II, the final report is sent to the actors named above for comment.	15 June 2022
Response of the actors (no-objection basis).	1 July 2022
Draft final report on the policy review is sent to the monitoring committee.	2 July 2022
Discussion of the draft final report on the policy review with the monitoring committee, after which any comments are incorporated.	7 July 2022
Written clearance of the definitive final report by the monitoring committee.	25 August 2022
Receipt/completion of the final report on the policy review	1 September 2022

2.2 Splitting of the Public Contract

This Public Contract will run parallel to the Terms of Reference Part I and Part III procedure and

relates to different aspects of the policy review. It has been decided to split the Public Contract because of substantive differences between the studies.

2.3 Duration of the Contract

We want to enter into a Contract with a single Supplier for the period from 1 March 2021 to 31 December 2022.

2.4 Requirements

The Requirements we have set for the performance of the Public Contract are listed below. By submitting a Tender you unconditionally accept these Requirements. If you do not meet all the Requirements, your Tender will be invalid and you will take no further part in the Contract Award Procedure.

Requirement 1: You declare that you meet the formal Requirements referred to in section 6.2.

Requirement 2: You accept the ARVODI 2018 and the draft Contract (Appendix A).

Requirement 3: You will deliver the draft final report on the study of part II no later than 1 May 2022.

Requirement 4: You will deliver the definitive final report on the study of part II no later than 1 September 2022.

Requirement 5: You will be available to answer any questions from 1 September 2022 to 31 December 2022.

WHAT IS IMPORTANT AND HOW WE ASSESS

3. Award criterion

The Contract will be awarded on the basis of best price-quality ratio. We explain this in further detail in the following section on the Award Subcriteria.

3.1. Award Subcriteria

The table below lists the Award Subcriteria for this Contract Award Procedure and the maximum number of points you can score. The Award Subcriteria are further explained in the following sections.

Award criterion: Best price-quality ratio		
Award Subcriteria	**Weighting**	**Maximum score**
Quality Award Subcriterion:		
• Quality Award Subcriterion 1: external independent evaluator Requirements	60%	600 points
• Quality Award Subcriterion 2: method and approach	40%	400 points
Total score for quality	**100%**	**1,000 points**

You must score at least 60% of the maximum number of points

If you score less than 60% of the maximum number of points for the quality Award Subcriteria, your Tender will be deemed inadequate and set aside. You will take no further part in this Contract Award Procedure. We will assess your Tender on price only if you score at least 60% of the maximum number of points for quality. In other words, you must score at least 60% x 1,000 points = 600 points to be eligible for the award.

3.2 Quality Award Subcriterion 1: external independent evaluator Requirements

Your response to this Award Subcriterion must provide further details on the consultant proposed to perform the Public Contract. It must include:

- details on the consultant, describing the extent of his/her expertise, experience and overall added value. You should also state the role of each team member;
- the consultant's CV. The CV should be no more than two sheets of A4. It should be appended separately to your Tender (in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR).

Your response will be assessed on:

- The consultant's demonstrable knowledge and experience of comparable activities, such as:
  a) relevant evaluation knowledge and experience of studying the efficiency and effectiveness of policy by means of synthesis studies, interviews and desk studies;
  b) knowledge and experience of evaluating multilateral partners and the performance of trust funds;
  c) knowledge of the administrative and constitutional relationships within the Kingdom (including the Caribbean parts);
  d) knowledge and experience of analysing and synthesising findings of progress reports, monitoring reports and evaluation reports; writing and communication skills;
  e) the consultant's academic qualifications and other relevant training.

3.3 Quality Award Subcriterion 2: method and approach

Your action plan must be clear, well-structured and readable. Your response must include:

- a detailed study plan;
- an explanation of the chosen study method;
- the Client's role in the study (substantive);

- a description of the products and services to be delivered;
- the opportunities and risks you foresee when performing the Public Contract and the management measures you will take.

Your response will be assessed on:
- the extent to which the risks are relevant to the Public Contract and the management measures described are appropriate to the risks and actually manage them;
- the extent to which your proposal displays creativity, analytical quality and vision.

Requirements regarding your response
Your response to the Award Subcriteria must not exceed 10 pages (excluding the covering letter and CV). Pages in excess of this maximum will not be assessed. The following requirements also apply:
- font: Verdana 9 pt.;
- line spacing: at least 12 pt.;
- including appendices.

Your answers to the questions must be given under the relevant Award Subcriterion. We will not assess references to other answers.

3.4 Best price-quality ratio: price Award Subcriterion

The price is the fixed total price for the Public Contract
The price must meet all Requirements in this Request for Tenders and Appendices. The price must include all guarantees, costs and discounts. We will not assess discounts, conditions or other information that is not requested. All prices must be in euros, excluding VAT.

State your price in Appendix 2
The Client has set a fixed total price for this Public Contract. This total price is €70,000 excluding VAT. If the total price of your Tender is exceeds this amount, your Tender will be set aside.

Your Tender will be assessed solely on quality. The Tender with the highest quality score will win this Public Award Procedure. No points can be scored for the price component.

4. Assessment of your Tender

This chapter explains how we will assess your Tender.

4.1 Quality assessment

Our assessment of the quality of your Tender will be expressed as a score
If your Tender meets all the Requirements, an assessment committee will assess your Tender and award a score. You can score points on each Award Subcriterion. The maximum number of points that can be scored on each Award Subcriterion and the relative weighting are described in section 3.1. The assessment will lead to a total score for each Tender. We will select the winner on the basis of the total score.

The score expresses the substantive assessment
The assessment committee will give a score for each Award Subcriterion. The assessors will give a score of between 0 and 10 in steps of two points. The table below explains the meaning of each score for the quality of your Tender.

10	The Tenderer's answers to the questions concerning this Award Subcriterion were excellent.
8	The Tenderer's answers to the questions concerning this Award Subcriterion were good.
6	The Tenderer's answers to the questions concerning this Award Subcriterion were adequate.
4	The Tenderer's answers to the questions concerning this Award Subcriterion were inadequate.
2	The Tenderer's answers to the questions concerning this Award Subcriterion were poor.
0	No score. The Tenderer ignored this Award Subcriterion or failed to consider all aspects of it.

Once the individual members of the assessment committee have awarded points, the assessment committee will meet to reach a consensus under the supervision of UBR|HIS's procurement adviser. The meeting will decide the final score for each Award Subcriterion for each Tenderer.

4.2 Price assessment

The Client has set a fixed total price for this Public Contract. This total price is €70,000 excluding VAT. If the total price of your Tender exceeds this amount, your Tender will be set aside.

Your Tender will be assessed solely on quality. The Tender with the highest quality score will win this Public Award Procedure.

4.3 Assessment of the best price-quality ratio

You will be given a total score for your Tender
For the sake of readability, your total score and your scores on each Award Subcriterion will be rounded to two decimal places.

If two or more total scores are equal, the Public Contract will be awarded to the Tenderer with the best score for quality
We will take into account the total scores for quality rounded to two decimal places. If two or more total scores for quality are equal, the Public Contract will be awarded to the

CONDUCT OF THE PROCEDURE AND HOW TO SUBMIT A TENDER

5. Conduct of the procedure

This chapter explains how the Contract Award Procedure will be conducted. It includes the timetable and an explanation of each step. It also names your Contact and explains how you can ask questions.

5.1 Limited bidding procedure

You have been selected for this Contract Award Procedure
We have invited three Suppliers to make an offer.

5.2 Contact

Your Contact is Rochelle Vriesde, UBR|HIS procurement adviser
All communications regarding this Contract Award Procedure must be addressed to your Contact. Communication will take place via the Contract Tender Management platform (CTM). If you approach other officials of the Contracting Authority about this Contract Award Procedure or attempt to influence them through other channels, we may exclude you from the procedure.

5.3 Timetable for the Contract Award Procedure

The timetable for the Contract Award Procedure is given below. The following sections provide a brief explanation of each activity.

Activity	**Deadline**
Publication of Request for Tenders	18 January 2021
Deadline for asking questions and reporting inconsistencies in the Request for Tenders including Appendices	**12.00**, 25 January 2021
Publication of Information Notice	29 January 2021
Submission of Tenders	**17.00**, 10 February 2021
Assessment of Tenders	15 February 2021
Announcement of assessment result	18 February 2021
Deadline for objections	28 February 2021
Award of the Contract	1 March 2021
Expected start date of the Contract	1 March 2021

5.4 Questions and inconsistencies

This section explains what to do if anything in the Request for Tenders is unclear.

Submit your questions via CTM
If you have any questions about the substance or conduct of this Contract Award Procedure or have found inconsistencies, ambiguities or anything that is objectionable, report it via the messages module in CTM. To do so, complete Appendix B (Question form for Information Notice) and attach it to your message. We will not answer questions asked in any other way.

All questions and reports of inconsistencies must be submitted by the deadline given in the timetable
This will ensure that your questions will be answered. Questions submitted after the deadline will be answered only if we think the information concerned is important to all Suppliers. If inconsistencies, ambiguities and anything that is objectionable are reported after the deadline, in principle we will no longer amend the Request for Tenders. You cannot derive any rights from inconsistencies that you do

not report or report after the deadline. We make every effort to prevent inconsistencies in the Tender Documents.

Your questions and suggestions should be submitted anonymously
Questions should not include:

- the names of Economic Operators;
- product names;
- other names relating to your organisation.

We will publish all questions and answers in CTM
All questions and answers will be included in the Information Notice. All Suppliers will therefore receive the same information. You will always be notified by email when we publish the questions and answers. We will publish the Information Notice no later than the deadline given in the timetable.

Information will be provided via CTM only
You cannot derive any rights from information received in any other way, not even if the information is provided by one of our officials or representatives.

The Information Notice always takes precedence
In the event of inconsistencies between the Information Notice and the Request for Tenders, the Information Notice takes precedence. Where several Information Notices have been published and there are inconsistencies between them, the most recent Information Notice takes precedence.

5.5 Submission of Tenders

You must submit your Tender before the deadline given in the timetable
You can submit Tenders only via CTM. Tenders submitted after the deadline or not via CTM will be declared invalid. More information on how to submit Tenders is provided in chapter 6.

5.6 Announcement of the Award Decision

The Supplier to which we will award the Public Contract will be announced no later than the deadline given in the timetable
You will receive an email via CTM. You will find the Award Decision in the messages module in CTM. The Award Decision will state:

- which Supplier will be awarded the Public Contract;
- your score, with an explanation for each Award Subcriterion;
- the score on each Award Subcriterion achieved by the Supplier that will be awarded the Public Contract;
- a description of the suspensive period, i.e. the period in which you can lodge an objection to the decision.

Please note: You cannot derive any rights from the Award Decision
If the Award Decision is in your favour you will, as a rule, be awarded the Public Contract. However, at this point in the Contract Award Procedure we can still decide to award the Public Contract to another Supplier or decide not to award the Public Contract at all. The announcement of the Award Decision does not therefore constitute acceptance of an offer. You cannot derive any rights from the Award Decision and you have no right to compensation on the basis of the Award Decision.

You have a right to perform the Public Contract only once the Contract has been signed.

Certain information may sometimes be excluded from the Award Decision
We will not disclose information if this:

- would be contrary to any statutory regulation;
- would be contrary to the public interest;
- could harm an Economic Operator’s lawful commercial interests;
- could distort fair competition among Economic Operators.

5.7 Suspensive period and objections

The suspensive period lasts 10 calendar days. You may lodge an objection to the Award Decision during this period. Following the suspensive period, we are free to conclude a Contract.

Before lodging an objection, always get in touch with your Contact. Your Contact will make an appointment with you to discuss your objection. Use the CTM messages module for this purpose.

5.8 Complaints procedure

You may make a complaint if:

- you think we have not complied with laws and regulations;
- you think we have discriminated, acted unfairly, did not award the Public Contract transparently or set unreasonable Requirements.

Complaints should be emailed to klachtenmeldpuntHIS@rijksoverheid.nl
The email should clearly state that you are making a complaint and specify the complaint's nature. Your complaint will be dealt with in accordance with the advisory report on complaints settlement. More information is available (in Dutch) on the website of the public procurement expertise centre.

A complaint is not a request for further information
The purpose of making a complaint is to show that you do not agree with the conduct of the Contract Award Procedure. Do not make a complaint in order to obtain further information. The Contract Award Procedure provides enough opportunity to ask questions or seek clarification.

If you make a complaint, the Contract Award Procedure will usually continue
We will suspend the Contract Award Procedure only if we find it necessary to do so.

5.9 Reservations of the Contracting Authority

We may terminate this Contract Award Procedure at any time
We may terminate the procedure even after the Public Contract has been awarded to a Tenderer. We can decide not to award the Public Contract or to terminate the Contract Award Procedure in full or for a particular lot. If we decide to do so, you will be notified via CTM.

We do not reimburse costs
All costs incurred for this Contract Award Procedure are for your own account. Any financial losses that may arise if you are not awarded the Public Contract or if the Contract Award Procedure is terminated are also for your own account.

6. How to tender

6.1 Tender via CTM

Tender via CTM
UBR|HIS has opted to use the Complete Tender Management (CTM) tool to support the Contract Award Procedure. CTM is an online electronic tendering platform and contract management system.

CTM is ISO 27001 compliant. ISO 27001 is an information security standard. It lays down requirements relating to the general operational risks of establishing, implementing, operating, controlling, assessing, maintaining and improving a documented Information Security Management System (ISMS). For more information, see www.ctmsolution.nl.

CTM platform manual for Suppliers
Appendix C to this Request for Tenders includes the CTM manual for Suppliers.

Help with technical questions about the CTM platform
If you have any technical questions about the CTM platform, contact the CTM Solution help desk on +31 (0)20 670 8500 (during office hours from 08.00 to 18.00) or at helpdesk@ctmsolution.nl.

Further provision
You are personally responsible for organising and managing authorisations in CTM so that you respond to requests for tenders in good time. We are not liable for:

- disruptions relating to CTM;
- requests for tenders not being received by the Supplier's correct contact in CTM, if, for instance, you have not allocated the necessary authorisations;
- your email security (firewall, spam filters) not accepting email notifications from CTM. You are responsible for this yourself. Make sure you can receive emails from info@ctmsolution.nl.

6.2 Formal Tender Requirements

Your Tender must meet the formal Requirements
If you do not meet one or more of the formal Requirements, your Tender will be invalid and you will take no further part in the Contract Award Procedure. By submitting a Tender in this Contract Award Procedure, you agree to everything stated in this Request for Tenders including the Appendices. The formal Requirements are:

- you must submit your tender in good time;
- you must provide all the information requested;
- you must use the forms in this Request for Tenders and the Appendices. You must not make any changes to the standard text of these forms;
- you must not attach any conditions or reservations to your Tender;
- the Tender must be duly signed, i.e. by someone with proper authorisation;
- the Tender must be valid for 60 days after the closure of the submission period;
- all communication concerning the Tender must be in Dutch. All communication during the term of the Contract must be in Dutch, too.

Your Tender is invalid and you will take no further part in the Contract Award Procedure if:

- your Tender does not meet all the Requirements;
- the price bid form of your Tender contains no value, a negative value or 0 and the Tender does not meet the other price-related conditions;
- one or more of the grounds for exclusion apply to you;
- your Tender scores less than 60% of the maximum number of points on the quality Award Subcriterion.

We will treat your information in confidence
We will not provide your information to third parties, even if you are not awarded the Public Contract. We do not disclose information relating to the award of a public procurement contract if publication of

that information:

- would be contrary to any statutory regulation;
- would be contrary to the public interest;
- could harm an Economic Operator's lawful commercial interests;
- could distort fair competition among Economic Operators.

You must submit the following documents:

1. covering letter;
2. responses to the Award Subcriteria;
3. CV submitted as a separate appendix in accordance with the GDPR;
4. other points for consideration (where applicable);
5. Appendices 1 to 3 as referred to on page 3 of the Request for Tenders.

7. Conditions

If you are awarded the Public Contract we will conclude a Contract with you. This chapter explains what you will agree to and the associated rights and duties.

7.1 Contract and government terms and conditions

We will lay down your and our rights and duties in the Contract
The General Government Terms and Conditions for Public Service Contracts (ARVODI 2018) form part of the Contract. We do not accept delivery conditions, payment conditions or other general conditions on your part and they are explicitly not part of the Contract we conclude with you.

The duration of the Contract is from 1 March 2021 to 31 December 2022.

7.2 Invoicing

Invoices are to be submitted on a monthly basis in arrears (80%). The outstanding invoices (20%) will be settled on completion of the final report.

E-invoicing
Invoices must be submitted electronically. However, you may choose the channel you use to submit e-invoices yourself. Information on the options available to submit e-invoices is provided in the brochure entitled 'E-factureren Rijksoverheid' (Central Government e-Invoicing, Appendix D, in Dutch). Suppliers have many options for submitting e-invoices to central government.

Glossary

Some terms recur frequently in this Request for Tenders and the Appendices. We have defined the most important terms below, so that you know exactly what they mean before submitting a Tender and perhaps signing a Contract.

Contracting Authority	The State of the Netherlands. The specific participants in this Contract Award Procedure are named in section 2.1 of this Request for Tenders.
Tender Documents	All documents prepared or referred to by the Contracting Authority to describe or define aspects of the Contract Award Procedure or the Public Contract.
Public Procurement Act 2012	Act of 1 November 2012, laying down new public procurement rules (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2012, 542).
Appendix	Any document with the word 'Appendix' in its title in this Request for Tenders or in related documents in CTM. An Appendix is part of the Request for Tenders.
Contact	UBR|HIS Ms Rochelle Vriesde Procurement adviser Email address: Rochelle.Vriesde@rijksoverheid.nl
CTM	Complete Tender Management, the electronic tendering platform to be used for the purposes of this Request for Tenders.
Requirements	Requirements in the Request for Tenders that you and/or your Tender must meet to be eligible for the award.
Award Criterion	The criterion on which the Award Decision is based.
Award Decision	The intention to award the Public Contract to a Supplier. This means that we intend to conclude a Contract with that Economic Operator.
Tenderer	An Economic Operator that has submitted a Tender in response to this Request for Tenders. A potential Tenderer is an Economic Operator that has registered in CTM and possibly has the intention of participating in this Contract Award Procedure.
Tender	The offer made by a Tenderer in response to this Request for Tenders.
Supplier	An Economic Operator that is invited to submit a bid in this Request for Tenders.
Information Notice	The document containing: - our answers to questions asked by you and other potential Tenderers, and - amendments and additions to the Request for Tenders. The Information Notice is one of the Tender Documents.
Request for Tenders	This request to Suppliers to submit a Tender for this Public Contract.

Contract Award Procedure	This public procurement procedure, taking the form of a limited bidding procedure as referred to in part 1.2.4 of the Public Procurement Act 2012.
Economic Operator	A Supplier, contractor or service provider, as defined in section 1.1 of the Public Procurement Act 2012.
Public Contract	The public contract that you can tender for by means of this Contract Award Procedure. We follow the definition of public contract in section 1.1 of the Public Procurement Act 2012.
Client	The legal person with which the Contractor concludes the Contract.
Contractor	The Supplier with which the Client concludes a Contract for the purposes of this Contract Award Procedure.
Contract	A written document laying down the contractual agreements between the Client and the Contractor. The draft Contract is included in Appendix A
Award Subcriteria/ Award Subcriterion	A further elaboration of the Award Criterion.
UBR|HIS	The organisation overseeing the Contract Award Procedure on behalf of the Contracting Authority. For more information, see: http://ubrijk.nl/his.

ANNEX II

Letter to Parliament
21 September 2020

Letter of 21 September 2020 from State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations Raymond Knops to the House of Representatives on the study design for the policy review of article 8 of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget

By means of this letter, I am informing you of the design of the policy review of article 8, Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba, of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (chapter IV of the national budget), which will be sent to the House in 2021, and the evaluation questions the policy review will address. This letter honours the motion submitted by Mark Harbers (Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2014-2015, 34 000, no. 36) that the House should be informed in advance of the design and evaluation questions of policy reviews and that the House should be given the opportunity to influence the design and questions.

The goal of the policy review of article 8 is to gain an understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy conducted between 17 September 2017 and 1 September 2020. The review will meet the quality requirements laid down in the Order on Periodic Policy Evaluations. This is reflected in the study design and questions, for which I refer to the appendix.

This letter has been delayed by the decision to involve an independent evaluator in the policy review (see the study design) in order to guarantee the review's independence.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Study design of the policy review of budget article 8 of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget

Appendix number	1
Date	21 September 2020
Our reference	2020-0000438233

Introduction

Hurricanes Irma and Maria swept over St Maarten, Saba and St Eustatius with destructive force in September 2017, devastating large parts of the islands. The Netherlands' initial response was to release a total of €55 million in acute humanitarian emergency aid for the three islands. Following this initial emergency aid, attention turned first to the early recovery phase of the islands, focusing on essential projects that could begin quickly. A plan for the reconstruction of the three islands was also drawn up during the early recovery phase. The Dutch government has made €550 million available for the reconstruction of St Maarten (comprising €80 million in direct support and €470 million through a World Bank Trust Fund) and €67 million for the reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius. This €67 million was transferred in its entirety to various ministries from the Ministry of Finance's supplementary item.

To this end, article 8 was added to the Kingdom Relations budget:
- article 8.1: reconstruction (including direct support),
- article 8.2: emergency aid.

The budget for 2019 stated that the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations would commence a policy review of article 8 in 2020. The policy review will start in 2020 and be submitted to the House in 2021.

Goal

The aim of the policy review is twofold. On the one hand, it must give the fullest possible picture of the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure already incurred for the reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba and, on the other, it must describe the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation structure put in place for the reconstruction of St Maarten, in theory and in practice.

Reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba began at the end of 2017 and will continue on Saba and St Eustatius until 31 December 2021 and on St Maarten until 31 December 2025. Most of the reconstruction activities on St Maarten formally began when the Trust Fund commenced operations on 16 April 2018. A full policy evaluation therefore cannot be carried out at present as many activities still have to be completed. The policy review can be regarded as an intermediate step concerned principally with learning lessons and identifying areas for improvement. The policy review will also account for the selection of activities and the expenditure already incurred. A final evaluation of the policy for the reconstruction of St Maarten, Saba and St Eustatius (article 8 of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget) can be carried out after completion of the reconstruction activities on 31 December 2025.

Questions

The policy review will examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy conducted regarding article 8 in the period from September 2017 to 1 September 2020.

The policy review will therefore consist of three parts:
- Part I: emergency aid (including early recovery aid for St Maarten),
- Part II: reconstruction of St Maarten (including direct support),
- Part III: reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.

As the activities for part II and part III will continue until 31 December 2025, these parts will be subject to a midterm review ahead of a full final evaluation of article 8 after completion of the reconstruction programme. The study of parts II and III will therefore focus on obtaining findings with a view to learning lessons and making recommendations for the remainder of the reconstruction programme.

The activities for part I, provision of emergency aid, have been completed and will be studied as part of the policy evaluation in order to account for the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of funds.

The policy review will address the following questions:

General questions for parts I, II and III:
1. What article(s) (or article part(s)) is/are considered in the policy review?
2. Where applicable, when will the other article parts be reviewed?
3. What prompted the policy? Is the cause still relevant?
4. What is central government's responsibility?
5. What is the nature of and relationship between the instruments used?
6. What expenditure is associated with the policy, including costs in other areas and for other parties?
7. What is the justification for the expenditure? How does it relate to the volume/use and price/tariff components?
8. What evaluations (with sources) have been carried out, how was the policy evaluated and for what reasons?
9. What policy components have not yet been evaluated? Including an explanation of whether or not the effectiveness and efficiency of policy can be evaluated in the future.
10. To what extent can opinions be expressed on the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy field based on the available study material?
11. Have the policy goals been achieved?
    i See questions for part I, emergency aid.
    ii See questions for part II, reconstruction of St Maarten.
    iii See questions for part III, reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.
12. How effective has the policy been? Have there been positive and/or negative spinoff effects?
    i See questions for part I, emergency aid.
    ii See questions for part II, reconstruction of St Maarten.
    iii See questions for part III, reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.
13. How efficient has the policy been?
    i See questions for part I, emergency aid.
14. What measures can be taken to increase efficiency and effectiveness?
    i See questions for part I, emergency aid.
    ii See questions for part II, reconstruction of St Maarten, only effectiveness.
    iii See questions on part III, reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius, only effectiveness.
15. In the event of significantly lower funds being available (about 20% less funding for the policy article(s)), what policy options are available?
    a) The improvement section will briefly consider the performance of the policy review in order to obtain a better understanding of the effectiveness and efficiency of policy in the future.
    b) Finally, the policy review will include scenarios in which policy options are carried out with

20% less funding (saving) or with 20% more funding (spending increase).

Questions for part I: Emergency aid
a) Has the crisis structure that has been established made it possible to provide emergency aid efficiently?
b) On what criteria (including design versus practicability) were the projects selected for the early recovery phase? Were those criteria relevant in view of people's needs and based on a needs assessment?
c) Did the projects selected for the early recovery phase help put the right conditions in place for the reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba? Did they do so efficiently?
d) What lessons can we learn for future hurricane-related crisis situations?

Questions for part II: Reconstruction of St Maarten
e) What agreements were made regarding accountability in relation to the Trust Fund and the part played by the World Bank, and what were the underlying reasons for those agreements?
f) To what extent were the agreements honoured in practice? Were the agreements practicable? On what points were departures made from the agreements and why?
g) Does this structure ensure (in theory and in practice) that the funds are spent on the right projects and programmes and on a timely basis (effectiveness and efficiency)?
h) Does the structure give the Netherlands enough influence (in theory and in practice) to ensure that the Dutch Guiding Principles are observed?

Questions for part III: Reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius
i) How has the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations fulfilled the role of coordinating the reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius and how did this role contribute to achieving the government-wide goals (effectiveness and efficiency)?
j) Did the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations' use of funds and measures achieve the intended goals? How effective and efficient were those funds?
k) What role did/do the other ministries play regarding the aid?

To answer question 6 in full, information is needed on both public and private local contributions to Saba, St Eustatius and St Maarten. A full understanding is not considered possible, partly because many reconstruction activities are being/will be financed privately. The possibility of taking a different approach will be studied. This approach will entail interviews with key informants and studies of government documents (Saba, St Eustatius and St Maarten) containing information on what has been financed from public funds. Such information can then be checked against the original plans and financial projections.

Scope of budget article 8

The review will consider the policy conducted under policy article 8 of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget in the period from 17 September 2017 to 1 September 2020. It will not include reconstruction activities funded from the budgets of other ministries.

General goal
Coordination of the reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius and of the Netherlands' contribution to the reconstruction of St Maarten following the damage caused by hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017.

Role and responsibility
Hurricanes Irma and Maria left a trail of devastation across the Caribbean region in September 2017. Within the Kingdom, the public bodies of Saba and St Eustatius and the country of St Maarten were affected.

Reconstruction is being coordinated by the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, and the Ministry of Infrastructure and

Water Management are also involved in the reconstruction projects, besides the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The projects funded from the budgets of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management are not included in the policy review.

The State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations is financing part of the cost of the reconstruction of St Maarten through the reconstruction fund until 31 December 2025. This contribution is linked to political conditions agreed with St Maarten: the establishment of an Integrity Chamber and the strengthening of border control. The Netherlands will strictly monitor compliance with these conditions during reconstruction.

The main funding pathway for the reconstruction of St Maarten involves a Trust Fund set up by the World Bank. Both the Netherlands and St Maarten sit in the steering group that manages the Trust Fund. The Netherlands' priorities are economic development and accessibility, the waste problem and good governance. The Netherlands will also provide direct support for the reconstruction of St Maarten outside the Trust Fund. It will contribute, for instance, to the cost of law enforcement. At an earlier stage, the Netherlands directly contributed to emergency aid for St Maarten and to certain projects in the transitional phase in anticipation of the Trust Fund coming into operation.

Budget article 8 consists of two budget items that will be included in the policy review (see also table 1):

1. article 8.1: reconstruction
2. article 8.2: emergency aid

Besides emergency aid and reconstruction, the theory of change and evaluation questions also distinguish the early recovery phase. The early recovery phase is not recognised as such in budget article 8, and the activities and related budget are included under the direct support provided from article 8.1 (reconstruction).

Although it is a condition for the provision of aid, the establishment of the Integrity Chamber does not fall under article 8 and will therefore not be included in the policy review.

Table 1: Multiyear Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget, policy article 8

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget, policy article (in thousands of euros)		**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**
Art. no.	**Commitments**	**€ 28,103**	**€ 331,958**	**€ 24,362**	**€ -**
	Expenditure	**€ 21,491**	**€ 338,226**	**€ 21,222**	**€ -**
	Of which legally required (percentage)				**0%**
8.1	**Reconstruction**	**€ -**	**€ 319,304**	**€ 21,222**	**€ -**
	Grants	**€ -**	**€ -**	**€ 1,230**	**€ -**
	Miscellaneous grants	€ -	€ -	€ 1,230	€ -
	Loans	**€ -**	**€ 38,579**	**€ 13,245**	**€ -**
	Liquidity support for St Maarten	€ -	€ 38,579	€ -	€ -
	Bridging credit, St Maarten airport	€ -	€ -	€ 13,245	€ -
	Engagements	**€ -**	**€ 134**	**€ 491**	
	Reconstruction of St Maarten	€ -	€ 134	€ 491	€ -
	Contributions to local governments	**€ -**	**€ 11,842**	**€ 6,123**	
	St Maarten Police Force	€ -	€ 3,358	€ 300	€ -
	Reconstruction of St Eustatius	€ -	€ 3,463	€ 5,823	€ -
	Reconstruction of St Maarten	€ -	€ 250	€ -	€ -
	Reconstruction of Saba	€ -	€ 3,861	€ -	€ -
	Border control, St Maarten	€ -	€ 910	€ -	€ -
	Contributions to national and international organisations	**€ -**	**€ 268,749**	**€ 133**	
	Reconstruction of St Maarten	€ -	€ 6,748	€ 133	€ -
	World Bank	€ -	€ 262,001	€ -	€ -

8.2	**Emergency aid**	**€ 21,491**	**18,922**	**-**	**-**
	Engagements	**€ 6,861**	**425**	**-**	**-**
	Emergency aid	€ 6,861	€ 425	€ -	€ -
	Contributions to national and international organisations	**€ -**	**1,617**	**-**	**-**
	Emergency aid, St Maarten	€ -	€ 33	€ -	€ -
	Emergency aid, St Eustatius and Saba	€ -	€ 1,584	€ -	€ -
	Contributions to agency administrative costs	**€ -**	**-**	**-**	**-**
	Central Government Real Estate Agency (reconstruction contribution)	€ -	€ -	€ -	€ -
	Contributions to other budget chapters	**€ 14,630**	**16,880**	**-**	**-**
	Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management	€ 6,350	€ -	€ -	€ -
	Ministry of Defence	€ -	€ 16,837	€ -	€ -
	Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport	€ 1,682	€ -	€ -	€ -
	Ministry of Justice and Security	€ 5,444	€ 43	€ -	€ -
	Ministry of Education, Culture and Science	€ 836	€ -	€ -	€ -
	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	€ 318	€ -	€ -	€ -
	Revenue		**1,467**	**-**	**-**

Notes
1. The activities financed from budget article 8 began in September 2017.
2. The article 8.2 emergency aid contributed to other budget chapters is included in the policy review.
3. The contributions for the reconstruction of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba in the budgets of other ministries will not be included in the policy review as they have not yet been completed. These reconstruction activities can be evaluated in the final policy review in due course.
4. The reconstruction activities on Saba and St Eustatius (€67 million) have not yet been completed and will continue until 31 December 2021.
5. The St Maarten Trust Fund, which will provide up to €470 million for the reconstruction of St Maarten, commenced operations on 16 April 2018. Most of the activities have not yet been completed. The aim is to complete these activities by 31 December 2025.
6. The activities funded from the €80 million provided in direct support have not yet been completed and will continue until 31 December 2021.

The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management are involved, besides the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Ministry of Defence was and is also closely involved in the emergency aid and reconstruction. These ministries are therefore also involved in the policy review and are represented in the associated monitoring committee.

Budget flexibility 2020

This article does not include a budget for 2020. The portion of the 2019 budget that was not spent during that year will be available in 2020. Depending on developments in 2019, funds will be transferred from Ministry of Finance's supplementary item to the Kingdom Relations budget for the account of the Trust Fund managed by the World Bank.

As there has still been no expenditure under this article in 2020, 0% of the article 8 budgets is legally required. This article has a full year-end margin. No expenditure has therefore been budgeted for 2020.

Theory of change

The general theory underlying this policy relates to the alleviation of immediate needs following a natural or other disaster (acute emergency aid to provide medical care, food, drinking water and temporary shelter) followed by the early recovery phase, in which the most essential social and economic services are restored. These two phases are followed by the reconstruction phase to

restore the pre-disaster situation. The reconstruction phase also considers whether and to what extent services should be restored in such a way that they are better than before the disaster, including in a future disaster ('build back better'). For aid to be successful, it is important for these three phases to be properly planned and implemented.

The total contribution of €550 million for reconstruction is subject to two conditions that St Maarten agreed to in December 2017 as an independent country within the Kingdom: the establishment of an Integrity Chamber and the strengthening of border control. The Netherlands will strictly monitor compliance with these conditions during reconstruction. Since 2010, Saba and St Eustatius have had the status of public bodies (analogous to municipalities) within the Caribbean Netherlands. It was therefore not necessary to conclude separate agreements with these two islands to provide the aforementioned €67 million for their reconstruction.

Emergency aid & early recovery

The Netherlands' initial response was to release a total of €55 million in emergency aid for the three islands. Following this initial emergency aid, attention turned first to the early recovery phase of the islands, focusing on essential projects that could begin quickly and direct benefit the most vulnerable groups, such as children and the elderly. For instance, projects were launched to repair houses in order to provide short-term shelter to these vulnerable groups, and psychosocial assistance was also provided. Measures were also taken to create jobs through the provision of microcredits to new and recovering businesses and to encourage innovative entrepreneurship in cooperation with Dutch startups.

Reconstruction of St Maarten

A considerable proportion of the €550 million was placed in a Trust Fund managed by the World Bank. The Netherlands has made up to €470 million available to the Trust Fund. As an independent expert, the World Bank has advised St Maarten on the preparation of an integrated National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). The NRRP is a step-by-step plan for the reconstruction of St Maarten.

The Trust Fund will finance programmes and projects based on the NRRP that require public funding. The projects must meet the World Bank's standard requirements on the integrity, regularity and efficiency of expenditure. The Dutch Guiding Principles (DGP) apply to the activities financed from the Trust Fund.

The DGP are non-binding guidelines regarding expenditure of Trust Fund resources by the World Bank and third parties. In essence, they require the Dutch funds to contribute to the recovery/reconstruction of St Maarten where necessary. The motto is to 'build back better': all new buildings must be sustainable and capable of withstanding category 5 hurricanes. Furthermore, the DGP include several principles such as necessity, complementarity, suitability, effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. They also set specific policy goals, such as sustainable waste processing and water treatment, guaranteed access to St Maarten and good governance. These specific policy goals are extremely desirable but are not binding.

Reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius

The government-wide strategy for the reconstruction of the public bodies of Saba and St Eustatius is being coordinated by the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The State Secretary has also provided funds from the ministry's budget. The ministry is therefore contributing to the recovery and hurricane-proofing of homes on St Eustatius and Saba. On St Eustatius, work to stabilise the eroding cliff on which Fort Oranje is located began in 2018.

Method

The policy review will consist chiefly of an ex-post synthesis study of the evaluations of individual policy instruments based on the three parts:

- Part I: emergency aid (including early recovery aid for St Maarten),
- Part II: reconstruction of St Maarten (including direct support),

- Part III: reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius.

Several evaluations for part III, reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius, have already been carried out for the policy review of article 8.1 (reconstruction). For the review of part II, reconstruction of St Maarten, periodic accounting reports, monitoring reports and other reports prepared for this programme will be studied. Interviews will also be held with stakeholders. The reports and interviews will be analysed to establish how the project-based approach has contributed to the results achieved by the Trust Fund so far.

For the review of article 8.2 (emergency aid), several evaluations have already been carried out for part I; see the section on 'Evaluations and other documents' below.

All article 8's policy components are therefore covered.

The implementation method and study approach differ from one study component to another.

An external consultancy with experience of evaluations of crisis management, acute emergency aid and reconstruction following natural disasters will be engaged to study parts I and III (emergency aid and reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius). The core reconstruction team of the Directorate-General for Kingdom Relations (DGKR), which is responsible for the performance of the policy review, does not have sufficient expertise in these areas.

The study of part I of the policy review will focus on learning lessons for effective action in future crises and accounting for the efficient use of the funds provided.

The study of part III will largely take the form of a midterm evaluation to obtain important findings with a view to learning lessons and making recommendations for the remainder of the programme. This is because funding of the reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius will continue until the end of 2021. Funding for St Maarten will continue until the end of 2025 owing to the arrangement with the World Bank. In due course the final evaluation of part III can then be carried out together with the final evaluation of part II.

It is more efficient to have the same consultancy evaluate part III rather than the core team tasked with the policy review. The researchers will examine to what extent emergency aid and reconstruction complement each other.

The method for part II, like that for part III, will focus on learning lessons and making recommendations for the remainder of the programme and will have more of the character of a midterm evaluation. The reason for this is that the reconstruction of St Maarten has not yet been completed. In due course, the final evaluation of part III can then be carried out together with the final evaluation of part II.

An external independent evaluator will be engaged to study part II, with the support of the core team, consisting of staff from DGKR's reconstruction team. The main reason for this is that the core team is already working closely with the main respondents and enjoys the confidence of the World Bank and stakeholders on St Maarten. This will enhance the quality of the interviews. Furthermore, the core team's members regularly attend, or have attended, the meetings of the steering group and the Technical Working Group (TWG). This is a significant advantage as the reports are often summary in nature. Furthermore, the World Bank shares many valuable documents informally with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and it has said that it might not be able to share all these documents with an external consultancy. The core team's involvement can nevertheless make this possible. The study's independence is guaranteed by having an external evaluator carry it out with assistance from the core team.

Parts I and III
The core team will decide on the method to be used in consultation with the consultancy engaged. A consultancy will be asked to make an initial proposal. The joint decision on the method will

ensure that the approach matches the evaluation questions by combining the consultancy's expertise with the core team's knowledge of the islands and the reconstruction process.

Part II
The evaluation questions for part II of this review will be addressed by means of a desk study and interviews.

- The **desk study** will focus on: a) the agreements made, including the Dutch Guiding Principles, and the assessments made in the process leading up to them; b) reports on meetings of the steering group and the TWG; and c) other relevant documents.
- **Interviews** will be held with the three members of the steering group and the members of the TWG. Several interviews will also be held with other stakeholders, including those at the ministries on St Maarten, beneficiaries of the Trust Fund, and current and former staff at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations who were involved in making the agreements. Where feasible, interviews will be held in person (i.e. on site in St Maarten and Washington) as this will improve the quality of the information obtained. Digital interviews may also be held (via Skype, etc.) although this is not the preferred method. Interviewees must be made aware that the information they provide during the interviews will be made public.

As noted above, the reviews (studies) of articles 8.1 and 8.2 will be carried out separately, but there will be a single monitoring committee and independent adviser. The studies will be separate because of the different nature of the reviews of the two articles. For both articles, it has been decided (in part) to engage one or more consultancies to carry out the activities. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will provide input and take part in substantive meetings on the theory of change and analysis. The study findings of the entire policy review will be presented in a final synthesis report.

Improvement section
The improvement section will consider the performance of the policy review in order to gain a better understanding of policy effectiveness and efficiency in the future.

Lower- and higher-funding variants
Finally, the policy review will include scenarios in which policy options are implemented with 20% less funding and 20% more funding.

Quality assurance

A committee has been appointed to monitor the quality and progress of the review. It is made up of representatives of the ministries involved in budget article 8.

The committee is chaired by Sjef IJzermans. Mr IJzermans is the Netherlands' former ambassador to Bangladesh, frequently worked with the World Bank during his time as an economic attaché to the World Bank at the Dutch embassy in Washington DC and can therefore accurately gauge the various political sensitivities of the parties concerned. He also has a wealth of experience chairing various advisory committees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere.

An independent expert will be involved in the policy review of article 8. The independent expert will oversee the quality of the study methods, partly by participating in the monitoring committee's meetings, and will express an opinion on the quality of the policy review. The independent adviser was also involved in the preparation of the study design and advised on it.

Ted Kliest will act as independent adviser for the policy review of article 8. Mr Kliest has more than 25 years' experience of organising and performing evaluations and policy reviews. As a senior evaluator at the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he headed the policy review of the aid provided by the Netherlands following the earthquake on Haiti and the policy review of Dutch support for fragile states. He was also involved in evaluations relating to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Since his retirement in 2014, Mr Kliest has worked

as an independent quality adviser in the fields of evaluations and evaluation studies.

Timeline
The aim is to submit the review to the House no later than the final quarter of 2021.

Evaluations and other documents

- Administration Arrangement with the Government of the Netherlands for Contribution to TF073024
- Operating Procedure for the Administration Arrangement
- Guiding Principles of the Netherlands Regarding the Execution of the Trust Fund for the Recovery of St Maarten
- Reports on all meetings of the steering group and TWG
- Project proposals for the early recovery phase
- Accounts and reports of the parties implementing the early recovery phase
- Internal documents of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (documents provided to ministers and state secretaries, internal emails between members of the reconstruction team)
- Any internal evaluation or progress reports of the World Bank on the reconstruction of St Maarten.
- Communication between the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and other ministries
- The outcomes of the external study
- Documents on Saba and St Eustatius
- Evaluation by the Hurricane Irma National Crisis Organisation (COT)
- Other studies of central government's response to natural disasters in the Caribbean Netherlands, such as Hurricane Louis in 1996
- Any studies already made of the crisis organisation in the region and of the further development of the Regional Crisis Management Platform (RPC)

Other sources will be identified in the request and the analysis phase. Transcriptions of the interviews with members of the steering group and the TWG and external parties will also be studied. These sources will become available in the course of the policy review.

ANNEX III

Letter to Parliament
17 December 2020

Letter of 17 December 2020 from State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations Raymond Knops to the House of Representatives replying to written questions submitted on 4 November 2020 by the Permanent Committee on Kingdom Relations regarding the study design for the policy review of article 8 of chapter IV (Kingdom Relations) of the national budget (Parliamentary Paper 33 189, no. 12)

Questions relating to the period under study:

- **Why has it been decided to carry out this policy review now, with the period under study being just three years, 2017-2020?**
- **Is it likely that the findings will provide a realistic picture of the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure and the policy conducted, given that the study covers such a short period and the reconstruction activities on St Maarten (part II) will not be completed for another five years?**
- **Why not wait a short while before evaluating the reconstruction activities on Saba and St Eustatius, as they will be completed in 2021?**

The House was given an undertaking on the timing of the policy review in the Budget Act on chapter IV, Kingdom Relations and BES Fund, for 2019 (Parliamentary Paper 35 000 IV, no. 2).

Further to your questions and in the light of your remarks and a consideration of the pros and cons, I have decided to extend the study period for the policy review, with completion now set for 2022.

I took the following factors into account:
1. extending the study period will permit an investigation of whether and how reconstruction activities funded from other ministries' budgets can be included in the review;
2. extending the study period will also enable the reconstruction activities completed on Saba and St Eustatius to be included and a final evaluation to be carried out, so that an additional evaluation will not be needed.

As a result, the evaluation can also include another year of St Maarten's reconstruction. This is expected to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy review.

Questions relating to the external independent evaluator and the core team's support:

- **The external independent evaluator engaged for the study will be supported by the core team, consisting of staff from the reconstruction team at the Directorate-General for Kingdom Relations of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Have the arrangements been set out in a sort of protocol? What steps will be taken to prevent the core team finding itself in a position where it has to evaluate and review itself?**
- **What steps will be taken to prevent the core team's involvement and support from compromising the study's independence?**
- **Is there no other way of providing the World Bank's documents to the external consultancy than by sharing them informally with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, for instance by means of a confidentiality agreement?**
- **Why hasn't an independent evaluator been involved in the study from the outset as this was one of the quality requirements under the Order on Periodic Policy Evaluations?**

The policy review of the reconstruction of St Maarten is a midterm evaluation. It was therefore not thought necessary to have an independent evaluator carry it out. This is not required under the Order on Periodic Policy Evaluations (RPE). Policy reviews are often carried out by ministries themselves. From the outset, however, the need for an independent expert was recognised, in accordance with the RPE. During the development of the study design for the policy review, it was realised, partly due to comments by the monitoring group overseeing the policy review in

accordance with the RPE, that an independent evaluator would be essential in this case owing to the complex relationships between the parties. An independent evaluator was therefore added to the study design.

The external evaluator is responsible for studying the reconstruction activities on St Maarten in accordance with the requirements for independent and reliable evaluations. The core team has only a facilitating and supporting role. The external evaluator is also responsible for the policy review's final report, which will present the results of the consultancy's study of the emergency aid on all three islands and the reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius. The quality of the study will be monitored by both the monitoring committee and the independent expert.

In conjunction with the World Bank, we are currently examining the options. For the time being, we are proceeding on the basis of the study design.

Questions relating to the conditions attached to the aid provided to St Maarten:

- **Why aren't the conditions attached to the aid provided to St Maarten (strengthening of border control and establishment of an Integrity Chamber) included in the policy review?**
- **Why isn't the policy review being used to gain an understanding of the performance of St Maarten's Integrity Chamber and determine whether it is meeting the requirements set by the Netherlands?**
- **Why is the policy review not being used to evaluate border control on St Maarten?**

The establishment of the Integrity Chamber and the strengthening of border control were conditions for the provision of financial support for the reconstruction activities on St Maarten. The Integrity Chamber and border control are not reconstruction activities. As indicated in the study design, the strengthening of border control is included in the policy review because it falls under article 8. The establishment of the Integrity Chamber is not included because it falls under article 4 and is therefore outside the scope of the policy review.

Questions relating to evaluation questions 4 and 6:

- **Does the study of central government's responsibility relate to central government solely in the context of the Netherlands or in the context of the Kingdom?**
- **Will interviewing several key informants and studying government documents on the award of public funds provide sufficient insight into both public and private fund expenditure and costs in other areas and for other parties associated with the policy?**
- **It might not be possible to answer question 6 in full because it requires an understanding of local contributions to St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba from both private and public funds. As it is currently worded (What expenditure is associated with the policy, including costs in other areas or for other parties?), what does question 6 contribute to the study given that it might not be possible to answer it in full?**

The policy review will evaluate the policy of the central government of the Netherlands. The government of the Netherlands does not have the power to evaluate the public authorities of other countries. However, it can consider the role played by the government of St Maarten in the reconstruction activities, how the Netherlands handled this, and the lessons that can be learned. This is also set out in question 6.

During the study, interviews will be held with an appropriate and varied number of key informants. Various government documents will also be studied to gain the necessary insight. The policy review will be dependent, however, on the key informants' willingness to talk with the consultancy.

Regarding question 6, if the information is inadequate, the methodological report customary for

evaluations such as the present policy review will state so.

Questions relating to the midterm nature of the evaluation:

- **What form will the final evaluation take? More specifically, how will the final evaluation of part III (reconstruction of Saba and St Eustatius, which will be completed in a year's time) be designed?**
- **Has a possible design for a future final evaluation of the reconstruction of St Maarten by the World Bank already been proposed?**

The final evaluation of the reconstruction activities on St Maarten will take the form of an ex-post evaluation. Its primary goal will be to provide information on the ultimate results of the reconstruction aid on all the islands and thus on the results of the reconstruction policy.

The extension of the study period means the midterm evaluation of the reconstruction activities on Saba and St Eustatius will become a final evaluation.

A possible design for a future final evaluation of the reconstruction of St Maarten by the World Bank has not yet been proposed. The methodological design of the ex-post final evaluation will be prepared during the six months prior to the completion of the reconstruction activities financed from the Trust Fund (which ends on 31 December 2025). The design of the final evaluation of the reconstruction activities on all three islands will draw on the lessons learned from the current policy review. The final evaluation is expected to begin in 2026. The World Bank will also carry out a final evaluation of the reconstruction of St Maarten in accordance with its own standard method.

Questions relating to reconstruction activities funded from the budgets of other ministries:

- **Why doesn't this policy review include reconstruction activities funded from other ministries' budgets?**
- **How can a relevant and comprehensive policy review of the emergency aid and the reconstruction be carried out if it does not consider these activities or funds?**

It was decided in the Budget Act on chapter IV, Kingdom Relations and BES Fund, for 2019, to include the article 8 reconstruction activities in the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations budget. In the current study design, all emergency aid activities are covered by the policy review. However, any reconstruction activities funded from other ministries' budgets are currently being identified for inclusion in the policy review.

Question relating to evaluation question 8:

- **Will relevant evaluation reports issued by such organisations as the National Ombudsman's Office, the Court of Audit, the Red Cross, UNICEF and the Institute for Safety be included in the policy review? If not, why not?**

All relevant reports will be included in the policy review, including those issued by the aforementioned organisations.

ANNEX IV

Evaluation Matrix
with references

Policy Reviews of Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations

Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)

Part II Review: Reconstruction in Sint Maarten

Annex IV: Evaluation Matrix

General Questions:

EQ 1[1]: Which parts of policies of the Government of the Netherlands aiming at emergency aid, early recovery and reconstruction in the wake of 2017 hurricanes in the WindwardIslands (Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations) are covered by the present policy reviews?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the overall scope of Article 8 and the distinction between parts I / III and part II. The focus of this policy review is on part II. Policy measures outside Article 8 are also mentioned briefly, e.g., the Integrity Chamber and activities under recently adopted Covid-19 provisions.
References	Sections 3.1.-3.3., 8. **Section 9.1.**
EQ 2[2]: How are other relevant parts of policies mentioned in EQ 1 (parts I / III) addressed by policy reviews?	
References	The question is addressed in the separate policy review of Parts I / III.
EQ 3[3]: What motivated the policy of the Netherlands Government aiming at reconstruction in Sint Maarten under Article 8? Is this motivation still relevant at present?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on specific motivations expressed over time by the Netherlands (cabinet, parliament etc.) concerning responsibilities for the Netherlands arising from the Charter of the Kingdom
References	Sections 4.1-4.2., 5.1. – 5.3., 6.1.-6.3., 8 **Section 9.1.**
EQ 4[4]: Which have been the responsibilities of the Government of the Netherlands for reconstruction in Sint Maarten in the context of the Charter of the Kingdom?	
Coverage of the question	The question addresses the responsibilities of the Netherlands in the context of the Charter of the Kingdom and draws attention to the responsibilities of Sint Maarten arising from its autonomous status.
References	Sections 4.1.-4.2., 5.1-5.3., 6.1.-6.3 **Section 9.1.**
EQ 5[5]: How do the instruments that are part of the overall policies aiming at reconstruction in Sint Maarten under Article 8 relate to each other, notably direct support and the World Bank Trust Fund?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on implementation of reconstruction activities as part of Netherlands policies under Article 8 part II through direct support and through the Trust Fund of the World Bank and their inter-relationship.
References	Sections 5.1.-5.3., 6.4.-6.6, 7.1-7.3., 8 **Section 9.1.**

[1] Question 1 in Letter to Parliament of 21 September 2020
[2] Ibid question 2
[3] Ibid question 3
[4] Ibid question 4
[5] Ibid question 5

EQ 6[6]: What expenditure has been made for reconstruction in Sint Maarten under Article 8 and how does this relate to overall expenditure for reconstruction since 2017, including other funding mobilized in the Netherlands and in Sint Maarten from public and private sources?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on a) expenditure for reconstruction under Article 8 part II; b) funding mobilized by the Government of the Netherlands for reconstruction outside Article 8; c) funding mobilized for reconstruction by the Government of Sint Maarten; and d) funding for reconstruction mobilized by private funds in Sint Maarten; e) share of Article 8 funding for reconstruction within overall funding for reconstruction.
References	Sections 3.1., 5.1.-5.3., 6.1.-6.7., 7.1-7.3., 8. **Section 9.1.**
EQ 7[7]: To what extent has the reconstruction policy under Article 8 been (partly) evaluated in the past (including background and context and mention of specific evaluations)?	
Coverage of the Question	The question will focus on evaluations conducted in the past on reconstruction policy and activities under Article 8.
References	Sections 4.3.1. and 4.3.5.
EQ 8[8]: Which parts of the reconstruction policy under Article 8 have not been (partly) evaluated? What is the likelihood that all parts will be evaluated under the present policy review?	
Coverage of the Question	The question focuses on parts of direct support and Trust Fund activities that have not been evaluated and likelihood that all activities will be covered by under the present policy review.
References	Sections 4.3.1. and 4.3.5.
EQ 9[9]: To what extent is there enough documentary evidence to assess effectiveness and efficiency of the reconstruction policy under Article 8 in Sint Maarten?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the availability of documentary evidence and on scope and coverage of available documents to warrant evidence-based, credible and useful findings and conclusions concerning effectiveness and efficiency of the reconstruction policy under Article 8 in Sint Maarten.
References	Sections 4.3.1. and 4.3.5., 7.1.-7.3.

Effectiveness:

EQ 10[10]: How effective has the reconstruction policy under Article 8 of the Government of the Netherlands in Sint Maarten been in terms of outputs, outcomes and impact? Have there been positive or negative side-effects?	
Coverage of the Question	The question focuses on the realization of intended objectives of the Government of the Netherlands concerning reconstruction in Sint Maarten in terms of achieved outputs, outcomes and impact and also assess positive or negative side-effects.
References	Sections 6.5.-6.6, 7.1.-7-3 **Section 9.2.**
EQ 11[11]: To what extent have Dutch Guiding Principles aiming at "Building Back Better" been realized, not only in terms of improved physical infrastructure, but also with a view to enhance resilience of the country?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the objective expressed in the appendix to the Arrangement between the Netherlands and the World Bank of 16 April 2018 entitled "Guiding principles of the Government of the Netherlands regarding the execution of the Trust Fund for the recovery of Sint Maarten": "*The Dutch contribution will support the material and non-material reconstruction and recovery of St. Maarten wherever necessary, so as to restore vital infrastructure and sustainably boost the country's resilience to the effects of possible disasters, natural and otherwise.*"

[6] Ibid question 6
[7] Ibid question 8
[8] Ibid question 9
[9] Ibid question 10
[10] Ibid question 11
[11] Additional question by Ministry of BZK

References	Section 6.1.-6.6., 6.7.2. **Section 9.2.**

Efficiency

EQ 12[12]: How has expenditure for reconstruction under Article 8 been justified in terms of volume / use and prices / standard rates?	
Coverage of the Question	The question focuses on the justification of expenditure for reconstruction under Article 8 by referring to standards, decision-making and procedures on volume / use and prices / standard rates.
References	Section 6.7.1., 7.2.-7.3. **Section 9.3.**
EQ 13[13]: How efficient have policies of the Government of the Netherlands aiming at reconstruction in Sint Maarten been?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the relationship between effects (benefits) of the reconstruction policy and cost / expenditure mobilized to produce these effects. The assessment will only take into consideration cost made for reconstruction in Sint Maarten and effects (benefits) intended under Article 8.
References	Section 6.7., 7.2.-7.3. **Section 9.3.**
EQ 14[14]: Which policy options exist in case there were significantly more or fewer means available (20 % savings or a 20 % increase)?	
Coverage of the question	The question will focus on the hypothetical case that the earmarked budgets for reconstruction in Sint Maarten under Article 8 had been 20 % less or 20 % more.
References	**Section 10.1.**
EQ 15[15]: Which were respective responsibilities of the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank, how were they agreed upon and which were underlying motivations and assumptions?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the terms of the Arrangement between the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank, underlying motivations and assumptions and the negotiation process.
References	Sections 6.1.-6.3. **Section 9.1.**
EQ 16[16]: How have agreements between the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank been respected and translated into practice? Have there been digressions and, if so, why?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Netherlands and the World Bank and adherence in practice to its terms and procedures as well as possible digressions, with an explanation of the reasons for adherence or digressions (positive or negative factors)
References	Sections 6.1.-6.7, 8.1. **Section 9.1.**

[12] Ibid question 7
[13] Ibid question 13
[14] Ibid question 15
[15] Ibid question II e)
[16] Ibid question II f)

Looking forward

EQ 17[17]: Does the Trust Fund arrangement with the World Bank make it possible (both in theory and in practice) that means are applied appropriately (and in a timely manner) for the right projects and programmes (effectiveness and efficiency)?	
Coverage of the question	Based on assessments made under questions 12 d), 15 and 16, the question will focus on the prospect of the Trust Fund to demonstrate adequate effectiveness and efficiency, i.e., achievement of its objectives in a timely and cost-efficient manner by the end date (31 December 2025).
References	Sections 6.1.-6.7. **Sections 9.1.-9.3., 10.1.**
EQ no. 18[18]: Which measures can be taken to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of reconstruction policies in Sint Maarten?	
Coverage of the question	The question focuses on the ability of the Governments of the Netherlands and Sint Maarten in the medium and long term (including beyond the existence of the Trust Fund) to accomplish reconstruction in Sint Maarten, including enhancing resilience of the country, economic recovery, good governance and crisis and disaster management. Recommendations will be formulated.
References	Sections 6.1.-6.7. **Sections 10.1.-10.2.**

[17] Ibid question II h)
[18] Ibid question 14

ANNEX V
Interview Guide

Interview Guide

Netherlands Policy Review on the Emergency Aid, Early Recovery and Reconstruction of Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba.

1) Background

The Government of the Netherlands has commissioned a policy review of article 8, '*Emergency Aid, Early Recovery and Reconstruction of Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba of the Budget for Kingdom Relations'*. The review aims to gain insight into the efficiency and effectiveness of the policies implemented between September 17, 2017 and December 31, 2021. Two independent reviewers have been selected to conduct the policy review – consultancy company Ecorys and independent consultant Lucien Back. Three consultants make up the Ecorys team: Michel Briene, Elvira Meurs and Simone Snoeijenbos.

2) Interview objective

The interviews are an important part of the overall policy review. They are intended to help the evaluators further interpret the results obtained through desk research and contextualize them. They will also help the team identify lessons learned on policy design for emergency aid, early recovery and reconstruction efforts after a disaster. Conducting interviews with involved parties on Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius is an integral part of the policy review, and we are grateful for your interest in participating.

3) Confidentiality and anonymity

Everything discussed in the interview is strictly confidential and will only be used for the policy review. The evaluators will not quote interviewees, nor will they attribute findings to specific individuals in the report. Any information shared during the interview will therefore be anonymized. Notes taken during the discussion will be used for internal purposes only and not shared with persons outside of the evaluation team.

4) Interview questions

The following interview questions are based on the policy review topics and are meant to provide a structure for the interview. The evaluating team is aware that the depth of the discussion will depend on the level of involvement of the interviewee.

General

1) What has been your involvement in the emergency aid, recovery and reconstruction activities carried out on the island(s)? What capacity were you involved in?

Policy rationale

2) What has been the responsibility of the Government of the Netherlands with regards to the provision of emergency aid, early recovery and reconstruction to Sint Maarten / Saba / Sint Eustatius?
3) Which specific instruments were / have been deployed to address the need for aid, recovery and reconstruction? Can you comment on the coherence between these instruments?
4) To what extent did the instruments deployed differ between the islands?

5) How were budgetary allocations to the different instruments determined? To what extent were other sources of funding taken into account (NGO's, insurances, transfers from the diaspora etc.)?
6) To what extent were the island(s) involved in defining the instruments and projects used for emergency aid, early recovery and reconstruction? What did this involvement look like in practice?

Governance emergency aid / early recovery

7) Did the crisis structure that was put into place enable efficient delivery of emergency aid and direct support?
8) Did this crisis structure that was put into place ensure a timely allocation of resources to the appropriate projects and programs? (*effectiveness and efficiency*)

Governance reconstruction

9) *(Related to the reconstruction of Sint Maarten)* What arrangements were made regarding the division of responsibilities around the Trust Fund and the World Bank's commitment to it? What were the underlying reasons for these choices?
10) *(Related to the reconstruction of Sint Maarten)* To what extent have the agreements made on the division of responsibilities been respected in practice? Are these agreements actionable? At what points are the agreements deviated from and why?
11) *(Related to reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius)* How has the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations fulfilled the directing role in the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius? Has this directing role contributed to the materialization of the government-wide objectives?

Effectiveness and efficiency of implemented policies and projects

12) To what extent have the aid, recovery and reconstruction goals been achieved?
13) Did the projects implemented in the early recovery phase contribute to setting up the right conditions for reconstruction?
14) *(Related to the reconstruction of Sint Maarten)* Did this structure allow for the Dutch Guiding Principles to be followed? Did this occur in practice?
15) Were any particular measures taken to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency response/early recovery and reconstruction? Can you think of any potential actions that could still be taken to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of reconstruction?

Lessons learned and recommendations

16) What lessons can be taken on board for future policy responses to hurricane-related crises?
17) What are the key lessons learned regarding the implementation of reconstruction activities, particularly those under article 8?
18) Looking forward, does the current implementation approach for reconstruction warrant any changes? What would these be?

Policy options in the case of fewer or more available resources

19) What activities and results would have been possible in the case of significantly more resources (e.g. a 20% increase in the budget)?
20) What activities and results would have been possible in the case of significantly fewer resources (e.g. a 20% decrease in the budget)?

ANNEX VI
Persons Met

Policy Reviews of Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations
Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)
Part II Review: Reconstruction in Sint Maarten
Annex VI: Persons met[1]

Organisational perspective[2]	**Persons met**	**Observations**
Evaluation Management		
Ministry of BZK	Bekker, Wim	Evaluation Manager
	Vonk, Patrick	Evaluation Manager
External Independent Adviser	Kliest, Ted	
Chair Evaluation Support Group	Ijzermans, Sjef	
Evaluation Support Group		
	Ijzermans, Sjef	Chairperson
	Bekker, Wim	Ministry of BZK, secretary
	Bijenvoort, Bas	Ministry of Defence
	Clerq, Sophie de	Ministry of Finance
	Doorn. Marloes van	Ministry of Finance
	Jeurissen, Judith	Ministry of BZK
	Kruizinga, Marjon	Ministry of Justice and Security
	Namen, Irina van	Ministry of Justice and Security
	Reeder, Ron	Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
	Rixt, Wilbers	Ministry of Finance
	Sliedrecht, Marius	Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management
	Steenbakkers, Willy	Ministry of Justice and Security
	Kuiper, Hanjo de	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Vonk, Patrick	Ministry of BZK, secretary
Evaluation Team Parts I and III		
Team leader	Briene, Michel	Ecorys
Team Member	Meurs, Elvira	Ecorys
Team Member	Snoeijenbos, Simone	Ecorys

[1] Interviews were combined for Parts I / III and II both in the Netherlands and in Sint Maarten.
[2] Persons met are listed according to their perspective on emergency assistance and reconstruction based on their involvement in the process. They may currently work in other organisations.

Government of the Netherlands		
Netherlands Representative in the Steering Committee	Weekers, Frans	
(Netherlands) Ministry of BZK	Arkenbout, Erwin	
	Bekker, Wim	
	Bonnet, Dirk Jan	
	Borkulo, Erik van	
	Brons, Henk	
	Burlet, Yor	
	Coppelman-De Vries, Mirte	
	Dagelet, Stella	
	Flens, Annecarijn	
	Goozen, Mijke van	
	Johnson, Chris	
	Joosen-Parie, Lenneke	
	Hoeve, Merel van	
	Horn van der Plante, Sarah	
	Knops, Joris	
	Kouwenhoven, Sanne	
	Kuperus, Carlein	
	Leijten, Hans	
	Meulen, Sjoerd van	
	Muller, Wilfried	
	Pluijmakers, Cecile	
	Reuver, Saskia de	
	Schulting, Gerard	
	Stelt, Hans van der	
	Tabatabaie, Reza	
	Wetten, Sjoerd van	
	Wilde, Robert Jan de	
	Wiele, Wendele van der	
	Wijsman, Celine	

(Netherlands) Ministry of Defence	Beijnvoort, Bas	
	Nasser, Garrick	
	Trip, Hans	
	Wagemaker, Roos	
(Netherlands) Ministry of Finance	Slippens, Thijs	
(Netherlands) Ministry of Justice and Security	Brand, Wouter	
	Gerritse, Koen	
	Oudelenferink, Rosie	
	Steenbakkers, Willy	
(Netherlands) Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management	Sliedrecht, Marius	
	Tjalma, Anneke	
(Netherlands) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Schutink, Gerard	
(Netherlands) Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science	Lantinga, Pim	
	Rijke, Mirja de	
Government of Sint Maarten		
Sint Maarten Representative in the Steering Committee	Gumbs, Marcel	
(Sint Maarten) Prime Minister's Office	Cornelia, Nerissa	Legal Policy Adviser Cabinet of the Prime Minister
(Sint Maarten) Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport	Powell Richardson, Shermina	Acting Secretary General
	Boirard, Oralie	
	Mussington-Service, Olga	
(Sint Maarten) Ministry of Public Health, Social Development and Labour	Arnell, Fenna	
	George-Groeneveldt, Chantale	
Former Sint Maarten Minister of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment, and Infrastructure	Giterson, Miklos	
Trust Fund Implementing Partners		
National Recovery Program Bureau (NRPB)[3]	Connor, Claret	Director NRPB
	Knottnerus, Abel	Deputy Director NRPB

[3] NRPB Management was present in most project related meetings.

	Lake, Olivia	Program Manager
	Laurensse, Thijn	Program Manager
NRPB – Emergency Recovery Project I (ERP-I)	Sijssens, Paul	Project Manager
NRPB – Emergency Income Support and Training Project	Arnell, Joy	
	Bain, Alice	Project Manager
	Schoe, Francetta	Focal Point Ministry of Public Health, Social Development and Labor (VSA)
NRPB- Emergency Debris Management Project + Additional Funding for the Emergency Debris Project + Long Term Waste Management	Thompson, Rueben	Head Safeguards Team
NRPB - Airport Terminal Reconstruction Project	Breel, Mirto	Project Director
	Schmidt, Damien	Project Coordinator
NRPB – Enterprise Support Project	Dijkhoffz, Anisa	Project Manager
	Ochu, Elozona	Adviser
	Elwin Groeneveld	Qredits
	Dumbs, Edsel	Qredits Sint Maarten
NRPB - Sint Maarten Digital Government Transformation Project	Badejo, Femi	(Netherlands) Ministry of General Affairs
	Connor-Thomas, Emilia	
	Roberts, Chris	Project Manager
NRPB - Fostering Resilient Learning Project	Lake, Olivia	Program Manager
	Laurensse, Thijn	Program Manager
	Halley, M.	Stichting Katholiek Onderwijs
	Frederiks, Tanja	Stichting Katholiek Onderwijs
Sint Maarten General Hospital - Hospital Resiliency and Preparedness	Holiday, Felix	Felix Holiday, Medical Director
	Dekker, Bonny Horst, Ineke van der Verwoerdt, Ingeborg	Management Team
	Franca, Keith	
Red Cross Netherlands - Red Cross Roof Repair Project	Jonkers, Carla	
UNICEF-NL - Child Resilience and Protection Project	Moses-Burton, Suzette	Coordinator Sint Maarten
	Roefsema, Marieke	

VNG-I / R4CR - Civil Society Partnership Facility for Resilience Project	Hunink, Rolf	Coordinator R4CR
	Sommers, Jose	R4CR / NPOwer Project under Foresee Foundation
	Vermeer, Elger	VNG-I
World Bank		
	Davidse, Koen	Executive Director
	Heemskerk, Frans	Former Executive Director
	Keane, Michelle	Program Manager for the Sint Maarten Recovery, Reconstruction and Resilience Trust Fund
	Wissenburg, Jochem Martin	Assistant to the Executive Director
Emergency Assistance / Early Recovery / Direct Support Implementing Partners		
White-Yellow Cross	Boetekees, Bregje	Operations Manager
Red Cross Early Recovery Projects (Waste Disposal, From Waste to Work, School Meals)	Jonkers, Carla	
	Swarte, Fanny de	
	Wilmers, Yvonne	
UNDP (Housing Project)	Blewitt, Richard	Former Resident Coordinator Port-of-Spain
SMDF (Elderly Project and Community Helpdesk Hope Estate)	Brooks Makhicia	Director
	Franca, Keith	Former Director
UNICEF-NL Child Support Projects	Moses-Burton, Suzette	Coordinator Sint Maarten
	Roefsema, Marieke	
NOC*NSF	Metz, Sjors	
Border control	Falize, D.J.	Head Operations Koninklijke Marechaussee
Public law and order	Kievitsbosch, Rob	Adviser Detention Center Point Blanche
	Mol, Miriam	Public Prosecutor Sint Maarten
Schiphol Group Nederland	Kloosterziel, Kjell	
Fire Brigade	Martens, Paul,	
	Richardson, Clive	
	Pauletta, Silvanico	

VNG-I assistance to the (Sint Maarten) Ministry of VROMI	Vermeer, Elger	
Other organisations		
Integrity Chamber	Fuchs, Gabi	
	Pompier, Charna	
K1 Britannia	Schet, Alan	